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ABSTRACT 
 
We seem to experience a world abounding with events that exhibit dynamic temporal structure; 
birds flying, children laughing, rain dripping from an eave, melodies unfolding, etc. Seeing objects 
in motion, hearing and communicating with sound, and feeling oneself move are such common 
everyday experiences that one is unlikely to question whether humans are capable of perceiving 
temporal properties and relations. Despite appearing pre-theoretically uncontroversial, there are 
longstanding and contentious debates concerning the structure of such experience, how temporal 
perception works, and even whether the perception of change, motion, and succession is possible. 
The overarching goal of my project is to develop a comprehensive model of temporal perception 
that does justice to the apparent phenomenology, explains how perception functions to represent 
temporally structured targets, and generates empirically-informed hypotheses for how such 
perception is neuro-cognitively realized. I also defend my model against the challenges of anti-
realist competitors whom deny the possibility of perceiving temporal relations between non-
simultaneous events (e.g., Reid, Chuard, Le Poidevin). 
In Chapter 1, I begin with the apparent phenomenology of temporal experience, identifying 
and lending some plausibility to three claims about the nature and content of temporal experience: 
i) humans perceive dynamic events that instantiate temporal properties and stand in temporal 
relations (e.g., change, succession, duration, order), ii) humans perceive events as present, and iii) 
successive events of brief duration can be experienced together as present within some finite 
interval.  This approach enables me to outline what models of present experience are supposed to 
represent and explain. I proceed to sketch one family of models that posit an extended perceptual 
present to explain how non-simultaneous events can be experienced together as present, called 
“Extensionalist Models” (e.g., James, Broad, Russell, Dainton). I examine two distinct branches 
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of extensionalism (Process vs. Content) and proprietary hypotheses linking those models to the 
real systems they are intended to explain, and challenge the tenability of process extensionalism. 
Throughout the dissertation, I advocate for Content Extensionalism, the model that holds we 
perceive the temporal relations between non-simultaneous events in virtue of targeting and 
representing temporally extended content. I develop the model by pairing it with a theory of mental 
representation that distinguishes representation from indication, and explains how representations 
are source-independent isomorphs of their intended targets. In doing so, I demonstrate its 
comparative advantages over other extensionalist models, provide a straightforward account of 
claims (i-iii), and equip the model with the resources to defeat an argument that offers two routes 
to denying the third and most contentious claim—that successive events occurring within a brief 
interval are experienced together as present. I conclude the chapter by taking a closer look at the 
“Intentionalist Models” largely based on Edmund Husserl’s seminal work on time consciousness, 
rehearse some common objections against it, and argue that content extensionalism is a preferable 
model. 
In Chapter 2, I turn my attention to motion perception, arguing that perceptual representations 
of constant motion are not reducible to mere successions of static perceptions representing what 
happens at a given time. My position directly opposes temporal atomists (e.g., Chuard, Le 
Poidevin), whom deny that we perceive motion, claiming that we only perceive what happens at a 
given time and that putative experiences of motion reduce to a series of static perceptual 
“snapshots” arranged successively. In the first half of the chapter, I examine and challenge some 
the motivations for atomism, including its connection to the empiricism of Locke and Reid, and 
its mereological conception of experience, such that purported experiences of motion supervene 
on and are reducible to the successive atomic perceptions of which they are composed. In the 
iv 
 
second half of chapter, I argue that both the apparent phenomenology and neurocognitive research 
shift the burden upon atomism to provide a compelling an error theory to explain away our putative 
perceptions as of constant motion and make their anti-realism about extended experiences 
palatable. I proceed to reconstruct and criticize their standard strategy of appealing to cinematic 
metaphors to motivate their view that motion perception is entirely reducible to series of static 
perceptions presented successively. Finally, I draw analogies between Zeno’s puzzle of motion 
and the temporal perception debate, and argue that the atomist explanation of motion experience 
is analogous to Zeno’s failed solution to the original puzzle and that content extensionalism 
provides a preferred explanation consonant with the Russell-Salmon solution.  
In Chapter 3, I continue to combat skepticism about the perception of temporal properties and 
relations. Le Poidevin (2007) proposes an epistemological puzzle of time perception, from which 
he derives the claim that the order and duration of events do not causally contribute to our 
perceptual beliefs about them. Since his view is motivated by a causal truthmaker principle for 
grounding knowledge, it also holds that perceptual beliefs about temporal features must be caused 
by the features themselves in order to count as knowledge. Given these theoretical commitments, 
there is a puzzle concerning how such perceptual beliefs could constitute knowledge of temporal 
properties. In response to Le Poidevin, I argue for an account according to which order and 
duration are objects of perception, causally contribute to our perceptual beliefs about them, and 
such beliefs are capable of counting as knowledge. I conclude by showing that, on my alternative 
account, the epistemological puzzle dissolves and his own solution to it fails. 
In Chapter 4, I specify a target range of temporal phenomena salient to understanding 
perceptual cognition, and motivate the multi-scale sampling (MSS) hypothesis that sensory 
subsystems sample information at multiple rates, i.e. shorter and longer sampling periods. I argue 
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that both behavioral and neurophysiological data support the hypothesis that nervous systems 
process temporal information by sampling stimuli signals at shorter and longer durations, favoring 
the content extensionalist hypothesis that temporal perception is constituted by multi-scale 
sampling and integration, over a single-sampling rate hypothesis implied by the atomistic 
“snapshot” model.  
In the second half of Chapter 4, I defend a form of constructive realism—the view that 
scientific theories are best understood as (a) families of models and (b) hypotheses that specify the 
respects and degrees in which a model represents some real physical system. I conclude the 
dissertation with a section on philosophy of science, because I engage empirical work throughout 
the project and employ a model-based approach to theorizing. Furthermore, I suggest that 
philosophical analysis of the experimental findings may generate new hypotheses and predictions, 
or offer critical arguments to help rule out the plausibility of particular competing models. To 
illustrate this interdisciplinary upshot, I briefly make a case for possible philosophical 
contributions to the fertile domain of temporal processing where there remain many contenders 
and no consensus on the exact mechanisms that realize temporal perception. 
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1. MODELING PRESENT EXPERIENCE 
1.1. Present Experience of Dynamic Events 
Imagine the following events during a thunderstorm: the wind violently blows tree branches 
causing them to bend and shake, rain patters a steady rhythm against the windowpane, a lightning 
strike flashes across the dark sky and a crackling peal of thunder follows seconds later, a dog howls 
and other neighborhood dogs join in the canine chorus. That a human is able to make observations 
about events occurring during a storm, in part, on the basis of sensory perception is a banal fact of 
experience. Instead of being overwhelmed by the flood of manifold information, I am able to select 
and attend to certain features of my experience as salient and allow others to recede into the 
phenomenal background. Accordingly, I am able to distinguish, to greater or lesser degrees, the 
different sources of the complex stimuli from one another, e.g., that the steady pattering originates 
from the rain hitting the glass pane and the sustained howling issues forth from reverberations in 
the throat of another creature.  
Disagreement over how one's knowledge of the world is constrained by perceptual and 
conceptual resources, is a perennial problem in epistemology and philosophy of mental 
representation. How can I observe the visual stimulus as lightning, or the auditory stimuli as rain 
pattering, as thunder, and as canine howling? I must possess concepts (viz., lightning, rain, 
thunder, canidae) or other representational resources for doing so, or so the standard story goes. 
The manner in which we acquire these resources varies greatly according to one's preferred theory: 
empiricists contend that all ideas derive from sensory impressions, association, and reflection, 
rationalists propose nativism about primitive concepts, and transcendental idealists posit a priori 
first principles of cognition which ground the possibility of all experience.  
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In the B-edition of the “Transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of understanding,” Kant 
clearly saw the trilemma (B167-169), “…either the experience makes the concepts possible or 
these concepts make experience possible….[or the categories] were rather subjective 
predispositions for thinking implanted in us along with our existence by our author in such a way 
that their use would agree exactly with the laws of nature along which experience runs…” (2006: 
264-265). Of course, Kant thinks both the empiricist horn and rationalist nativism are doomed to 
failure, and argues that the pure categories are necessary a priori, which ground the possibility for 
acquiring empirical concepts and thereby representing the world. I largely agree, but what follows 
does not rest on nor presuppose my general agreement with a Kantian inspired representational 
pluralism, so I will not rehearse his arguments here. Rather, I want to flag that despite drastic 
differences about the roles and origins of perceptual and conceptual resources, the observations 
with which I begin do not beg any questions, since everyone can provisionally agree that we 
undergo temporal experiences and we are able to make such discriminations and observations. My 
purpose in this initial chapter is to illuminate a particular set of phenomena that lead to diverging 
models of present experience, and debate the merits of those divergent models. 
The manifest world in which we find ourselves is replete with events that exhibit dynamic 
temporal structure; movement, change, succession, duration, and order are temporal features of 
our environment. Not only is the world dynamically structured, but we experience it as such. This 
much I take to be relatively uncontroversial.1 Furthermore, humans experience as present things 
                                                 
1 Not to say that there are no dissenters. Classically, defenders of Parmenidean monism, like Zeno of Elea, deny that 
the world is dynamic, as a metaphysical solution to the well-worn paradoxes of change and motion. But, even Zeno 
recognized that we surely seem to see things moving and changing, but he seeks to explain away the phenomena and 
argues that the seeming dynamism is unreal. In chapter 2, I discuss Zeno's infamous paradox of the arrow to 
highlight the mistake involved in denying dynamic properties, and to illustrate some differences in basic models of 
succession. More recently, 4-dimensionalists claim that the world is a static block and thus not dynamically 
structured, any purported dynamic properties are reducible to relations obtain between property instantiations at 
places and times. For instance, Laurie Paul (2011) argues that experiences as of dynamic events like motion are 
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moving, changing, and succeeding one another over finite duration—the dynamic events seem to 
occur as and when we perceive them. When I see the lightning strike, for example, I perceive the 
flash of light as present and, after a brief interval, I likewise hear the peal of thunder as present. 
Even with prior knowledge that the sound event is produced by an electrical discharge and that 
sound waves travel more slowly than light waves, I do not perceive the thunder as past.2 In fact, 
given that sensory information travels at finite speeds and that it takes time for our sensory and 
cognitive systems to process the inputs, I have little reason to believe that the event I perceive as 
present is ever strictly simultaneous with my perception of it—there will always be some cognitive 
latency between stimulus and experience.3  Setting the issue of cognitive latency aside, the research 
question for this chapter becomes: what does experiencing events as present consist in? What is 
the structure of such experience?  
As a starting point, in (§1.2), I identify and lend some plausibility to three substantive claims 
about the nature and content of temporal experience, which generalize from phenomenological 
data describing experiences as of present dynamic events. This approach allows us to see what 
models of present experience are supposed to represent and explain. In (§1.3), I provide a sketch 
of one family of models that posit an extended perceptual present to explain how non-simultaneous 
events can be experienced together as present, sometimes called “Extensionalist Models,” by 
                                                 
illusory, which bears striking similarities to Zeno's diagnosis, despite being motivated by reductionism instead of 
monism.  
2 Cf. Le Poidevin (2007: 78) and Mellor (1998: 16) make the same point that perceiving some event is to perceive it 
as present, even if we believe that the stimulus event is in the near past (or, if you believe the present is a 
metaphysical fiction).   
3 Relativity theory also provides reasons to doubt that there is anything like an absolute objective present; instead 
there are simply causal relations that obtain between events in the same inertial frame of reference. Dainton (2001), 
Lockwood (2005), and Maudlin (2007) give accessible and thorough treatments of both the physics of spacetime and 
metaphysical implications thereof. These issues are beyond the scope of this chapter, which pertains exclusively to 
ordinary experiences of present temporally-structured stimuli and models of such experience. From this I am not 
drawing any metaphysical conclusions about the nature of physical spacetime, since I think ordinary experience, on 
its own, is generally an unreliable guide to the fundamental features of physical spacetime.    
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examining two distinct branches (Process vs. Content) and the proprietary hypotheses linking those 
models to the real systems they are intended to explain. In the course of doing so, I offer a prima 
facie argument to favor Content over Process Extensionalist Models. 
I proceed, in (§1.4), to consider an argument that offers two routes to denying the third and 
most contentious claim—that successive events occurring within a brief interval are experienced 
together as present—and thereby purports to undermine Extensionalist Models committed to that 
claim. In (§1.5), I rebut the argument, by pairing Content Extensionalism with a theory of mental 
representation that distinguishes representation from indication, and explains how representations 
are source-independent isomorphs of their intended targets.4 My proposal provides a 
straightforward account of the phenomenological claims set forth in (§1.2) and disarms the 
argument against extensionalism. In doing so, I also uncover implicit assumptions of the 
competing models. This requires taking a closer look, in (§1.6), at the Husserlian “Intentionalist 
Models” that explain perception of dynamic events by positing that content is modified by tensed 
modes of orientation. I put pressure on the tenability of intentionalist models and identify features 
that should be selectively gleaned from them.    
 
1.2. Phenomenological Claims concerning Present Experience 
The first phenomenological claim gives a particular answer to the question, “what class of 
targets is it possible for a system of temporal perception to have?”5 By ‘target’ I mean ‘that which 
perception is directed at,’ i.e. the intentional content of a representation. The class of targets a 
system of temporal perception can have are those for which it has the resources to represent. Not 
                                                 
4 Cf. Cummins & Poirier 2004, Cummins et al. 2008, Cummins & Roth 2010 
5 Answers to this sort of question is what Haugeland (1991, 1998) calls, objectivity of representation which is 
integrally connected to the intentionality, i.e. how those targets are fixed by the system. See, Clapin (2002: 119-166) 
for an insightful exchange primarily between Cummins and Haugeland. 
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only do we seem to experience temporally structured events (e.g., birds flying, thunder pealing, 
oneself riding a bicycle), but, if we think such events exist, then such widespread phenomenal 
seeming provides a strong presumption in favor of the claim that such events are the targets of 
temporal perception. Events are the objects that such perception is of or about. In absence of 
compelling reasons to override this presumption6, we should provisionally accept that: 
 
 (i) Systems of temporal perception target dynamic events which instantiate temporal 
properties and stand in temporal relations.  
 
In other words, a system of temporal perception has temporally structured events as its intended 
targets. Birds flying, lightning flashing, melodies unfolding, oneself peddling a bike, etc. are events 
that instantiate temporal properties and parts of which stand in temporal relations, and in virtue of 
temporal perception we experience such events as having such properties and relations. Since 
humans seem to undergo experiences of such dynamic events; we cognize, to borrow a phrase 
from Kant, appearances of that which is changeable elapsing in time. 7 It follows, that the human 
cognitive system as a whole somehow has the capacity to detect or experience time – whether in 
virtue of devoted subsystems or as a consequence of the operation of multiple subsystems or a 
consequence of the working of the cognitive system as a whole. If so, then dynamic events are the 
class of possible targets for human temporal experience—what such experience is about. These 
targets are normative for the epistemic accuracy on particular occasions of temporal perception. 
That is, token perceptions are accurate to the degree to which they represent the temporal structure 
of their intended dynamic targets.  
                                                 
6 In a later chapter, I respond to skepticism about temporal perception, but I will table such worries at present.  
7 In his discussion of pure schema of substance, Kant (A144/B183) says, “Time itself does not elapse, but the 
existence of that which is changeable elapses in it.” (2006: 275) 
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There may be considerable disagreement about how humans so perceive, and about the details 
of the experienced temporal structure. Such disagreement notwithstanding, denying (i) eliminates 
any initial common ground upon which to debate the merits of the various proposals meant to do 
justice to the phenomena. Notice, however, that even if someone denies the reality of dynamic 
events, say, because they are committed to the universe being a static four-dimensional block 
constituted entirely of static time-slices, she will still admit that the contents of temporal 
experience are seeming dynamic events (i.e., we have experiences as of movement and change)—
and offer an error theory for why humans mentally represent dynamic events despite the targets 
being static time-slices of objects instantiating different properties at different times.8 Even on 
such a revisionary metaphysical picture, (i) need only be modified by exchanging ‘dynamic’ for 
‘series of static’ targets. So, for now, we should simply let (i) stand, as is, and let the disagreement 
between static and dynamic targets play out when I later explicate the models compatible with 
each. 
Moving on, another familiar feature of our ordinary perceptual experiences is that when we 
undergo them, the objects of experience seem immanently present. Experiences I am currently 
undergoing are phenomenally distinct from events represented by more remote experiences I have 
had or will have. I submit that we experience some events as present; the experiences I am having 
now seem to be present as and when I am undergoing them. There seems to be a continuous 
sequences of events I experience as present, each of which are present, in turn. When I hear a dog 
barking I experience the barking as present, when I feel a bee stinging I experience the stinging 
sensation as present, when I see a leaf falling I watch its floating descent as present, and so on. 
Each of these present experiences is phenomenally distinguishable from related memories of past 
                                                 
8 Recently, Laurie Paul (2011) makes exactly this move; for a similar strategy, compare Philip Chuard (2011). 
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dog barks, bee stings, and leaf falls, since in memory none of the events are represented as present. 
These observations generalize to a second claim about temporal experience:  
 
(ii) Humans perceive events as present. 
 
To put it in a slightly different way, undergoing experiences of dynamic events occurs within the 
“conscious Now” of the perceiver.9 For instance, when I am perceiving the lightning flash, the 
bright flash is experienced as present to me—as happening now—in contrast to the phenomenal 
quality of the event having occurred at some earlier time, when I later remember the lightning 
flash. This suggests that there is something that it is like to experience an event as it occurs, and 
conscious “nowness” distinguishes the objects of present experiences from remembrances of 
events past and imaginings of future events to come. When I bite into an apple, I taste the sweetness 
and feel the crisp texture on my pallet at that time; there is a nowness to my experiencing the 
phenomenal properties of sweetness and crispness.10  
Some might confuse this notion of nowness as a substantive metaphysical property of events 
in the world. One might immediately balk at positing some secondary quality of phenomenal 
properties, or ascribing some irreducible monadic property of nowness to events themselves.11 
Perhaps, rightly so, since it seems to imply both that experiences have phenomenal properties and 
                                                 
9 The phrase ‘conscious Now’ is used by psychologist Eva Ruhnau to indicate the interval of present perception; she 
argues that the conscious Now is “of the duration of approximately 3 seconds” (1995: 168). Here I am using her 
phrase merely to identify the present perspective, without making any claims about the duration of the Now. 
10 If you are a friend of qualia, then you can think of this experience as having a sweetness-now quale and a 
crispness-now quale. I prefer to avoid such commitments, and “Quine” qualia (see Dennett 1988).  
11 Paul (2011: 335) attributes this view to the so-called “antireductionist” tense realists, whom hold that tense is an 
intrinsic feature of the world and use our experience as of nowness to infer that events have such a property (cf. 
Hare 2010). I have no interest in making such an argument for tense realism, which is why I take (ii) to be a 
phenomenological claim about our temporal orientation to events as and when we experience them, but is 
ontologically noncommittal. It may turn out, however, that some form of perspectival realism is unavoidable.  
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that the instantiation of those properties (while someone is undergoing an experience) has a further 
quality in virtue of presently occurring. I suggest that this balking is a bit premature. 
To be charitable, I think (ii) can be given a reasonable gloss, without buying too many 
commitments about a particular metaphysics of mind. When I am listening to a recording of 
Charlie Parker riffing bebop on the saxophone, for example, there is a real sense in which I hear 
his meandering chromatic progression occurring now, as and when I listen to the record play. I do 
not confuse the nowness of my experience for a property of the recorded performance itself (I 
realize the original event took place in the 1940s); rather, my listening to the recording is taking 
place now and the auditory stimuli produced by the stereo speakers are causally influencing my 
present experience of the musical sound event.12 This description of my experience does not 
commit me to some irreducible nowness in the world, rather it just recognizes that one undergoes 
experiences within a present frame of temporal reference.  
On this demystification, (ii) only implies that some contents of perception are perspectival and 
sensitive to the context of occurrence. This should come as no surprise at all. Most parties can 
accept this minimal claim of phenomenal presence whether one thinks that phenomenal properties 
are intrinsic nonintentional features of experiences (i.e. qualia13) or, extrinsic intended features of 
targets represented in experience (i.e. representational content14). Alternatively, one can posit that 
phenomenal properties are impure representational properties, which an experience instantiates 
in virtue of representing an intentional content in a certain manner.15 Likewise, metaphysicians of 
                                                 
12 Elsewhere in Ch. 3, (Bowen 2013), I endorse a view that sounds are events in space-time. On the sound as event 
view, playing a recording produces a new sound event, an ancestor of the original recorded performance. It is this 
ancestor which causes the present experience.  
13 See Horgan and Tienson (2002), McGinn (1988), Siewart (1998), Chalmers (2004). 
14 See, e.g., Harman (1990), Tye (1995, 2000, 2003, 2013), Carruthers (2000), Dretske (1995), Lycan (1996). 
15 Julian Kiverstein (2010: 158) explicitly endorses this route, and he attributes the terminological distinction 
between ‘impure’ and ‘pure’ representational properties (i.e. those with intentional content) to Chalmers (2004) and 
also defended by Crane (2009). 
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various stripes can and do admit that we have experiences as of present events, whether or not one 
holds that tense is an irreducible property of events. So, the phenomenal presence of experience 
asserted by (ii) should also be endorsed, at least, on the ontologically innocent reading I suggest.  
A third claim about temporal experience can be illustrated by the thunderstorm example: 
although a peal of thunder has a relatively brief duration, I seem to hear the sound event in a single 
present unified experience while also discerning both that the event has a very brief duration and 
that the sound has earlier and later parts (say, a sharp crack followed by a rolling boom). This 
phenomenological datum generalizes to: 
 
(iii) Successive events of brief duration can be experienced together as present within some 
finite interval.  
 
Michael Lockwood characterizes a somewhat stronger version of this third claim as follows: 
It seems to be a brute fact about experience that events which are contained within a 
sufficiently small interval can be experienced as a group, encompassed within a single 
phenomenal perspective, without thereby being experienced as simultaneous. (Lockwood 
1989: 263)       
 
Lockwood is asserting that relatively rapid non-simultaneous events are experienced together as 
phenomenally present, over some brief duration. He is also claiming that this is a brute fact, not 
further analyzable in other terms, on which (iii) is agnostic. The basic idea is that the conscious 
first-person perspective spans a ‘sufficiently small interval,’ in which sequences of brief events 
can be experienced as and when they seem to occur. Combining (ii) and (iii) entails that some 
events are experienced together as phenomenally present, and the scope of one's present 
perspective can encompass non-simultaneous events. The conscious now of the perceiver is not an 
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instant, but an interval. Claim (iii) implies that present experience encompasses non-simultaneous 
events of some brief duration. Also, if one takes it to be a brute fact along with Lockwood, then 
dynamic experience is constituted by representations of non-simultaneous events grouped within 
‘sufficiently small’ extended intervals. To use a figurative metaphor, we do not drink in the 
dynamic world one drop at a time, rather we drink it in by gulps containing collective drops. The 
resulting view informs one family of models representing how temporal experience is structured, 
by positing an extended present to explain how the perceptual experience of dynamic events within 
a single phenomenal perspective is possible—Extensionalist Models.16 I will further explicate the 
common features of such models below (§1.3) and how branches of the family differ from one 
another, ultimately defending a version of Content Extensionalism. After articulating the features 
of extensionalism, I turn to an argument that denies (iii) and with it extensionalism.  
 
1.3. Extensionalist Models 
Extensionalist models posit an extended present to explain how non-simultaneous events can 
be experienced together as present. Typically, the term of art ‘specious present’ refers to the brief 
extended interval in which the contents of experience are present to the perceiver; as William 
James famously describes it, “the prototype of all conceived times is the specious present, the short 
duration of which we are immediately and incessantly sensible” (1890: 610).  ‘Specious,’ in this 
context, simply means ‘appearing to be experienced’, i.e. it is the duration encompassing what 
                                                 
16 I follow Dainton (2008: 363) in adopting the designation 'extensionalism' for these views of temporal experience. 
Dainton's (2000, 2001, 2003, 2008) defends his “Simple Overlap Model” which is a type of process extensionalism, 
other defenders of extensionalism include James (1890), Stern (1897), Russell (1915, 1927), Foster (1979), Sprigge 
(1983), and more recently, Strawson (2009), Soteriou (2007, 2011), Hoerl (2009, 2013). Heidegger's 'ecstatic-
horizonal' model (1988: 261-273) is a special case, because he endorses a form of extensionalism about represented 
time, when he posits ‘spannedeness’ [Gespannheit] as an intrinsic character of ‘structural moments of expressed 
time,’ but defends a form of tensed Husserlian intentionalism when he analyses the basic constitution of temporality 
“…as the original unity of future, past, and present, is ecstatically-horizonal intrinsically” (1988: 267).  
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seems to be present to a subject at a given moment, where ‘moment’ refers to a non-zero interval—
an extended present. The concept, however, is employed by different philosophers and 
psychologists in at least the following four ways: to gesture at a general idea regarding the temporal 
extension of subjective experience, to denote the duration of external events experienced as 
present, to denote the non-zero duration of present experience itself, and to identify a particular 
branch of theories which propose similar explanations of temporal phenomena in perceptual 
experience (e.g., succession, change, persistence, simultaneity, duration).17 Instead of derailing the 
discussion into an exercise in conceptual house-keeping, I prefer to eschew the term ‘specious 
present’ and discuss the details of extensionalist models.18 These models come in two branching 
sub-types: Process Extensionalism and Content Extensionalism.19 
 
1.3.1. Process Extensionalism 
 Beginning with the first sub-type, here is an official gloss: 
Process Extensionalism:  Experience of a temporally extended event consists in an 
extended experiential processes with intrinsic temporal structure: (a) composed of 
temporally contiguous experiences of temporal parts of the events, (b) in virtue of being an 
extended process, an experience represents the temporal structure of dynamic events 
occurring within the same brief interval that the experience itself seems to take up.  
 
                                                 
17Cf. Clay (1882), James (1890), Broad (1923), Boring (1949), Myers (1971), Pӧppel (1978, 1988) Ruhnau (1995), 
Varela (1999), Dainton (2000, 2008), Kelly (2005b), Lockwood (1989, 2005), Soteriou (2007), Hoerl (2009) and 
Phillips (2010). See also Gallagher (1998: 26-31) for a discussion of the terminological and philosophical 
perplexities of the specious present. 
18 The term ‘specious present’ carries different connotations for different theorists, from fairly benign to 
ontologically weighty. Since it might do more harm than good, and distract from the main issue of modeling present 
experience, I prefer to avoid the loaded language. 
19 Cf. Chuard (2011) for an extended critique of both views, which he calls “State Temporal Extension” and 
“Content Temporal Extension,” respectively. I elect to use ‘process’ instead of ‘state,’ since I think it better captures 
what defenders like Dainton (2000, 2008) and Phillips (2008, 2011) are claiming. Geoff Lee (2014) also calls them 
“Experiential Process Views,” which he contrasts with his favored “Extended Atomic View”—a version of Content 
Extensionalism on my account. The lack of uniformity in labels for models is a bit confusing in this literature, so I 
adopt familiar labels where possible, and remain consistent in my attributions throughout.  
12 
 
When, for example, I see a bird's motion in flight, my experience is composed of disjoint but 
contiguous experiences of brief segments of the bird’s flight.20 Likewise, when I listen to Bird 
Parker's chromatic progression on the saxophone, my experience of the longer melody is composed 
of briefer experiences of parts of the progression. Figure 1, depicts temporal experience on the 
basic Process Extensionalist Model: 
  
Figure 1:  Process Extensionalist Model: A, B, C represent individual experiences that 
compose the longer ongoing experience of the melody.  
 
The model posits process-like experiences (A, B, C) that mirror the temporal structure of the events 
occurring within the interval of each experience. The downward arrows in the figure represent the 
hypothesized temporal synchrony between the timing of the target and the timing of the 
                                                 
20 One might reasonably inquire, “how finely or coarsely are these constituent experiences individuated? Do 
experiences have proper temporal parts? Or, are experiences gunky?” At this point, we can safely set that worry to 
one side, and take it up later when event segmentation is a more central concern. 
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experience. A primary motivation for conceiving of process-like experiences is to accommodate 
the intuition that a dynamic experience directly reflects the temporal structure of its dynamic target. 
This intuition is something about which Ian Phillips claims we cannot be systematically in error, 
“when we reflect upon the nature of our experience, we come to appreciate that the apparent 
temporal structure of experience maps the apparent temporal structure of the world experienced” 
(2008: 197). When I see the bird flying it seems as though my ongoing visual experience tracks its 
spatio-temporal path, presenting the temporal properties and relations of events perceived in virtue 
of being in synchrony with them. As I listen to a melody, my experience seems to be carried along 
by the tempo of the music. According to process models, the temporal structure of my experiences 
correspond to the temporal structure of the events experienced. Geoff Lee (2014) argues that this 
intuitive hypothesis, what he calls “Mirroring,” is the essential feature of process models, and 
ultimately what he takes to be their Achilles Heel. Lee offers three possible degrees of Mirroring 
that a Process Model might endorse: 
Mirroring comes in different strengths. On Metrical Mirroring, the ordering and duration 
relations between the temporal parts of a process-experience match those of the apparent 
perceived scene. So for example, an experience of a 1 second gap between two sounds is 
mirrored by a 1 second gap between the experiences of the sounds themselves. Topological 
Mirroring is weaker, only requiring mirroring at the level of temporal order, not duration. 
Structural Mirroring is even weaker, only requiring that distinct temporal stages of the 
perceived scene are presented by distinct temporal stages of experience. (2014: 8)  
 
There is a certain simplicity in the process model, since it has a short and simple story to tell about 
how a system targets dynamic events that instantiate temporal properties and stand in temporal 
relations [claim (i) above]—by mirroring them in the process of perceptual experience. We can 
give a general definition of the hypothesis, as follows: 
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MIRRORING: For any temporal property T and for any experience ϕ, if a phenomenally 
present event E is experienced, and E seems to instantiate T, then ϕ itself instantiates T.21 
 
If it seems as though the thunder rumbles for 4s, then my experience of the thunder has a duration 
of 4s. If my experience seems to have a particular temporal structure, then it does have that 
structure. MIRRORING is thus a kind of incorrigibility thesis about temporal experience. The 
hypothesis entails that experiences inherit their temporal structure from the apparent objects of 
experience.22 In the example there are at least three times in question: a) the actual timing of the 
thunder roll, b) the experienced timing of the thunder roll (viz. 4s), and c) the timing of the mental 
process that instantiates the experience. The inheritance of structure implied by MIRRORING can 
be understood in two distinct ways: either the objects of experience are mental entities like sense 
data (i.e. b inherits its structure from c) or the objects of experience are events out in the world 
(i.e. b inherits its structure from a).  
On the first route, the apparent objects of experience are mind-dependent, easily 
accommodating cases were the mental thunder roll does not correspond to any electrical discharge 
in the atmosphere, since the experienced timing is inherited from the timing of the mental event. 
Hence it seems innocuous to claim that the temporal structure of an experience mirrors that of the 
mental event, even in cases where the event is a hallucination. Nevertheless, this merely pushes 
                                                 
21 Ian Phillips explicitly endorses this sort of hypothesis, “for any temporal property apparently presented in 
experience, our experience itself possesses that temporal property.” (2014: 694)  
22 Alternatively, one might claim, following Leibniz, that God programs a pre-established harmony between mental 
events and bodily events in the world, and thus MIRRORING is a function of God’s will such that when the lightning 
causes a thunder clap, my mind mirrors the event out in the world. Likewise, Malebranche’s occasionalism is 
consistent with MIRRORING, but with the important difference that God is the only efficient cause in a 
Malebranchean universe and thus God causes my experience to be occasioned by the thunder clap, God also 
coordinates the sound waves being occasioned by a lightning discharge which God causes to result from the static 
energy, etc. None of the contemporary parties to this debate concerning temporal perception actively endorse either 
of these 17th century rationalist strategies, so I think this footnote suffices to flag the possibility without further 
engaging it as a serious contender.  
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the problem back for ordinary cases where there is an external thunder event, requiring further 
explanation of the relationship between the sense data structure and the external event, the 
relationship in virtue of which sense data represents the structure that the experience so inherits. 
If the experience inherits its temporal structure from sense data, and in some cases the experienced 
timing (b) corresponds to the actual timing (a), then there must be some explanation of how the 
sense data can accurately represent the temporal structure of the event out in the world. Either 
sense data can represent worldly events without another inheritance principle, making MIRRORING 
an unnecessary complication in the process extensionalist explanation of how we experience 
dynamic targets since the relationship between the target and the sense data will do the analytical 
heavy lifting, or else sense data inherit their structure from the worldly events they mirror which 
collapses into a version of the second route.   
Additionally, on the first route, MIRRORING makes a troubling claim of correspondence 
between temporal structures (b) and (c). The apparent timing of the event and the timing of the 
experience itself are claimed to mirror each other, instantiating the same temporal properties and 
relations. On the face of it, MIRRORING appears to violate the transparency of perceptual 
experience. A widely held view is that perceptual experience is transparent, meaning that the 
content of perceptual experience represents qualities of the states of affairs experienced, rather 
than intrinsic qualities of the experiencing. 23 When I hear the booming thunder roll for 4s, 
according to transparency, my perceptual experience represents properties of the thunder event, 
including its pitch and duration, not the properties of my auditory system processing the 
information transmitted by the sound event. Yet, this is precisely what is being suggested on the 
mind-dependent interpretation of MIRRORING, if my experience of the temporal structure of the 
                                                 
23 See Harman (1990), Dretske (1995), and especially Tye (2002) for defense of the transparency of perceptual 
representation. 
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thunder roll inherits its structure from the mental process instantiating that experience. When I see 
the spatial dimensions of a room, I do not judge that my visual experience shares those dimensions, 
it merely represents them. Smelling a skunky odor I don’t judge that my experience is itself skunky, 
or feeling the tackiness of drying paint I don’t judge my experience to be tacky. If I made any of 
those judgments, then I would be systematically in error as to which properties are represented in 
perception and what those properties represent. By claiming that a temporal experience mirrors 
the temporal structure of that which is experienced, process extensionalism commits an implicit 
content/vehicle confusion.24 “The message is: Don’t confuse the representation of time with the 
time of representing; don’t confuse the representation of sameness with the sameness of 
representing; and so on. That is, don’t suppose the type of contents must project onto their 
subpersonal vehicles, or vice versa” (Hurley 1998b: 42). Process extensionalism conflates the 
content of an experience with the vehicle instantiating the perceptual representation, and thereby 
has the burden of defending the idea that temporal properties are unique in that they do project 
onto their subpersonal vehicles or vice versa, via MIRRORING. 
Tough questions remain concerning what mechanisms realize this process and whether or not 
some version of the MIRRORING is even plausible on a developed theory of mental representation.25 
The former question is empirical, and can be set aside for now (see Ch.4). The latter question about 
representation is more pressing and raises explanatory problems for process models, which require 
some attention.  
                                                 
24 Process extensionalism seems to conflate the content and the vehicle of the experience, a critique advanced 
against process models by Dennett & Kinsbourne (1992) and Grush (2007). 
25 To account for functional mechanism, process models might appeal to dynamic oscillators and find a natural ally 
with Dynamic Systems Models (e.g., Van Gelder 1998, 1999; Van Gelder & Port (eds.) 1995), that challenge 
representational accounts of cognition, and thereby avoid some of the problems facing the Process Extensionalist 
Model, but also inheriting some of the problems facing anti-representationalism. Cf. Clark (1998)  
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On the second route, experiences inherit their temporal structure from the events in the world 
being perceived, but this generates a problem for cases of hallucinated targets since there is nothing 
from which to inherit the structure. Given that MIRRORING is a property inheritance principle, it 
implies that temporal experiences are source dependent, where an experience presents a dynamic 
event with specific temporal properties only in virtue of instantiating the same properties as and 
when the event unfolds. In a sense, this explanation lets time be its own model.26 If so, then the 
process cannot mirror an event's temporal structure in absence of the constituent temporal phases 
of the event. But, in some cases, we do seem to experience dynamic events in their absence. 
Temporal illusions and musical hallucinations are cases where one experiences a dynamic event 
instantiating temporal properties and relations, but when the target has a different temporal 
structure (i.e. temporal illusion) or is entirely absent (i.e. hallucination).  
The process extensionalist has some wiggle room with illusions, since an experience only 
instantiates the apparent temporal properties of the events experienced.27 Sometimes one's 
experience seems to slow down relative to the world, for instance, when being thrown from one's 
bicycle, a psychological effect known as subjective time dilation. Since the events of hurtling over 
one's handlebars seem to be stretched out in time, so too is the experience thereof on the process 
model. The experiential process mirrors the apparent temporal structure, in such cases, but its 
apparent structure is still source dependent, since there are dynamic events and although the 
subjective duration of them is dilated, the order is accurately reflected (e.g. one hurtles over the 
handlebars before hitting the ground). So understood, cases of subjective time dilation undermine 
                                                 
26 In artificial intelligence, anti-representationalists like Rodney Brooks (1991) have designed robots that can carry 
out various tasks without computing any internal models, but by ‘letting the world be its own model.’ 
27 This is especially true for Dainton (2000) who endorses a Lockean theory of perception, he calls ‘projectivism.’ 
So, his process model only requires that the mirrored properties are secondary qualities of phenomenal objects. 
Foster (1982) defends a form of Idealism that is also primarily concerned with the temporality intrinsic to 
phenomenal contents.  
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metrical mirroring, since the experience does not mirror the duration of the event. This leaves only 
the weaker topological and structural mirroring theses available to the process extensionalist. 
Potentially more damaging examples are those where the dynamic target is absent altogether. 
What structure is the mirror process reflecting when I experience a catchy tune playing in my 
head or, worse, an annoying commercial jingle? Such an experience is sometimes called an 
‘earworm’ or ‘brainworm.’28 Although this is not a case of perception, the rather common 
phenomenon of experiencing a melody repeat in one's head does seem to be an experience, the 
content of which represents the temporal structure of the tune (probably more so than its tone and 
pitch), in the absence of the target. Some individuals also undergo intense musical hallucinations, 
in which they “hear” music playing out in the world when there is none at all—a seeming 
perceptual experience. For patients whom experience this type of hallucination, neurologist Oliver 
Sacks reports, “this sort of instant reproduction has some resemblance to our reaction to catchy 
tunes, but the experience for someone with musical hallucinations is not mere imagery, but often 
physically loud, as-if-heard ‘actual’ music” (2007: 73). Thus, a full-fledged musical hallucination 
is a temporal experience, for which there is no dynamic target present.  
How can the process model account for such experiences with MIRRORING? Does the 
brainworm or musical hallucination consist in a process that mirrors a simulated auditory event? 
Perhaps, the process extensionalist can appeal to processes inheriting the apparent temporal 
properties from earlier processes, in order to give an account of where the apparent temporal 
structure comes from. For instance, a previous extended process of my experiencing the song, 
                                                 
28 Cf. Oliver Sacks (2007: 41-48) chapter of Musicophilia dedicated to brainworms, i.e. the phenomenon of 
“hearing” a repetitious musical phrase or melody in one's mind. Metaphysician's Warning: Do not confuse this use 
of the term for a metaphysical implication of 4-dimensionalism in which a brain persists in virtue of have different 
temporal parts at different times, where brain A at t1 is numerically identical to brain B at t2 iff A and B are 
timeslices of the same 4D brainworm.  
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“You Can’t Always Get What You Want,” is encoded as an auditory memory trace, and when I 
later experience the melody repeat in my mind, the brainworm process inherits its temporal 
structure from the initial auditory process via the memory trace, or so the explanation goes. A 
response along these lines generates new puzzles concerning how the temporal signature of the 
process is stored and how this re-process experience sequence is initiated to generate the 
hallucination.  
This suggestion is also ill-suited to explain how someone might hallucinate entirely novel 
musical sequences—a condition apocryphally attributed to Shostakovich as a result of a piece of 
metal shrapnel from the siege of Leningrad being lodged in the composer’s auditory cortex.29 He 
reportedly found inspiration for his compositions in these novel musical hallucinations. Given that 
these are not simply memory experiences of some previous experience, such phenomena seem 
utterly mysterious for MIRRORING process models of temporal experience. Or else, it forces a 
retreat to phenomenal idealism, where the apparent phenomenal objects of experience are all that 
exist. A move welcomed by process theorists like Foster (1982) with independent commitments 
to Berkeleyan idealism, but one that should be met with resistance from anyone that takes a realist 
reading of the dynamic targets I motivate in (i). At the very least, cases of this sort should put 
pressure on MIRRORING and its implicit source dependency. 
There are possible ways for the process extensionalist to respond to these challenges. For one, 
a process model might reject a representational account of perception, and opt instead for what is 
sometimes called a ‘relational view’ of perception.30 According to the relational view, perception 
                                                 
29 Donal Henahan (1983) makes this claim about Shostakovich, “Shostakovich, however, was reluctant to have the 
metal removed and no wonder: Since the fragment had been there, he said, each time he leaned his head to one side 
he could hear music. His head was filled with melodies—different each time—which he made use of when 
composing. Moving his head back level immediately stopped the music.” (as cited in Sacks 2007: 72f) 
30 Cf. Hoerl (2013: 6-8) for discussion of the view; proponents include Campbell (2002, 2009), Brewer (2004), 
Soteriou (2007, 2011). 
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is a distinctive relation of awareness or acquaintance that obtains between the subject and the 
objects in the world. As John Campbell expresses it, “it is not that the brain is constructing a 
conscious inner representation whose intrinsic character is independent of the environment. It is, 
rather, that there is a kind of complex adjustment that the brain has to undergo, in each context, in 
order that you can be visually related to the things around you” (2002: 119). This ‘complex 
adjustment’ explanation is a natural partner for the process model, since mirroring experiences 
supposedly play precisely this role in our perception of temporal properties and relations. I am not 
advocating for this relational move, I am merely suggesting that the process model pairs well with 
a rejection of representational accounts of perception, in order to resist objections based on 
standard theories of mental representation. Anti-representationalism might be a cost too steep for 
what process models provide in explanatory value. At this point, it is only important to possess a 
working idea of how the Process Extensionalist model accommodates claims (i)-(iii) with which 
we began, and some of its implications for how temporal perception is supposed to work. Now let 
us turn to the second branch of extensionalism. 
 
1.3.2. Content Extensionalism 
Unlike process models, Content Extensionalist models do not posit an extended process that 
inherits the temporal properties of target events experienced. Instead, content extensionalism 
claims that the content of an experience as present represents events that occur in a brief temporally 
structured interval, i.e. a temporal field of content.  
Content Extensionalism: Experience of a temporally extended event consists in a 
perceptual representation encompassing a temporal field of content: (a) content of an 
experience as present represents successive events occurring over a brief temporally 
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structured interval, (b) the realizer of the experience (state or process) need not have the 
same temporal structure as the successive events represented. 
 
When I listen to a melody, I experience parts of the sound event together as present. This does not 
imply that the process or state realizing my auditory experience has the temporal structure of the 
melody, since a vehicle only carries the information or representation. On this model, the 
perceptual system targets dynamic events instantiating temporal properties in virtue of 
representing temporally extended phases of the events and the temporal relations that obtain 
between their parts. A temporal field is the scope an experience encompasses, an extended window 
or interval within which temporally structured events can be experienced together. Figure 2, below, 
depicts the basic sketch of a Content Extensionalist Model:31  
 
 
Figure 2: Content Extensionalist Model  
                                                 
31 Proponents of models in this family include Broad (1923, 1925), Tye (2003: 85-92), Grush (2005), Bowen (2013) 
each with their own distinguishing features. Lee (2014) also defends a version of this model under the label, “The 
Atomic View,” where on his view temporal experience involve what he calls ‘local holisms,’ which correspond 
roughly to the temporally extended fields of content on my articulation of Content Extensionalism.  
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The model posits temporally extended fields, i.e. the interval of an experience as present, and 
some mechanism for representing the content in those fields in order to explain how successive 
events can be experienced together as present. In Figure 2, for example, the beamed quadruplet of 
eighth notes are within the scope of field B, and thus the cognitive system fixes the target 
quadruplet and deploys R(B) to represent its temporal structure including its brief duration and the 
order of occurrence within the field (i.e., I hear the B quaver as occurring before the A, the A as 
occurring before the A flat, and the A flat as occurring before the A natural). According to this 
model, temporal experience is representational. I experience successive events occurring within a 
brief interval as present in virtue of representing the temporal properties instantiated by and 
relations that obtain between the events. On this way of understanding content extensionalism, 
dynamic targets (e.g., musical phrases) are fixed by the representational function of some 
mechanism within the cognitive system which deploys R(F) to represent in experience the 
temporal structure of events occurring within some present field of content, F.32  
Since content extensionalism can be elaborated in several different ways, there are a few 
additional points about the model that bear further clarification. First, one might worry that the 
time of representing is an instantaneous state of the system, on a content extensionalist model. 
While some versions of the model might endorse this instantaneity, as Broad’s (1925) version 
seems to, other versions accommodate the possibility that the physical process realizing the 
representation is itself extended in time, including Broad’s earlier (1923) model that posits 
‘momentary acts of sensing’ which are realized over a finite interval. Such models are importantly 
different from process models, because the temporal properties of the realizing process (e.g., the 
                                                 
32 In a more general theory of mental representation, Cummins (1996) dubs such mechanisms, 'intenders', whose 
function it is to represent a particular class of targets. 
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firing rates of neuronal cell assemblies) are not the same as those represented in the temporal field 
of content. To put it another way, the vehicle of the representational content may have temporal 
structure determined by its physical realization in a distributed neural process, but the vehicle’s 
temporal structure is not the same temporal structure as the content it carries. Content 
extensionalism does not confuse the temporal properties represented in the temporal field of 
content with the temporal properties of the vehicle that carries that content, i.e. content 
extensionalism does not commit a content/vehicle confusion.33 This clarification underscores one 
significant way in which content models differ from process models. 
Second, the diagonal lines in Figure 2 delimit the scope of the temporal fields, and those that 
slope to the left appear to extend the field into the future. How can R(A) represent an eighth note 
that has not yet been played?34 If real-time perceptual representation involves some inductive 
extrapolation from observed stimuli, in order to target ongoing dynamic events, then some of the 
temporal field of content is a projective construction. Although this “forward-looking” feature is 
not essential to the model, I drafted the diagram to accommodate it, since some versions of content 
extensionalism hypothesize that temporal perception requires predictive interpretation.35 For 
instance, one such model posits a mechanism that realizes a trajectory estimation function, 
mapping states of the process onto successor states. This enables a cognitive system to predict 
future transformations of represented events by filtering the noise from observed signals and 
exploiting a prediction-correction cycle to generate statistically optimal state estimations (Grush, 
2005a: S211).36 Content extensionalism paired with a trajectory-estimation hypothesis 
                                                 
33 For further discussions of the content/vehicle distinction cf. Dennett (1991), Dennett & Kinsbourne (1992), 
Hurley (1998a, 1998b), Millikan (1993), Grush (2005b).  
34 See Kelly (2005b) for a critique of extensionalist views that have a forward-looking component. 
35 Cf. Dennett & Kinsbourne (1992), Rao et al. (2001), and Grush (2005a). 
36 In particular, Grush (2005a) develops his trajectory estimation model based on a Kalman filter (cf. Kalman 1960), 
which is an information processing algorithm for filtering noise from signal data to produce estimates of future 
states of domain, wherein Grush assumes, for the sake of computation, that the modeled domain is a driven Gauss-
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accommodates the possibility that a system can represent a temporal field of content that 
incorporates a projective estimate constituting its leading edge.   
Other versions of content extensionalism specify that a temporal field only extends into the 
near past. In fact, Broad makes the “backward-looking” constraint on his model explicit when he 
says, “it is certain that what can be sensed at any moment stretches a little way back behind that 
moment.” (1923: 348) and “to sense what has not yet become, would be literally to sense nothing” 
(1923: 358).37 To accommodate Broad’s constraint in the figure, the left-sloping diagonals can be 
made perpendicular to the representation times.  
Notice, however, that Broad's way of putting the point in terms of sensing and not being able 
to sense what has not yet become, construes perception as a passive process of receiving 
information from the senses as events happen. Broad’s view implies a causal theory of content that 
identifies targets by correlating sense data tokens with detections of distal properties.38 Such a 
theory reduces representation to correctly processing detector signals, since it holds that the 
content of a token temporal experience of succession R(F) is its dynamic target under conditions 
of correct application, e.g. when the temporal relations of succession within F actually obtain. This 
conflates the content of the representation with the content of its correct applications, simply 
mapping temporal experiences under the right conditions onto appropriate temporally structured 
events. For this reason, Broad’s version of content extensionalism seems to be plagued by a similar 
problem as process models, since there is an implicit source dependency between a series of sensa 
represented within a momentary sensible field, and temporal properties of events causing the 
                                                 
Markov process (e.g. a ship at sea whose states (position, velocity) at t+1 are determined by its position and velocity 
at t, 'noise' like winds and currents, and predictable driving forces like the engine and rudder).   
37 Of course, this follows straightaway from Broad’s metaphysical position; he defends a Growing Block Universe 
theory in which the four-dimensional universe grows as time advances.  So, it would be impossible to perceive the 
future, if one were to also think that perception is causally source-dependent (like Broad's sense data theory).  
38 Contemporary versions of causal theories of content include Stampe (1977), Fodor (1987), Dretske (1981); for 
extended criticism see Cummins (1996: Ch. 5), Cummins & Poirier (2004), Paul Churchland (2007). 
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representation to be tokened on that occasion. I raise this issue as a point of caution, and in order 
to contrast Broad’s version with other versions of content extensionalism which are not married to 
a causal theory of content.  
Let us consider an alternative version of content extensionalism. On this view, representation 
is an isomorphism between the content and the actual or possible states of affairs targeted, i.e. a 
relation-preserving mapping between the content and its target (cf. Cummins, 1996; Waskan 2006: 
94-102). If temporal experiences are representations, as content extensionalism has it, then their 
content is grounded in the relational properties instantiated, not in the causal relations they bear to 
dynamic events in the world. A target is normative for judging the accuracy of a representation 
deployed on a particular occasion, but a representation's content is not fixed by its causal relation 
to the target on any particular occasion, it is fixed by the actual or possible states of affairs 
represented. As Paul Churchland (2007: 156) points out, in a relevant discussion of maps, “it is 
the existence of an abstract, relation-preserving projective mapping, from some external domain 
to that map, that makes it a good or an accurate portrayal of that external domain. Causal 
connections enter the picture only if, and only when, the map is finally put to some use or other.” 
For example, Jesse has an accurate street map of downtown Chicago just in case there is a relation-
preserving mapping between the city’s streets and the representation. If Jesse mistakenly tries to 
use the map to navigate the streets of Milwaukee, then she is deploying the map incorrectly—the 
map still represents Chicago, and has the relations between Chicago streets as its content, but is 
being misapplied to the wrong external domain. So, a representation's content is not causally 
determined by a particular occasion of its correct or incorrect use.  
For example, Figure 2 is a representation of how a possible system perceives successive events 
together as present, by positing temporal fields that delimit intended targets fixed by 
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representational functions. The figure does not represent the actual temporal structure of a 
particular sound experience, which has been partially encoded in a spatial form, since the figure is 
a static graphic not a temporally evolving model. The temporal structure is recoverable from the 
representation, given that the time signature and the musical notation encode features of musical 
passage in F major, such that a musician could play it—their performance serving as a projective 
relation-preserving mapping—and thereby undergo the temporal experience. If so, the notation 
represents the music's structure and the musician's subsequent auditory experience represents the 
sound event generated by her performance, but the experience does not represent the notation. So, 
representation is intransitive. This also entails that, “representations, because their content is 
grounded in their structure, do allow for portability of representation” (Cummins & Roth 2010: 
179). The portability, i.e. source independence, of representations has useful implications for the 
problem broached earlier concerning temporal illusions and hallucinations. 
We are now in a position to see that content extensionalism, with representational content, has 
a much easier time accounting for seeming perceptions of absent targets. In contrast to mirror 
processes, source independent representations are better suited to explain brainworm and 
hallucination phenomena. After all, an accurate representation is an isomorph of its target, by 
definition, and a representation is portable, since it can be deployed in the absence of its target. 
This view of mental representation also provides a reasonable explanation of the Shostakovich 
case, since representational schemes are in the business of structurally transforming tokens of 
semantically individuated types.39 So, Shostakovich “mentally composes” in virtue of mechanisms 
in his auditory cortex manipulating musical tokens and thereby generating novel representations, 
                                                 
39 Cf. Cummins & Poirer (2004: 21-40) 
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which he then transforms into external compositions and physical music—the dynamic targets his 
hallucinations represent, prior to their physical realization in sound waves.  
This move, while consistent with content extensionalist models, undermines the motivating 
intuition of process models, since the vehicle of a representation (e.g. spike trains across a neural 
assembly) need not mirror the properties of the target at all. All the worse for process models. 
Adopting the portable representation explanation eliminates the need for processes that inherit the 
temporal structure of its apparent targets. This provides a prima facie reason to prefer some 
versions of content extensionalism over process extensionalism, and an even stronger reason if 
one respects the content/vehicle distinction and is already committed to a representational theory 
of perception more generally. Now let us turn to an argument that challenges both branches of 
extensionalism, by denying successive events are ever perceived together as present. 
 
1.4. An Argument Against Extensionalism 
Some dispute the supposed ‘brute fact’ of (iii) and argue instead that perceiving something as 
present implies the events experienced must be simultaneous.40 Those critical of extensionalism 
claim that, for any two events perceived as present, x and y, x must be perceived as happening at 
the same time as y. So, one can accept (i) and (ii), yet deny that one can perceive non-simultaneous 
events together as present. Examining a reductio argument against (iii) is instructive, even if no 
one offers such an argument, since the dilemma it poses and the possible ways of responding to it 
delineate divergent models of temporal experience. The dilemma results from two alternative ways 
of explaining how one can discern earlier and later events in a perceived succession. The first horn 
                                                 
40 Le Poidevin (2007: 81) raises this objection without making the argument explicit when he says, “we could hardly 
both perceive two events as present and perceive one as occurring before the other.” Cf. Kelly (2005b) 
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employs tensed content or some such modes of presentation, whereas the second reduces an 
experience of succession to a succession of experiences. One can argue in the following fashion:  
A1) Suppose, for reductio, that successive events are perceived together as present.  
A2) If successive events are perceived together as present, then one can discern earlier and 
later events within the experience.  
A3) So, one can discern earlier and later events within a present experience. 
A4) If one can discern earlier and later events within a present experience, then either some 
of the events in the sequence are not perceived as present, or the sequence of events 
are not perceived together within a single experience.  
A5) So, either some of the events in the sequence are not perceived as present, or the 
sequence of events are not perceived together within a single experience. 
A6) If some of the events in the sequence are not perceived as present, then it is not the 
case that successive events are perceived together as present. 
A7) If the sequence of events are not perceived together within a single experience, then it 
is not the case that successive events are perceived together as present. 
A8) So, contra supposition, it is not the case that successive events are perceived together 
as present.  
On the first horn of the dilemma (A6), earlier events in a rapid sequence are not perceived as 
present at the same time as later events in the sequence are perceived as present—instead the earlier 
events may be perceived as past when the later events are perceived as present. Or, one is merely 
aware of earlier events as past when later events are perceived as present. For example, the crackle 
of a thunder peal is first heard as present, then the crackle is past when the booming rumble is 
present. Robin Le Poidevin claims that this implication is obvious, and dismisses the idea that non-
simultaneous events are experienced as present: 
If we have a single experience of two items as being present, then, surely, we experience 
them as simultaneous. Suppose we are aware of A as preceding B, and of B as present. Can 
we be aware of A as anything other than past? (2007: 87) 
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According to this reasoning, if I am aware of the crackle as preceding the rumble, and of the rumble 
as present, then I must be aware of the crackle as past. Thus, contra supposition, successive events 
are not perceived together as present, since each event in a sequence recedes from the phenomenal 
present into the phenomenal past, where an experience of succession involves apprehending some 
events as past and the most recent event in a sequence as present.  
A further implication of this route is that A and B can be experienced together as present if, 
and only if, A is simultaneous with B. Targets of experience as present are limited to whatever is 
on the perceiver's relative plane of simultaneity at the moment of experience.41 Accordingly, 
successive events, if experienced together, must have modes of presentation distinguishing those 
present from those just-past, what Edmund Husserl calls "modes of temporal orientation" and the 
“running-off phenomena” (1893-1917: 27). The basic picture is that for each phase of experience 
which is, in turn, present, there is a continuous fading into past and further past modes of 
presentation. “The momentary phases of perception 'sink'; they continuously undergo 
modification” (1893-1917: 213). Husserl's account is representative of the view implied by the 
antecedent of (A6), on which a succession of events can be experienced together, but not each 
event within the sequence as present. Such a view posits that the cognitive system deploys modes 
of temporal orientation within experience in order to perceive dynamic events, where temporal 
perception is constitutively dependent on such intentional structure—call these “Intentionalist 
Models.”42  
                                                 
41 The idea dates back at least as far as Hermann Lotze (1879: 294).  For early criticism, see Stern (1897: 330f) who 
objected to the Lotzean idea, calling it the "the dogma of the momentariness of a whole consciousness or, in other 
words, of the necessary isochronism of its members".  
42 Kiverstein (2010) marks the useful distinction between 'intentionalism' and 'extensionalism', and defends what he 
calls 'weak intentionalism', in contrast to the 'strong intentionalism' of Tye (2003). More recently, Hoerl (2013) also 
defends this contrast and investigates the differences between these views, to which my discussion is indebted. 
Dainton (2008) calls these models 'retentionalism', due to Husserl's concept retention for the past-oriented 
awareness, but that choice of terminology limits the models to the tensed variety defended by Husserl and his 
followers.  
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On the second horn (A7), a sequence of events is not perceived in a single experience, rather 
each event in the sequence is experienced successively as present, in turn, not together. In this vein 
Philippe Chuard claims, “an experience can only represent what happens at a given time” (2011: 
8); the scope of direct experience is purely atomistic on his view. So, an experience of succession 
reduces to a succession of experiences. The experience of the crackle is distinct from the boom 
and, furthermore, if you discern successive phases of the crackling and successive phases of the 
rolling boom, then each discernible part of the thunder peal is a distinct percept, not perceived 
together as present. Experiences as of succession, motion, change, etc., are post hoc representations 
of some sort produced from sequential static snapshots of property instances at adjacent times. 
Thus, representing the entire dynamic event of the thunder peal is a cognitive achievement distinct 
from perception of the successive phases of the thunder. As before, this horn also undermines the 
supposition, by denying that successive events are ever part of a single experience as present. 
The dilemma suggests there are only two ways for discerning early and later events within an 
experience: either successive events are experienced together under different temporal modes of 
presentation, but not as present, or successive events are perceived successively as present, but not 
together. Either way the assumption that non-simultaneous events are experienced together as 
present is defeated. Does this argument force us to give up on phenomenological claim (iii) and 
reject Extensionalist Models?  Below I argue that there are reasons to resist this conclusion, and 
defend a plausible reading of (iii).  
 
1.5. Combating the Argument Against Extensionalism 
There are at least two ways to respond to the argument. First, the argument relies on the 
implausible assumption that experiences are a durationless instant. Second, one can object that 
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(A4) is false because the consequent is a false dilemma. In considering these responses, the second 
in greater detail (§1.5.2) than the first (§1.5.1), I sketch a representational strategy for explaining 
how successive events can be experienced together as present. 
 
1.5.1. Experiences are not durationless  
A first line of response to the reductio argument, points out that it rests on the implausible 
assumption that the present experience is a durationless instant such that successive events cannot 
be perceived as occurring together, no matter how brief the interval in which they are contained, 
which generates the inference to the false dilemma that either some of the successive events within 
the sufficiently brief interval are not perceived as present or the events are not perceived together 
within a single experience. The durationlessness assumption implicitly identifies the perceived 
present with a theoretical objective present. In this vein, St. Augustine argues that an objective 
present must be durationless, because otherwise some of its temporal parts would be either past or 
future and thus not present (Confessions, Book XI, §15).43  
Recall, however, that the claim at issue is phenomenological, not metaphysical; it is, in part, a 
matter of what seems to be perceived together as present in a single experience. The peal of thunder 
has discernible earlier and later parts (viz., crack-boom), but I certainly seem to experience the 
entire brief sound event as presently happening and it is represented in perceptual experience 
accordingly. If the perceived present were a durationless instant and any interval of time is 
infinitely divisible into a dense partial-ordering of such instants, then I should be able to represent 
                                                 
43 Dainton (2000: 120) has shown that an argument can be given to argue for a durationless present of experience. 
Augustine’s claim that the objective present is durationless together with presentism (i.e., the metaphysical thesis 
that only the present is real) jointly entail that if any experience is a real event, then it is durationless. Nevertheless, 
this argument is wildly implausible on phenomenological and empirical grounds and Dainton rebuts it on those 
grounds. See also Le Poidevin (2007: 79) for a nice summary of both Augustine’s argument and the presentist 
‘Augustinian’ argument that Dainton constructs.  
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in perception infinitely many distinct phases of the brief thunder peal. On the face of it, this 
suggestion seems paradoxical or at least nomologically impossible. Barry Dainton suggests as 
much when he asks, “Physicists currently believe that intervals below the Planck duration of 10-43 
seconds have no physical significance—is it likely that such intervals have any phenomenological 
significance?” (2000: 170). The obvious answer to the rhetorical question is: no, it is highly 
unlikely that we could consciously experience the present on orders of magnitude below those 
relevant to our best science and undetectable by our best instruments. After all, we develop the 
mathematical formalisms and instruments of science for the purpose of studying phenomena 
completely undetectable by our coarse-grained sensory systems. 
Furthermore, there are successive phenomena which we are unable to perceive as successive 
because the stimuli are too rapid. For instance, the way in which the cathode-ray tube works in 
older computer monitors and televisions exploits our inability to perceive the temporal order of 
stimuli that occur at too fast a rate. The accelerated beam of an electron gun scans the screen in a 
fixed pattern at a rate much too fast for our visual system to detect, and results in our seeing the 
successive patterns of electrons as a simultaneous image.44 This sort of phenomenon simply 
suggests that there are lower-bound thresholds for different sensory modalities which constrain 
what is consciously perceptible to humans. I discuss lower-bound thresholds in greater detail in 
Chapter 4.  
At this stage it suffices to point out that conscious perceptual experience is importantly 
constrained by the operational and functional limitations of an organism’s sensory and cognitive 
systems. We can only hear a certain range of frequencies, we can only see a certain range of light 
                                                 
44 Locke [1690/1975, II.XIV.10: 184-85] gives his famous thought experiment of a cannon-ball passing through a 
room as an example of this sort of phenomenon, but one can reasonably argue that an appropriately situated 
perceiver could perceive that the successive motions of the cannon-ball were non-simultaneous within the brief 
interval of the experienced present. 
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waves with the unaided eye, we can only feel a certain range of temperatures before the tactile 
sensors give out, and an analogous range of perceptual acuity is true of time perception. So, in 
addition to providing a perspicuous phenomenology of the contents of experience perceived as 
present, an account of human temporal experience and time perception should be developed within 
the actual limitations of our perceptual and cognitive systems. I take this to imply that a suitably 
naturalized account of time perception should provide plausible interpretations of current empirical 
research or generate new testable hypotheses for future research. As a start, we should avoid 
building durationless instants into our models of present experience. Now let us turn to the more 
constructive reply to the argument against extensionalism        
 
1.5.2. False dilemma: a representational third way available to Content Extensionalism  
According to the second response, there is a clear third alternative to explain how one can 
discern earlier and later events in a perceived succession, consistent with the version of content 
extensionalism I motivate above: a perceptual experience can simultaneously represent earlier and 
later events within a brief interval as successive, and indicate the dynamic target as present. Such 
an experience involves a representation of the temporal order of the events and an indication that 
the targets of the experience are all presently happening in immediate succession.45 
                                                 
45 This suggestion does not imply that we always represent the contents of events in their objective order, only that it 
is a reasonable explanation of veridical cases of time perception, when the deployment of a temporal representation 
accurately represents its target. In fact, there are many well-documented illusions like the flash-lag effect (Metzger 
1932; Mackay1958; Nijhawan 1994; Eagleman & Sejnowski 2000) and the cutaneous rabbit illusion (Geldard & 
Sherrick 1972); studies of both effects provide support for the hypothesis that the temporal content of an event is 
encoded in neural processing of sensory inputs and then reordered in conscious perception. See Dennett & Kinsbourne 
(1992), Grush (2005a), and Hoerl (2009) for philosophical discussion of these illusions. On the other hand, the 
experimental conditions necessary for reproducing these effects exploit the very brief neural latencies of our sensory 
systems and the effects disappear when the intervals between stimuli are increased. At most, these illusions support 
the modest claim that temporal processing at the level of neural encoding is not identical to the structure of time 
perception at the level conscious cognition (which seems obvious!).  I will argue later that these illusions provide 
some support for the hypothesis that duration of the experiential present ranges between 300ms-1s, since the illusory 
effects exploit processing thresholds at the sub-experiential level.    
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In this response, I am invoking a useful distinction between indication and representation 
(Cummins & Poirier 2004, Cummins et al. 2008, Cummins & Roth 2010); an indication detects 
the presence of a target, whereas a representation carries information about the structure of its 
target. A representation, if veridical, is isomorphic to its target. For example, when a litmus paper 
turns red, it indicates the presence of an acidic solution, but it tells me very little about the structure 
of that target (e.g. what kind of acid it contains). In contrast, a model of HCl represents the 
molecular geometry of hydrochloric acid, and tells me a great deal about its structure, but it does 
not tell me whether or not there is any HCl present. Additionally, as I argue above, representation 
is intransitive and portable. Indication, however, is transitive and source-dependent. To illustrate 
these properties of indication, let us consider a more developed example. 
Take for instance, a Geiger counter, a metal-lined tube with a wire running through its center 
filled with inert gas, which detects the presence of alpha, beta, or gamma radiation. When the 
counter audibly “clicks” upon detecting a voltage pulse between the wire and the wall of the tube, 
it thereby indicates that there are alpha, beta, or gamma rays passing through the tube. It does so 
because radiation ionizes the inert gas contained in the tube creating free electrons, and electricity 
easily passes through the ionized gas. So, the counter's “click” indicates the presence of radiation, 
where indication is a transitive relation. The example illustrates the transitivity of indication 
because a “click” indicates a voltage pulse, and a voltage pulse indicates ionization of the gas, 
which in turn indicates that alpha, beta, or gamma rays passed through the tube, so a “click” on 
the Geiger counter indicates the presence of radiation. By extension, lots of rapid clicks indicates 
a strong proximal source of radiation, which is why Geiger counters are useful devices for 
detecting dangerous levels of radiation. Notice that the Geiger counter does not represent radiation, 
because it doesn't tell us anything about the structure of the rays being detected (e.g. it cannot tell 
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us whether the rays are alpha, beta, or gamma), it only tells us that radiation is present. If there is 
no radiation, then the Geiger counter does not click. So, indication is source dependent in a way 
that representation is not. 
Recall my objections (§1.3.1) to the source-dependency inherent in process extensionalist 
models due to their commitment to MIRRORING. Such models conflate indication and 
representation, in particular, by appealing to a causal accounts of representational content, which 
hold that representation is, or derives from, indicator content. So, process models cannot avail 
themselves of the response I am developing to combat the argument against extensionalism. 
To return to problem at hand, the strategy I am pushing emphasizes that the presence appealed 
to in claims (ii) and (iii) is phenomenal presence, and thereby denies that indicating events are 
present implies representing them as simultaneous. Phenomenal presence is orthogonal to the 
exclusive distinction between successiveness and simultaneity. That the successive notes of a 
Charlie Parker riff are represented together in my experience, and indicated as present, says 
something both about the temporal order of the dynamic target and the relation I bear to the target, 
i.e. the target is present over some interval. In this way, temporal perception involves both 
representational content and indicator content, but the former does not reduce to some 
concatenation of the latter, since reliable indication is source dependent and representation is not. 
Merely remembering the same chromatic progression from, say, Parker's “Scrapple from the 
Apple,” represents the same semantic content (if my auditory memory is accurate), but the target 
is absent, since there are no external auditory stimuli present.  
Let us take a spatial analogy to show why this is a coherent way of understanding how 
successive events can be perceived together as present. When I perceive six dominoes as vertically 
stacked there in front of me, I can discern that certain dominoes are above or below others in the 
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stack while also being immediately aware that all six are there, spatially present, collectively 
occupying a region of space in my visual field. Does that imply that I am perceiving the six 
dominoes as exactly co-located? Of course not, that would be absurd, since exact co-location 
would require that the six dominoes somehow occupy, at the same time, the same region of space 
with the exact dimensions of a single domino.46 My experience represents the stack of six 
dominoes as there, and each domino occupying an exact location above or below others, as 
vertically contiguous. So, just as in the temporal case, spatial presence is orthogonal to the 
exclusive distinction between co-location and contiguity. Confusing as stacked there for exactly 
co-located is an analogous mistake to confusing as present for as simultaneous. 
The first horn of the dilemma (A6) trades on this equivocation, since there are two readings of 
as present, it can be understood either ‘as happening at the same instant’ or ‘as occurring within a 
brief temporally extended phenomenal perspective’. On the first reading, the original 
extensionalist supposition [claim (iii)] is obviously false, since events cannot be perceived both as 
successive and as simultaneous. On the second reading, the conditional (A6) is obviously false, 
since some events in a sequence not being perceived as occurring within the same brief temporally 
extended phenomenal perspective is not a sufficient condition for denying that successive events 
are ever perceived as occurring within the same temporally extended phenomenal perspective. The 
truth of (iii) requires the phenomenal perspective reading and the truth of (A6) requires the 
simultaneity reading, thus begging the question against extensionalism.  
Recall that the first horn of the dilemma is motivated by intentionalist models, which claim 
that a succession of events can be experienced together, but only one event within the sequence is 
perceived as present and the other events are experienced as further and further past in relation to 
                                                 
46 If that were possible, then it would only appear as a single domino, not a stack. 
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the present event. Since intentionalist models oppose extensionalism on this point and offer a 
competing explanation of temporal experience, it is imperative to evaluate the model on its own 
terms.  
 
1.6. Husserl’s Intentionalist Model 
According to Husserl's Intentionalist Model, if non-simultaneous events are experienced 
together, then at most one is experienced as present. This is because, for the intentionalist, 
discerning the temporal order of the successive events in experience derives from the intentional 
structure of the experience, i.e. the events in the sequence being represented under distinct modes 
of temporal orientation, only one of which is immanently present. As Christoph Hoerl defines the 
model, “intentionalism about temporal experience has it that the fact that we can have perceptual 
experiences, e.g. as of movement or change, is to be explained in terms of the idea of a particular 
intentional structure that experience possesses” (2012: 381). In order to better understand the 
intentional structure and how it is supposed to work, below I consider a basic sketch of 
intentionalism.47  
Within the intentionalist model, perceptual experience is constituted by, at least, two distinct 
structural elements that are represented simultaneously: instantaneous present sensory impressions 
together with receding retentions, i.e. intentional traces of just-past events. Husserl’s later version 
of the model also posits a third element, protentions, i.e. anticipations of the immediate future. 
Protention is a component of our experience that automatically anticipates the forthcoming phase 
of an ongoing event, a sort of predictive intention. Each of these three elements are inextricable 
from the whole experience, as Dan Zahavi describes Husserl’s schema of temporal experience, 
                                                 
47 Cf. Horwich (1987), Gallagher (1998), Kelly (2005), Strawson (2009), and Kiverstein (2010). 
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“the basic unit of temporality is not a ‘knife-edge’ present, but a ‘duration-block,’ that is, a 
temporal field that comprises all three temporal modes of present, past, and future,” (2005: 56). 
Invoking a unified temporal field makes it sound as though Husserl's model collapses into a version 
of extensionalism. The significant difference, however, is that instead of positing an extended 
present, it holds that only the primal impression is present, and experienced as present. Protentions 
and retentions are future- and past-modified contents of representations, respectively, which 
determine the temporal horizons—the leading and lagging edges—of our ongoing phenomenal 
experience. In this way, our experience has tensed contents, or constructs tensed contexts, that 
make it possible for us to perceive dynamic targets like successions and changes. The continual 
transformation of contents from protention to primal impression to retention constitutes the 
temporal structure and phenomenal character from one experience to the next, the temporal 
structure of perception constitutively depends on the intentional structure of experiencing.48 
Husserl claims, “since a new now is always entering on the scene, the now changes into a past; 
and as it does so, the whole running-off continuity of pasts belonging to the preceding point moves 
'downwards' uniformly into the depths of the past” (1893-1917: 28). Figure 3, below, provides a 
reconstructions of the basic features of the Intentionalist Model, illustrating Husserl's "running-off 
continuity" hypothesis:  
                                                 
48 “The concrete and full structure of all lived experience is consequently protention—primal presentation—
retention.  Although specific experiential contents of this structure change progressively moment to moment, at any 
one given moment this threefold structure is present (synchronically) as a unified whole.” (Zahavi 2005: 57).   
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Figure 3:  Husserl's Intentionalist Model49 
 
In the figure, the central horizontal line CI represents a series of primal impressions in experience, 
perhaps hearing a child recite the alphabet. The descending vertical lines, like FC'', represent a 
continuum of retention phases that accompany each successive primal impression. Primal 
impression E is retained at F as E' and apprehended along with the retentions, i.e. further past mode 
representations of the previous primal impressions D and C, which are denoted by D'' and C''', 
respectively. Likewise, F' is the retention of F accompanying the primal impression G. The 
diagonal dashed lines represent the ongoing retentional modification of primal impressions fading 
                                                 
49 I generated this figure by extrapolating from Husserl’s own diagram (1893-1917: 28) and Dainton’s 
reconstruction (2000: 152).  Compare to Merleau-Ponty (2004: 484) and Gallagher's modified version (1998: 50). 
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into the past, where the closer a retention is to the horizontal line, the more recent it is in the stream 
of conscious experience. So, at E, the impression of D is just-past, as D'. At F, the prior impression 
D is experienced as further past than E, hence D'' is lower than E' on the descending vertical; also 
at G, D is experienced as more past than it was at F, so D''' is further from the horizontal than D''. 
According to the intentionalist model, perceptual experience is inexorably and continuously 
being updated, as Husserl claims, “a pushing back into the past continually occurs. The same 
continuous complex incessantly undergoes a modification until it disappears; for a weakening, 
which finally ends in imperceptibility, goes hand in hand with the modification” (1893-1917: 30-
1). To illustrate the so-called ‘weakening’ in the figure, at H, the retention of D has faded almost 
entirely beyond the horizon of recent ongoing experience, to its eventual imperceptibility which I 
have represented by blurring the retention D''''. I think this helps to appreciate Husserl’s conception 
of the indefinite and continuously changing boundaries of the temporal field (Zeitsfeld) of 
experience, which bears striking similarities to the fields posited by Content Extensionalism with 
the important difference that tensed modes delimit the field for the Husserlian intentionalist model.  
One should also bear in mind that the figure abstracts away from the analog continuity of actual 
experience, by positing discrete primal impressions, thereby digitizing the intentional complex of 
protention-impression-retention. For Husserl, temporal experience is continuous, such that 
between F and G there is a dense continuous series of other primal impressions not represented in 
the diagram, since doing so would clutter the figure and make the model more difficult to explicate. 
Also, the vertical dashed lines, like EC'', consists in a continuum of retention phases, where each 
continuum of retentions represents immediately receding impressions and prior retentions 
undergoing retentional modification.  
41 
 
Figure 3 also depicts the anticipations of future primal impressions, i.e. protentions, the 
functional directedness of perceptual experience towards what is coming, with the vertical dotted 
lines ` GF, ` HG, and ` IH, which represent the protentions of intervals FG, GH, and HI, respectively. 
In contrast to the detailed analysis of retention, Husserl actually says relatively little about 
protention, which has led others to largely ignore it as well.50  Protention cannot simply be given 
a symmetrical analysis to retention for two distinct reasons. First, as just mentioned, ongoing 
temporal experience always consists in a retentional continuum of contents fading into the past of 
experience, eventually disappearing beyond the horizon of experience, viz. the running-off 
continuity hypothesis. Protention is a projective function of experience, the expectation that 
experience will continue in some way or other. Yet, it makes no sense to posit a protentional 
continuum since the horizon of future percepts does not reach very far, and is somewhat 
indeterminate (hence my blurring of `G, `H, `I). Sean Gallagher makes precisely this point, 
“protentioning cannot be a gradual and orderly fading into obscurity; it must be an unregulated, 
relatively indeterminate, and temporally ambiguous sense of what is to come” (1998: 68). 
Protention is more of an open anticipation of the unbidden and inevitable continuation of 
experience. Of course, we can and do anticipate specific future continuations of larger-scale 
events. I expect the child to continue reciting the alphabet, in order, until she reaches ‘Z,’ but that 
sort of determinate prediction is not confused with perceptual experience and thus is not a function 
of protention. Whereas, there is a sense in which I perceive or protend `G before the child voices 
“G,” I anticipate what I am immediately about to hear. Listening to familiar music has this effect, 
as well.  
                                                 
50 E.g., Barry Dainton sets it aside by saying, “Husserl is right to point out that we are not surprised that our experience 
continues; at any moment we expect that something will come next, experientially. But since Husserl does not give 
great emphasis to the protentional aspect of experience, nor shall I.” (2000: 153) 
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Second, the content of retentions are fixed by the impressions from which they descend. That 
which is intended by the retentional modification is determined, what the modification changes is 
the temporal orientation and tensed context from one moment to the next. Protention is entirely 
different in this respect, “protentioning is necessarily, as it functions, an unfulfilled intentioning 
directed toward an immediate but indeterminate about-to-become” (Gallagher 1998: 68). So, 
protention is unlike retention, in that it cannot consist in a continuum and its content is 
indeterminate.  
One might think that protention is a gloss on the “forward-looking” trajectory estimation 
function that I ascribe my preferred version of content extensionalism, but I think the differences 
actually favor extensionalism over intentionalism. Recall that a trajectory estimation function 
algorithmically predicts future transformations of represented events by filtering the noise from 
observed signals and exploiting a prediction-correction cycle to generate statistically optimal state 
estimations (Grush 2005a, Kalman 1960). Such state estimations have determinate content, rather 
than the indeterminacy built into the future-tensed mode of Husserlian protention. In this way, 
such a model provides a detailed and computationally sound manner for how a system of temporal 
perception constructs the leading edge of a temporal field of content, based on the most probable 
future state estimation. In comparison to this systematic and computable function, Husserl and his 
apologists, like Gallagher and Zahavi, give vague accounts of protention, as a function for 
intending indeterminate future contents, describing it as, ‘unregulated, relatively indeterminate, 
and temporally ambiguous sense of what is to come.’ On this score, a version of content 
extensionalism that posits a trajectory estimation function provides a detailed account to better 
explain how temporal perception can reliably represent near future contents in present experience, 
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whereas intentionalism waves its hands at a functionally ambiguous component of the intentional 
structure of our experiences.  
One might think that intentionalism can easily adopt the trajectory-estimate hypothesis to 
improve the account, but there is reason why doing so would depart significantly from the 
intentionalist analysis. Trajectory estimates are probabilistic predictions based on noise filtering, 
for which tense plays no functional role. Protentions, by contrast, are future tensed anticipations 
of immanent primal impressions, where the tense of the content plays an explanatory role in the 
relation that obtains between protention, primal impression, and retention in the intentionalist 
framework. As a primal impression, say D, is experienced and sinks into the past as D', D'', D''', 
etc., all that retentional modification changes is the tensed mode of presentation while retaining 
the content D; I anticipate that I will hear a D after B and C, and then D fades further and further 
into the past. On the trajectory estimate hypothesis, however, the entire trajectory is re-estimated 
through prediction-correction feedback cycles, entailing that some earlier perceptual information 
can be adjusted or overwritten to generate better estimates of the entire trajectory. Rick Grush 
emphasizes this significant difference between the trajectory estimation model and Husserl’s 
analysis: 
Husserl sees the relation between protention, retention and primal impression as one of 
‘modifying’ items that remain in other respects constant. This is suggested by the name 
‘retention’ itself, but is also explicitly stated as a feature of the analysis. On the trajectory 
estimation model this is not what happens. As time progresses, the entire trajectory is re-
estimated, with the consequence that some parts of the estimate can be changed. For 
example, according to the trajectory estimation model, in the cutaneous rabbit situation, at 
the time of the second tap the relevant part of the trajectory estimate is ‘second tap at the 
wrist’. If Husserl were correct about the way that retention operates, then this estimate 
should simply sink back, unchanged but for its temporal marker, as time progresses. But 
as we have seen, this need not happen. At some point, if the sequence of stimuli is right, 
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the trajectory estimate will be modified so that the relevant retention will have the content 
‘there was a second tap proximal to the wrist’. And this will be the correct explication of 
the content of that retention, at that time, even though there never was a primal impression 
with that content. On Husserl’s analysis, temporal illusions should not be possible. But 
they are possible, so Husserl’s analysis can’t be right in this respect.   (2006: 449) 
 
 Although Husserl makes an important insight by including protention in his model of the 
intentional structure of time consciousness, the model is ill-equipped to explain the mechanism of 
trajectory estimation without abandoning both the tensed mode of presentation explanation and his 
conception of ongoing retentional modification. Content extensionalism, however, can make good 
on the promise of explaining how an ongoing predictive mechanism plays a functional role in 
representing dynamic targets in experience.  
To further complicate the intentionalist model, slightly, one might experience multiple 
sensations together simultaneously, e.g. seeing lightning begin to flash and hearing a dog begin to 
howl. If those stimuli are initially experienced together, the entire constellation of simultaneous 
experiences undergo modification together as they sink further into the past. As Husserl claims, 
“several, many primal sensations occur 'at once'. And when any of them elapses, the multitude 
elapses ‘conjointly’ and in absolutely the same mode with absolutely the same gradations and in 
absolutely the same tempo” (1893-1917: 77).  If stimuli are perceived simultaneously, then they 
degrade and fade together in synchrony and at the same pace. There is a general exception to this 
conjoint elapsing; namely, when various simultaneous sensations are parts of distinct events of 
varying lengths, “series of primal sensations constitutive of the enduring immanent objects are 
variously prolonged, corresponding to the varying durations of the immanent objects” (1893-1917: 
77). In a simpler paraphrase, sensations that constitute initial phases in a longer event may continue 
to fade in connection to that event, when the initial phase in a briefer event has already faded into 
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obscurity. For example, the series of sensations constituting the visual lightning strike experience 
will fade beyond the retentional horizon of experience, whereas the initial phases of the dog howl 
experience continue to “flow away,” relative to the prolongation of the howl.  
Does this seem like a perspicuous account of temporal experience? When seeing lighting strike 
and hearing a dog howl at roughly the same time, do the early phases of those events seem to fade 
in synchrony? Another difficulty with intentionalism is not in the abstract conception of Husserl’s 
model, but rather its failure to adequately describe our actual experience or the contents of those 
experiences. It does not seem that I am presently experiencing fading traces of retentional continua, 
call this the ‘Lingering Contents’ objection (Dainton 2000).  
I do not perceive fading lightning flashes and previous phases of howling, I hear the present 
howl as present. To further illustrate, when I witness the execution of a 6-4-3 double-play in a 
baseball game, I first perceive the toss from short to second, then the throw from second to first 
(along with a retention of the toss from short to second).51 Husserlian intentionalism, on the other 
hand, gives a much more complex account: if the primal impression is momentary, then I should 
be conscious of the retentional fading of each successive momentary phases of the ball’s trajectory, 
as well as the countless fading continua of each of the player’s movements. But, there are no 
“comet-tails” of experiential contents. For instance, if you are listening to music on your stereo 
and someone suddenly disconnects the speakers from the receiver the music halts, the most recent 
melodic phrases do not linger on in experience, as we should predict if intentionalism were correct. 
So, Lingering Contents shows that intentionalism is misleading, at best, and a false account of 
present experience, at worst.  
                                                 
51 This might work if the two distinct throws were within two adjacent experiences as present and an intentional 
analysis is merely employed to account for the continuous succession of the double-play as a whole, a longer temporal 
gestalt.  In such a case, however, the resulting theory would be a version of Content Extensionalism with an ancillary 
intentional analysis to account for temporal phenomena extending beyond the present.   
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A related problem for intentionalism is what is sometimes called this the ‘Clogging of 
Experience’ objection (Dainton 2000). According to the intentionalist model, at any given 
moment, I must be apprehending an infinite amount of content due to the retentional continua of 
every successive phase of experience. If so, then observing a simple double-play would be a 
dizzying experience, listening to music would be overwhelming with all the layers of auditory 
continua, in general experience would be clogged by surplus content. But, it is impossible to 
perceive an infinite amount of content and, even if it were possible, it would make temporal 
perception much too computationally expensive—needing to devote all of the brain's cognitive 
resources to the task, thereby making it near impossible to engage in the world. This is not a very 
promising model for reproductive fitness. If our system for temporal perception were this taxing, 
then our species would have been evolutionary rejects long ago. 
Both Zahavi (2005, 2007) and Gallagher (2003) defend the model against these related 
objections by appealing to the strictly intentional character of both protention and retention.  That 
is, retentions do not supply additional content, they only modify our presently apprehended 
contents and what is retained is simply the meaning or significance of the just-past contents.  
Zahavi claims: 
…the protention and retention are dependent moments of any occurent experience.  They 
do not provide us with additional intentional objects, but with a consciousness of the 
temporal horizon of the present object. (2005: 58) 
 
This reply seems to supply answers to the Lingering Contents and Clogging of Experience 
objections to intentionalism by emphasizing the intentional structure of experience, and rejecting 
a commitment to persisting contents. If all that is being modified in retention is the tensed horizon 
of our past experiences in relation to the present primal impression, then retentions functions like 
a tense-marking working memory and just-past contents would not linger on in present experience. 
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Likewise, if retention only modifies the tense of just-past contents in relation to the present 
experience without generating additional intentional objects, then retentional continua do not clog 
our experience in the way the objection suggests. In this manner, the Zahavi-Gallagher line of 
response provides reasonable rejoinders to the standard objections by clarifying how the 
intentional structure retains past contents. 
But, at what cost? In making this clarification, it is difficult to grasp how intentionalism is able 
to explain how we perceive dynamic targets as present. If the only genuine content is the now-
phase of an event that is consciously apprehended in a primary impression, then we can never 
apprehend motion, change, or succession. We can only appeal to the retained meanings of just-
past contents to discern that something has moved, has changed, or something has succeeded 
something else. On the Gallagher-Zahavi purely intentional interpretation, at most, we perceive 
the phenomenal content of the primal impression (not the primal impression itself, rather the now-
phase of an event segment that is apprehended in the primal impression), and both protention and 
retention are only intentional horizons and modifications of the successive apprehensions. So, 
intentionalism, on the revised reading, seems to make representation of ongoing events a matter of 
intentional recognition of contents and tensed relations that obtain between them, rather than 
perception dynamic targets. 
Certainly we can countenance intentional features of temporal experience, features that inform 
our phenomenal contents, including tensed modes of temporal orientation, but a purely intentional 
account fails to do justice to the perceptual component of our actual experience. This should be 
taken as a significant cost, since we initially set out to disclose the conditions for the possibility of 
temporal experiences targeting dynamic events like birds flying, thunder rolling, or a saxophone 
melody meandering. A proponent of the model may modify the intentional reading to preserve the 
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contents apprehended in the primal impression, but this would only give us a continuous series of 
sensory impressions, and intentionalism would collapse into the view according to which the 
representation of an ongoing dynamic event, like a bird in flight, reduces to discrete perceptions 
of each temporal part of the event.52 The revised version of intentionalism avoids the lingering 
content and clogging of experience objections, but at the expense of either disconnecting our 
temporal experience from perceptual contents or only positing a continuous series of momentary 
impressions. Therefore, intentionalism is insufficient by itself for adequately accounting for 
phenomenological claims (i-iii), and a fortiori is insufficient to provide an explanatory analysis 
thereof.  
Unlike intentionalist models, the representational strategy, available to content extensionalism, 
forgoes tensed modes of temporal orientation, and instead posits a mechanism by which a cognitive 
system intends dynamic targets of sufficiently brief interval, where the semantic content of the 
token mental representation represents the temporal structure of the extended events (e.g., the 
crack of the thunder peal preceding its boom) and the experience also indicates one’s context-
sensitive relation to the target event, i.e. the brief thunder peal in its entirety as present.  In terms 
of cognitive economy, the representational strategy enables a perceptual system to group together 
connected sequences of events within a sufficiently small interval, which is plausibly a more 
efficient solution to the cognitive task than representing each instantaneous phase of an event 
individually. Contrast this to the view implied by the second horn of the dilemma (A7), which 
claims that sequences of non-simultaneous events are never perceived together within a single 
experience. From which it follows, representations as of succession reduce to successive 
perceptions of finely individuated atomic events—call these “Atomistic Models.” 
                                                 
52 On such a reading, intentionalism collapses into a version of temporal atomism, the model I introduce briefly 
below and argue against at length in Chapter 2. 
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An atomistic model holds that a present perceptual experience can only represent what happens 
at that time and is not divisible into earlier and later parts in perception. This move simply denies 
the phenomenological claim (ii), that we do perceive dynamic events as present, such as 
successions, movements, and changes. Such a denial implies that any purported dynamic 
experiences are not perceptual at all, but are inferential and combinatorial through and through. 
For instance, some models posit the recruitment of some form of memory in order to make ongoing 
inferential judgments of succession on the basis of successive discrete perceptions. Denying that 
we ever experience dynamic succession amounts to a denial of this widely endorsed 
phenomenological difference, between experience of succession and a succession of experiences.53 
Recognizing this distinction is part of the motivation for the early and continued philosophical 
discussion of temporal experience. Consider each of the following passages: 
 
The representation of something persisting in existence is not the same as a persisting 
representation. (Kant 1781/87: Bxli) 
 
A succession of feelings, in and of itself, is not a feeling of succession. (James 1890: 629) 
 
Obviously we must distinguish…the perception of a sequence from a mere sequence of 
perceptions. (Sellars 1968: 232) 
 
It has long been recognized that a succession of experiences is one thing, and an 
experience of succession is quite another. (Dainton, 2008: 623) 
 
The fact that the stimulus endures still does not mean that the sensation is sensed as 
enduring; it means only that the sensation also endures.  The duration of sensation and 
sensation of duration are two very different things.  And this is equally true of succession.  
                                                 
53 See Herbart (1834: 133), (James 1890: 629), (Strong 1896: 153), Broad (1923: 351), (Paton 1929: 318), Gallagher 
(1998: 22), Dainton (2003: 2), Lockwood (2005: 363); for a dissenting opinion, see Kelly (2005).  
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The succession of sensations and the sensation of succession are not the same. (Husserl 
1893-1917: 12)54 
 
To illustrate the distinction, a single experience of a thunder peal as present is markedly different 
than successive experiences of perceiving the lighting flash as present, then the intervening silence 
as present, and then the thunder peal as present. In the former experience, on one hand, I seem to 
perceive the crack and boom of the thunder peal together as present while also being aware that 
the crack occurs before the boom. On the other hand, I do not seem to perceive the lightning, 
silence, and thunder together as present; rather, the perceptions succeed one another, each of which 
is individually experienced as present within a sufficiently brief interval. 
According to the atomistic model, in neither case do I perceive a brief dynamic event as 
present, instead the purported experiences are comprised of successive simultaneous snapshots of 
the ongoing events. Judgments of dynamic qualities are made after the fact, thus not experienced 
together as present. This shifts the burden of explanation onto the atomist, to explain why there 
seems to be difference in these cases and why we seem to have such perceptual experiences of 
dynamic events when their model entails that we do not. Such an error theory, would have the 
additional burden of providing a principled distinction between experiences of illusory dynamic 
targets, like musical hallucinations, and veridical experiences of sound events. The 
representational explanation available to Content Extensionalism does justice to the 
phenomenological difference and provides a framework for understanding temporal illusions and 
hallucinations, faring better than the Atomistic Model on both counts.55  
                                                 
54 For similar observations, see Broad (1923: 351), Gallagher (1998: 22), Dainton (2003: 2), Lockwood (2005: 363); 
for a dissenting opinion, see Kelly (2005b).  
55
 I address atomistic models in more detail and some of their error theory proposals (viz. Chuard 2011, Paul 2011) 
in Chapter 2. In Chapter 4, I argue that Content Extensionalism also fares better than Atomism with respect to 
explaining how the mechanisms for temporal perception are physically realized in neural architecture. 
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1.7. Conclusion 
In responding to the Argument Against Extensionalism, I have sought to provide a workable 
solution for defending Content Extensionalism, and accommodate three phenomenological claims 
that I motivated at the outset: (i) temporal perception targets dynamic events which instantiate 
temporal properties and stand in temporal relations, (ii) that humans perceive dynamic events as 
present, and (iii) that successive events of brief duration are experienced together as present. I have 
not shown that Content Extensionalism is the only model in town. I have given a detailed analysis 
of both forms of extensionalism. I argued that process extensionalist models are committed to a 
property inheritance hypothesis, MIRRORING, which generates problems of source-dependency, 
where one possible way out involves endorsing some form of anti-representationalism about 
perception. Additionally, I have argued that content extensionalism has explanatory advantages 
when paired with a theory of mental representation that distinguishes representation from 
indication, and thereby recognizes that representations are source-independent isomorphs of their 
intended targets, which provides a straightforward account of claims (i-iii). I also examined 
Husserlian intentionalist models, and argued that it fails as a model of present experience that 
accommodates all three claims. Where intentionalism actually shares some insights with content 
extensionalism, regarding the function of intending future contents, I argue that a content 
extensionalist model that posits a trajectory estimation function is better-suited to explain how this 
mechanism works, making the Husserlian analysis otiose. This chapter introduces my model-based 
approach to temporal perception, provides some initial defense of content extensionalism, and 
advances some objections against the contending competitors.  
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2. MODELING CONSTANT MOTION PERCEPTION 
2.1. Introduction 
We seem to see raptors gliding in flight, leaves falling, bicycles cruising past, second-hands 
sweeping across the face of an analog clock, among countless other examples of constant motions 
perceived by humans. Seeing objects in motion is an ordinary everyday feature of visual 
experience, so ordinary that some take our visual capacity to target and track objects in constant 
motion to be an obvious fact (Phillips 2011: 808). In this context, what is meant by ‘seeing constant 
motion’ is that ‘there is no period during one’s visual experience of the moving target over which 
it does not appear to be changing position.’ In this sense, seeing constant motion is simply seeing 
something moving between stops, even if you never see the object at rest (e.g. a bee flies into your 
visual field, buzzes around, and flies out of sight). Observing a cardinal fly from a branch in one 
tree to another, the bird’s flights between the branches count as instances of constant motion, since 
the cardinal does not appear to pause or stop in mid-flight. Watching a pitcher throw a baseball, 
where the ball travels along a parabolic path after being released from the pitcher’s hand counts as 
constant motion. Windmills spinning, snakes slithering, hockey pucks sliding, and vehicles 
speeding are all constant motions observable by humans.  
The plethora of examples helps illustrate that, on this broad understanding of constant motion, 
it neither implies constant velocity nor constant direction. Pitches decelerate, speeding vehicles 
accelerate, slithering snakes take a meandering path, birds and bees change direction in flight, but 
insofar as the objects do not appear to stop during the periods over which they move, they satisfy 
the criterion for observable constant motions. Given their prevalence, putative experiences of 
seeing constant motion are some of the primary visual phenomena for which a model of temporal 
perception ought to have an account.  
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I say ‘putative experiences’ to avoid begging questions, because not everyone accepts that we 
perceive motion, even if we obviously seem to, since seeing motion would require perceiving the 
temporal relations between non-simultaneous events. For this reason, temporal atomism (hereafter 
‘atomism’), the view that perception can only represent what happens at a given time, denies that 
we perceive constant motion, but develops an explanation of how a series of successive static 
experiences produces the phenomenal seeming of motion perception (Le Poidevin 2007, Chuard 
2011, Paul 2010). The atomist model of perception holds that representations of motion over time 
reduce to a series of static percepts at a time, experienced sequentially. In brief, temporal atomism 
is the thesis that creatures like us are only capable of perceiving what is happening at a given time. 
If so, then we do not perceive temporally extended events instantiating temporal properties and 
relations.  
By contrast, content extensionalism holds that we do perceive temporal relations between non-
simultaneous events, and we perceive motion in virtue of representing temporally extended, albeit 
brief, phases of ongoing events. For content extensionalism, perceptual representations of constant 
motion are not reducible to mere successions of static atomic perceptions representing what 
happens at a given time. Rather, according to the content extensionalism I defend, seeing an object 
in constant motion requires sampling visual information about object’s trajectory over multiple 
temporal scales and continuously integrating the information, from which perceptual 
representations of extended phases of the object’s motion are extrapolated.56 Suppose, for example, 
seeing a baseball in motion is a result of sampling the ball’s trajectory at both 20-50ms and 150-
300ms, integrating distinct information from the samples (e.g. angular rotation cues at 20-50ms 
and velocity cues at 150-300 ms), and extrapolating a representation of the ball’s motion including 
                                                 
56 In Chapter 4, “Multi-scale Sampling and Integration as a Basis for Temporal Perception,” I argue for the multi-
scale sampling hypothesis at-length and make the case that it is a proprietary hypothesis of content extensionalism.  
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predicted future locations—continuously updated by a correction-feedback loop.57 On this way of 
modeling temporal perception, experiences of constant motion are not reducible to a series of static 
atomic perceptions, because perceptual representations are generated and updated by information 
gleaned from the motion-stimuli across multiple temporal grains.  
From these brief glosses and the contrast of the two models, there appears to be a substantial 
disagreement between atomism and extensionalism, which the case of motion perception 
illustrates. Atomism contends that we only perceive what happens at a given time and that putative 
experiences of motion reduce to a series of successive static perceptual “snapshots,” whereas 
content extensionalism denies the reduction to a static series and instead holds that perceptual 
representations of constant motion derive from integration of information sampled over multiple 
temporal scales.  
In what follows, I articulate and explore the nature of the disagreement between these two 
primary contenders in the temporal perception debate, and defend content extensionalism.58 In 
§2.2, I highlight some of the primary motivations for endorsing atomism, in order to get a better 
picture of the differing background commitments and intuitions. Since atomists often appeal to 
British empiricism for the historical provenance of their view, in §2.2.1, I briefly evaluate the 
Lockean motivations for atomism. Another central feature of atomism is a mereological 
conception of experiences, such that purported experiences of extended temporal contents, like 
                                                 
57 See Chapter 4, “Multi-scale Sampling and Integration as a Basis for Temporal Perception”  
58 In Chapter 1, “Modeling Present Experience,” I discuss other versions of extensionalism and Husserlian 
intentionalism. In the present chapter, I focus on atomism and, my preferred model, content extensionalism. Two 
reasons for this restriction, one programmatic and one philosophical. First, the first chapter serves partially as a survey 
of possible models and where content extensionalism fits in relation to the other models, but I also offer arguments 
against process extensionalism and intentionalism in that chapter and I take atomism to be the strongest opposing 
view. Second, intentionalism can be interpreted in at least two different ways (departing from Husserl orthodoxy), one 
by which it approximates content extensionalism and the other by which it approximates atomism; since either view 
can adopt some insights from intentionalism, including it here would needlessly complicate the analysis in the present 
chapter.  
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seeing constant motion, are composed by successively combining atomic temporal parts (i.e. 
perceptions at a time), and the purported extended “whole” experiences supervene on and are 
reducible to the successive atomic perceptions of which they are composed. In §2.2.2, I weigh in 
on Philippe Chuard’s (2011) Mereological Argument for the ontological priority of atomic 
perceptions and respond to the challenge it presents to some versions of extensionalism.  
In §2.3, I develop arguments in defense of content extensionalism, challenge atomism, and 
appraise the possible rebuttal strategies available to atomism. The apparent phenomenology of 
extended temporal experiences, like seeing constant motion or hearing melodic progressions, 
provide strong prima facie reasons to endorse some form of extensionalism or, at least, find 
counter-intuitive the atomist’s denial that we ever perceive temporal relations between non-
simultaneous events. In §2.3.1, I argue that the apparent phenomenology places a burden of 
explanation on atomism, requiring an error theory to explain away our putative perceptions as of 
constant motion and make their anti-realism about extended experiences palatable. In §2.3.2, I 
further strengthen the prima facie case in favor of extensionalism by arguing that a wide-range of 
cutting-edge neurocognitive and biological research programs operate on the presupposition that 
humans and non-human animals perceive constant motion. I proceed to examine the hypothesis 
that visual motion processing is realized in the middle temporal area of the visual cortex and the 
pathology that results from damage to that area, known as cerebral akinetopsia, wherein the patient 
exhibits deficits in global motion perception (Zeki 1991, 2015). I discuss the well-known case 
study of akinetopsia patient LM (Zihl et al. 1983, Baker et al. 1991), and argue that in order to 
explain LM’s neuropathology atomism must resort to positing dubious auxiliary hypotheses, 
which mark significant departures from prevailing neuroscience.  
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After establishing the prima facie case in favor of content extensionalism, in §2.3.3, I charge 
atomism with an error theory, charitably reconstruct their standard zoetropic strategy for 
explaining away the apparent phenomenology, and criticize the zoetropic strategy. In §2.3.4, I 
reconstruct a standard version of the Individuation Argument for extensionalism and explain its 
weaknesses as strategy for defending extensionalism.  
In §2.4, I utilize a version of Zeno’s familiar puzzle of motion, survey some common mistaken 
solutions, and explain the now standard Russell-Salmon ‘At-At’ motion solution to the puzzle. I 
draw analogies between Zeno’s puzzle and the temporal perception debate, and argue that the 
atomist explanation of motion experience is analogous to Zeno’s failed solution to the original 
puzzle and that content extensionalism provides a preferred explanation consonant with the 
Russell-Salmon solution. I conclude by taking stock of the debate between atomism and content 
extensionalism. 
 
2.2. Motivations for Atomism  
2.2.1. Lockean Motivations 
Atomists often attribute the historical provenance of their view within empiricism and Locke's 
conception of an instant. On one interpretation, Locke suggests that we individuate moments of 
experience by the ideas we can entertain at any one time. If we perceive no succession (even if 
there is one), then this constitutes an experiential instant. Consistent with the claims of atomism, 
a mental instant has some duration (not durationless), although it seems instantaneous to us. Locke 
illustrates the hypothesis by appealing to the example of a cannon ball passing through two walls 
of a room and taking with it the flesh of a man: 
Real succession in swift motions without sense of succession. The reason I have for this 
odd conjecture is, from observing that, in the impressions made upon any of our senses, we 
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can but to a certain degree perceive any succession; which, if exceedingly quick, the sense 
of succession is lost, even in cases where it is evident that there is a real succession. Let a 
cannon-bullet pass through a room, and in its way take with it any limb, or fleshy parts of 
a man, it is as clear as any demonstration can be, that it must strike successively the two 
sides of the room: it is also evident that it must touch one part of the flesh first, and another 
after, and so in succession: and yet, I believe, nobody who ever felt the pain of such a shot, 
or heard the blow against the two distant walls, could perceive any succession either in the 
pain or sound of so swift a stroke. Such a part of duration as this, wherein we perceive no 
succession, is that which we call an instant, and is that which takes up the time of only one 
idea in our minds, without the succession of another; wherein, therefore, we perceive no 
succession at all. (Essay, II.xiv.10) 
 
Atomists interpret this passage as Locke defining an ‘instant’ as ‘the time of only one idea’ and 
thereby expressing an atomistic “snapshot” view of temporal experience. Locke observes that there 
is ‘real succession in swift motions without sense of succession,’ and claims that there are motions 
that our human senses are too coarse-grained and can only perceive succession to a ‘certain 
degree.’ With respect to this inability to perceive fast motion, Locke hypothesizes that we cannot 
perceive rapid successions below a certain threshold even in cases where it is otherwise apparent 
that a succession took place. Atomists thereby take Locke as a forbearer of their view by 
acknowledging the limitations of our perception in perceiving fast motion and asserting that an 
experiential instant is only extended enough to entertain ‘one idea.’  
It is not altogether obvious, however, that Locke’s definition of instant implies the atomist 
thesis that one can only perceive what occurs at a given time. Locke defines ‘an instant’ as, ‘that 
which takes up the time of only one idea in our minds,’ but that does not obviously place 
restrictions on the complexity of the idea that can be entertained in such an instant. After all, Locke 
describes the mental operation of “Composition” to be the function which, “puts together several 
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of those simple ones it has received from sensation and reflection, and combines them into complex 
ones” (II.xi.6). I can perceive a butterfly because my mind combines the various simple ideas 
delivered via the senses (e.g. shapes, colors) along with general abstractions (e.g. antennae, wings, 
proboscis) to arrive at complex idea of a butterfly. Locke holds that if I entertain multiple ideas 
simultaneously, then my complex mental state constitutes non-inferential knowledge of the 
agreements between those ideas (Weinberg 2016). Although I must entertain the ideas 
simultaneously, it does not entail that the source of those sensations must occur simultaneously, 
i.e. in an instant. I could, for example, observe the butterfly land on a flower and begin probing 
with its proboscis, and thus perceive the complex idea of pollination by simultaneously holding in 
my mind the brief succession of movements carried out by the butterfly. So, arguably, although an 
instant is the time of only one idea in our minds, that idea can be complex and represent an 
extended event. 
Atomists are likely to respond to the previous argument by appealing to Locke’s discussion of 
the mental faculty “Retention,” which includes both contemplation and memory (II.x). The atomist 
can claim that the complex idea of the butterfly’s pollinating actions is only possible due to 
retaining the succession of sensory ideas of the butterfly over several instants that together 
compose the complex idea of the extended pollinating event, “by keeping the idea which is brought 
into it, for some time actually in view, which is called contemplation” (II.x.1). According to this 
line of response, I can know the butterfly is pollinating in virtue of my present sensations in 
combination with the retained ideas of the previous states of the butterfly. On this interpretation, 
one can see more clearly why atomists often identify Locke as an early representative of their view. 
Locke’s concept of an instant, the combinatorial operation of composition, and the role played by 
the faculty of retention all resonate with the central features of atomism, since atomism claims that 
59 
 
we only perceive what happens at a given time and that putative experiences of extended events, 
like motion, result from successive combinations of static “snapshots.” We should also flag that 
the function of composition in Locke’s theory of ideas, i.e. combining simple ideas into complex 
ones, lends itself to atomism’s mereological conception of experience, such that temporally 
extended experiences are composed of their temporal parts arranged successively. I now turn to 
the argument based on the mereology inherent in the atomist model.  
 
2.2.2. Mereological Argument 
Philippe Chuard’s (2011: 11-16) Mereological Argument presents a compelling challenge to 
extensionalist models, by making the case that whole temporal experiences (e.g. seeing a butterfly 
light upon a zinnia bloom to feed) are nothing over and above their parts experienced sequentially 
(e.g. seeing the butterfly 3cm away from the zinnia @ t1, the butterfly 2cm from the zinnia @ t2, 
the butterfly 1cm from the zinnia @ t3, the butterfly probing the zinnia with its proboscis @ t4). 
If an experience as of succession is explained entirely in terms of perceiving a series of successive 
events, then there is no reason to posit extended temporal experiences. Chuard’s move puts 
pressure on extensionalist models from two directions: a) undermining the common extensionalist 
intuition that an experience of succession is not reducible to a succession of experiences, and b) 
shifting the burden of proof onto the extensionalist to identify a property (or set thereof) which is 
not grounded in a succession of its temporal parts.  
Chuard begins the argument by establishing what he takes to be a very minor point, viz. that 
there are very brief or instantaneous perceptual experiences. By extension, brief near-instantaneous 
experiences are the temporal parts of the purported temporally extended experiences posited by 
extensionalism. He explains how this lemma is easily derived from common criteria for 
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individuating experiences. For example, it is fairly uncontroversial that differences in 
representational content provide a basis for individuation, which he labels the ‘content principle’: 
“If experience e1’s representational content ≠ e2’s representational content, then e1≠e2.” (2011: 12). 
Clearly, this principle can be employed to distinguish between types of experiences. Different 
sensory modalities produce experiences with distinct representational content. For instance, 
smelling an odor is different type of experience from hearing a sound, so olfactory experiences are 
distinct from auditory experiences. Also, the content principle differentiates types of experience 
within a sensory modality. Hearing a C# has different representational content from hearing a G, 
so tokens of those types of experiences are distinct experiences.  
Chuard argues that the content principle entails that the temporal parts of temporally extended 
experiences are distinct experiences. The butterfly pollinating the zinnia example illustrates his 
point. The temporal part of experience E @ t1 represents the butterfly 3cm away from the zinnia, 
the temporal part of E @ t2 represents the butterfly 2cm from the zinnia, the temporal part of E @ 
t3 represents the butterfly 1cm from the zinnia, the temporal part of E @ t3 represents the butterfly 
probing the zinnia with its proboscis, etc. Since each temporal part of the experience represent 
distinct spatial relations between the butterfly and the zinnia, the temporal parts have different 
contents. So, by the content principle, each of the temporal parts of E are distinct token experiences 
of different types.  
The content principle argument purports to show that temporally extended experiences have 
temporal parts that are themselves experiences. Chuard takes this to be uncontroversial, because it 
represents common ground between atomism and his opposition. The primary target of the 
mereological argument is process extensionalism, specifically the model defended by Dainton 
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(2000, 2008).59 Recall from Ch.1, process extensionalism holds that an experience of a temporally 
extended event consists in an extended experiential processes with intrinsic temporal structure: (a) 
composed of temporally contiguous experiences of temporal parts of the events, (b) in virtue of 
being an extended process, an experience represents the temporal structure of dynamic events 
occurring within the same brief interval that the experience itself seems to take up. Since 
experience mirrors the temporal structure of events, for process extensionalism, if the event being 
perceived has temporal parts, then the extended process of perception also has temporal parts. So, 
as Chuard points out, process extensionalism is already committed to the first premise of the 
Mereological Argument: 
M1) “Temporally extended whole experiences are mereologically composed by their 
temporal parts arranged successively.” (2011: 14) 
 
While seemingly uncontroversial, the first premise is crucial to setting-up the argument, 
because it frames the ontological debate between atomism and process extensionalism in terms of 
the mereology of experiences. Since both views accept that there are brief temporal parts which 
compose relevant wholes, the disagreement focuses on what exactly they compose and whether or 
not the wholes are reducible to the parts. On one hand, atomism contends that temporally extended 
whole experiences are nothing over and above the temporal parts, since the wholes are mere 
successions of very brief experiences. On the other, process extensionalism claims that the 
temporally extended whole experiences are irreducible to the temporal parts.  
Chuard states process extensionalism’s irreducibility commitment in terms of a failure of 
supervenience:     
                                                 
59 Chuard calls the view ‘State temporal extension (STE),’ but that is merely a terminological difference, because his 
label picks out the same set of models as my label, ‘Process Extensionalism,’ which I also mention in Ch.1, fn19.  
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M2) “Temporally extended whole experiences don’t supervene on mere successions of 
their temporal parts.” (2011: 15) 
 
Temporally extended whole experiences fail to supervene on mere successions of their temporal 
parts, if it is possible for two whole experiences E1 and E2 to share the same succession of temporal 
parts and yet  E1 ≠ E2. In others words, a particular succession of temporal parts composing a 
temporally extended whole experience E does not suffice to necessitate E, since the whole is not 
reducible to its parts. With this commitment of irreducibility, the burden falls on process 
extensionalism to provide the specific ontological difference between mere successions of 
temporal parts and the whole experiences which they compose. 
M3) If so, “there must be some property F (or set thereof) that whole experiences instantiate 
but mere successions of their parts lack, the having of which doesn’t supervene on 
properties of these temporal parts arranged successively.” (2011: 15) 
 
If there is a failure of supervenience between temporally extended experiences and mere 
successions of their temporal parts, then there must be one or more identifiable properties that 
extended whole experiences instantiate independently of their parts. This is the challenge that 
Chuard directs at process extensionalism: provide a property F instantiated by temporally extended 
experience E that is not grounded in E’s temporal parts arranged successively. He critically 
evaluates a variety of putative candidate properties, including the phenomenological difference of 
‘co-consciousness’ (Dainton 2000, 2008), the mereological differences of whole-part 
determination and part-part determination (Dainton 2000:188-206), and modal differences (Tye 
2003: 29). In each case, Chuard (2011: 16-26) presents compelling objections that each of the 
candidate strategies fails to provide a property, or set thereof, that ontologically distinguishes 
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extended experiences from their temporal parts arranged successively. Thus, he concludes the 
mereological argument: 
M4) “There is no such property F.” (2011: 15) 
M5) So, it must be false that whole experiences do not supervene on their temporal parts. 
 
I will not rehearse his arguments for (M4) here because a) I do not defend process 
extensionalism, and b) I argue that content extensionalism is immune to the mereological 
argument.60 I do suggest a possible modal objection to (M4), in §2.3.2 below, but primarily in the 
context of developing a different explanatory challenge to atomism. I emphasize that the target of 
the argument is process extensionalism, because content extensionalism rejects (M1). Since 
content extensionalism does not share the mereological conception of perceptual experiences, 
there is no commitment to denying supervenience and no need to propose a candidate property F 
to make (M3) true.  
How is (M1) false? Wasn’t it simply derived from a basic content principle for individuating 
perceptual experiences? The content principle is not the source of the problem, rather it is the 
implicit way in which perceptual experience is conceived in (M1) which presupposes mereological 
composition. Recall that content extensionalism claims that an experience of temporally extended 
events consists in a perception representing a temporally structured interval (see §1.3.2). There is 
no commitment that perceptions representing temporally extended contents are mereologically 
composed of temporal parts that are distinct experiences in their own right. Content extensionalism 
does not deny that some perceptions represent very brief near-instantaneous events; those are 
certainly one type of temporal experience with a particular type of representational content, but 
                                                 
60 Chuard acknowledges that his argument is tailored to challenge only one family of extensionalist models, “Here, 
to repeat, I develop a version of the argument specifically targeting the state view (STE)” (2011: 12).  
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temporally extended experiences are another type. Suppose, for example, I hear a melody modulate 
from D major (IV) to C major (III) over a 3s interval, according to content extensionalism, the 
representational content of that experience includes the duration over which the modulation occurs 
and the change in key over that duration. By contrast, a very brief experience of hearing one note 
played in D major (IV) has a different representational content, lacking any representation of 
change or duration. By the content principle, these are tokens of two different types of perceptual 
experience. 
The obvious atomist retort is to claim that the purported perception of melodic modulation is 
composed of several brief perceptions arranged successively, and the judgment of duration is a 
distinct post-perceptual representation aided by memory. First, this move begs the question, 
because it presupposes the atomist thesis that we cannot perceive temporal relations between 
distinct events, which is the central point of the disagreement. Second, it attempts to save the 
phenomenon of hearing the modulation over that interval, by appealing to underspecified post-
perceptual cognitive processes that generate the seeming perception of duration that somehow is 
not really a “perception.” I address this error theoretic character of atomism at length in §2.3, so 
flagging it now is sufficient. 
Additionally, an atomist might argue that since my purported temporally extended experiences 
represent events with earlier and later temporal parts, those experiences also have temporal parts. 
If so, then the parts of the experience representing earlier and later parts of the extended event are 
distinct experiences. To respond, let us revisit the modulation example. When I have the auditory 
experience of hearing a tonic modulation from D major (IV) to C major (III) over a 3s interval, the 
content of my perceptual representation includes a chord in D major (IV) before a common chord 
shared by both keys (e.g. E minor) followed by a chord in C major (III). My perceptual experience 
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represents the chords, the change in tonal center, and the relationship between the chords which 
constitute that change, including the temporal order in which the chords are played. An 
experience’s representational content can be complex in a variety of ways, and it just so happens 
that part of the complexity of extended experiences involves the representation of temporal 
relations, but that does not entail that every part of a representation is its own experience. 
Consider the non-temporal example of seeing the butterfly 3cm from the zinnia @ t1. The 
representational content of my visual experience includes the butterfly, the zinnia, spatial 
relationships between the two, not to mention the colors, shapes, and parts constituting both the 
butterfly and the zinnia. Is my perceptual experience of the antennae distinct from my experience 
of the proboscis? Is my visual experience of each of the petals of the zinnia its own distinct 
experience? Is my experience of the right-half of my visual field a distinct experience from that of 
the left-half? One could divide up one’s visual field an infinite number of ways. If so, am I having 
infinite experiences every time I see anything? This sounds absurd, because it is. The atomist’s 
suggestion that because my perception represents temporal parts of an event, those parts of the 
representation are themselves experiences, implies an infinite explosion of experiences for every 
possible experience, if the atomist’s proposed criterion applied to parts of representations in 
general. If the criterion is only meant to apply to temporal parts, then it is objectionably arbitrary. 
Atomism then faces its own challenge of providing a candidate property F (or set thereof), that 
representations of temporal parts instantiate but representations of every other possible type of part 
lacks, the having of which entails the individuation of experiences for temporal parts and not 
others. The prospects do not seem promising, which is likely why the mereological argument 
makes no effort to attack content extensionalism. 
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In this section I have reconstructed Chuard’s mereological argument, highlighted the 
commitment to a mereological conception of experience for both atomism and process 
extensionalism, shown how the argument poses a formidable threat to process extensionalism, and 
argued that content extensionalism is immune from this atomist attack. In the next section, I go on 
the offensive and present arguments against atomism and in favor of content extensionalism.   
 
2.3. Arguments for Content Extensionalism 
2.3.1. Apparent Phenomenology of Seeing Constant Motion 
I began this chapter with several observations about the wide-ranging everyday phenomena 
that exemplify putative experiences of constant motion. Humans commonly report seeing bees 
pollinating flowers, snakes slithering, raptors gliding on thermal lifts, snowflakes falling, athletes 
running, records rotating on turntables, etc. Recall that for present purposes, seeing constant 
motion is the visual experience of a moving target continuously changing position, i.e. seeing the 
motion of an object between two stops. It bears repeating that constant motion in this sense neither 
implies constant direction nor constant velocity; insofar as the objects do not appear to stop during 
the periods over which they move, they satisfy the criterion for observable constant motions. 
Besides the apparent phenomenological evidence that we observe countless examples of 
constant motion, many of our daily activities are premised on our capacity to detect and track 
moving objects. Swatting a nuisance housefly or mosquito would be nearly impossible, if one were 
unable to see the fast invertebrate motion in flight. Any sporting activity involving passing, 
catching, hitting, or volleying a ball would be unplayable, if one were unable to perceive motion 
and visually estimate trajectories to some degree of accuracy. Riding a bicycle on roadways would 
be a potentially deadly nightmare, if one were unable to see the motion of other vehicles, 
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pedestrians crossing, other cyclists, or animals crossing one’s path. The prevalence of constant 
motions, the overwhelming introspective evidence that one cannot help but observe objects in 
motion, and the common daily activities dependent on perceiving motion serve as strong prima 
facie reasons for contending that the experiences of constant motion are not merely putative, but 
most are veridical.61 Call this the ‘apparent phenomenology premise’ for the prima facie argument 
that humans perceive constant motion.  
Note that the apparent phenomenology does not yet settle how such seeing works, only that 
observation, introspective reports, and capacities for interacting with moving objects favor the 
strong general presumption that humans see things move.  Accordingly, a theory that denies 
perception of motion requires a compelling error theory to explain away why it so strongly appears 
that we do perceive motion. Before examining the atomist’s proposed error theory in greater detail, 
in the next subsection, I suggest that neuroscientific research programs investigating vision and 
skilled capacities for interacting with moving objects also operate on the premise that humans and 
other animals possess visual capacities to see constant motion. 
 
2.3.2. Seeing Constant Motion in Neurocognitive Research 
Our visual capacity to target and track moving objects is often taken as an uncontroversial and 
obvious fact about human experience, not just among the folk but also in relevant scientific circles. 
For instance, the experimental psychology literature on how skilled batters in fast ball-sports like 
baseball, cricket, and tennis successfully perform interceptive actions (Land & McLeod 2000, 
                                                 
61 Of course, there are well-known experimental paradigms that elicit visual illusions of apparent motion. For example, 
experiments where participants are presented two brief transient stimuli (e.g. colored dots on a screen) in two different 
locations, but report an impression of motion (Kolers 1973, Kolers & von Grunau 1976, Liu et al. 2004, Muckli et al. 
2005, Larson et al. 2006) for philosophical discussion of those illusions (cf. Goodman 1978, Dennett 1991, Dennett 
& Kinsbourne 1992, Grush 2005a, Dainton 2008, Paul 2010, Hoerl 2015).    
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Sutton 2007, Croft et al. 2010, Hayhoe et al. 2012, Mann et al. 2013) do not question whether we 
are able to perceive objects in motion, despite disagreements between competing models over how 
exactly we do so. Instead the debates focus on alternative hypotheses explaining how we execute 
visual-motor control in the performance of skilled interceptive actions. Although competing 
models postulate differing functional roles for eye movement strategies like predictive saccades 
(cf. Land & McLeod 2000 and Mann et al. 2013), they agree that humans perceive objects in 
motion and seek to explain how that functions in the skilled performance of hitting a ball.  
Additionally, the capacity for seeing constant motion is commonly attributed to other species 
and spawns research on how such seeing functions in those species: studies on how dogs track and 
catch frisbees (Schaffer et al. 2004), how dragonflies target and intercept prey midair at a 95% 
success rate (Olberg 2012, Gonzalez-Bellido et al. 2013), how archer fish determine where to catch 
their dislodged prey (Rossel et al. 2002, Wöhl & Schuster 2006), how falcons pursue prey using 
visual cues (Kane and Zamani 2014), etc. Of course, the fact that scientists attribute capacities for 
motion perception to both human and non-human animals does not settle the matter. After all, 
philosophers are experts in drawing subtle distinctions and challenging widely accepted beliefs, 
even those that shape and inform empirical research. Citing the wide variety of cutting edge 
research that posits the capacity to see constant motion does, however, flag the degree to which 
the atomist error theory departs from both common phenomenology and scientific orthodoxy 
regarding motion perception. To further press this point, I will explore an extended example to 
illustrate how atomism’s denial of motion perception and mereological conception of experience 
are in tension with science operating on the presupposition that humans perceive motion. 
There is confirmatory neurobiological evidence and reasonably strong consensus supporting 
the hypothesis that visual motion information is processed by neurons, located in the middle 
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temporal area of the visual cortex known as ‘MT’ or ‘V5,’ responding selectively to motion from 
different directions (Schenk 1997, Vaina et al. 2001, Schenk et al. 2005). Insult or damage to MT 
causes a condition known as cerebral akinetopsia, wherein the patient exhibits deficits in global 
motion perception ranging from stroboscopic vision to the inability to detect any motion in the 
visual field (Zeki 1991, 2015).  
The most documented case of akinetopsia is LM, a middle-aged German woman whose MT 
was damaged by stroke (Zihl et al. 1983, Baker et al. 1991). LM could see colors, identify objects, 
and judge distance within normal ranges, however, lacking the capacity to see motion, she 
struggled with many daily activities. When attempting to cross the street, cars did not appear to 
move, rather cars first appearing far way would suddenly appear in front of her. She was unable to 
pour tea into a cup because she could not see the motion of the rising liquid; the cup would appear 
empty at one moment and overflowing the next. LM’s tragic condition provides further support 
for the earlier claim that normal human activities rely on motion perception, since her severe 
deficits resulted in an inability to perform such activities. LM’s visual experience is atomistic, but 
radically different from the visual experience of humans without structural damage to MT. It would 
be a considerable loss for atomism, if the model only applied to a small number of individuals with 
serious brain injuries inhibiting the perception of motion. 
The case of LM poses no trouble for content extensionalism, since the model includes the 
hypothesis that seeing motion involves sampling visual information about an object’s trajectory 
over multiple temporal scales. If populations of neurons in MT selectively respond to motion from 
different directions, tracking objects’ change of relative position, then those neurons are sampling 
visual information over temporal intervals long enough to detect change of position over 
successive moments, on the scale of hundreds of milliseconds. By contrast, populations of neurons 
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in the primary visual cortex (V1) selectively respond to luminescence and contrast in the visual 
field, in order to detect the boundaries of objects (Marr 1982, Bar & Biederman 1999, Biederman 
2013), such neural populations sample visual information over briefer intervals on the scale of tens 
of milliseconds to detect brightness values at a time. LM could see stationary objects and their 
boundaries, because her V1 was undamaged and able to sample static visual information at a time. 
By contrast, she couldn’t see motion, due to the insult she suffered to MT, the cortical region that 
functions to sample extended visual stimuli like change of position over time. Content 
extensionalism thereby provides a plausible explanation of why LM could see objects at a time 
and judge spatial distances within normal ranges, but failed to see objects in motion. 
Atomism appears to be at a slight disadvantage in explaining the case of LM, given the 
mereological claim that putative experiences as of motion reduce to a series of successive 
perceptions. LM was able to perceive objects at a time, atomic visual perception, but she did not 
undergo experiences as of motion. If putative experiences as of motion supervene on mere 
successions of their temporal parts (i.e. atomic visual perceptions), as the atomist claims, then it is 
puzzling how LM could experience atomic visual perceptions in succession without thereby 
undergoing an experience as of motion. She saw the temporal parts of objects at successive 
locations without having the putative whole experience of motion, which seems at odds with the 
atomist’s mereological conception of experience. In response to the case of LM, atomists 
committed to denying that humans perceive motion and proposing an error theory have two likely 
strategies: a) challenge the standard interpretation that processing in MT ever constitutes motion 
perception, instead hypothesizing that it serves a post-perceptual role in generating visual 
representations, or b) suggest that structural damage to MT causes information loss, such that some 
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of the successive temporal parts (i.e. atomic perceptions) are inaccessible and without which no 
putative whole experience of motion supervenes, call this the ‘missing parts’ strategy.  
On strategy (a), an atomist contends that MT processing is a downstream consumer of static 
perceptual information functioning to collate successive atomic perceptions, which makes possible 
representations of motions over time. On this story, the MT neurons are in the business of post-
production editing and compilation, so an MT malfunction would result in the incapacity to 
represent a series of atomic snapshots of an object in adjacent locations as a moving object. 
According to this atomist reimagining of MT’s role in visual cognition, in the case of LM, damage 
to MT results in post-perceptual cognitive deficits in her capacity to represent motion, but not her 
visual perception. This treats LM as a limiting case for all putative experiences of constant motion. 
Most humans undergo experiences as of motion, because processing in MT enables representation 
of motion by combining successive series of static visual perceptions, but no one perceives motion, 
strictly speaking. LM’s deficits are representational, not perceptual. She perceives visually at any 
given time, but cannot generate the higher-order representations that constitute experiences as of 
motion over time.  
Strategy (a) attempts to explain the LM case, by reassigning the function of the MT region 
while preserving the atomist commitment to denying motion perception. Nonetheless, the post-
perceptual malfunction strategy has two apparent shortcomings. The first problem is that the 
explanation threatens to reduce the disagreement to a matter of semantics, a demarcation problem 
between what counts as ‘perception’ and what does not.  
Extensionalists and neuropsychologists alike identify the seeing of motion as a perceptual 
phenomenon and assign functional roles to the neural processing in the visual cortex in their 
models, in order to explain how one perceives motion. If the atomist denies that we ever perceive 
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motion, but accepts that MT plays a critical role in the generation of representations constituting 
experiences as of motion, then it threatens to collapse into a merely verbal debate over the 
application conditions for the concept [perception]. Atomists contend that insofar as different takes 
on their claim that we cannot perceive temporal relations between non-simultaneous events, “rely 
on different notions of ‘perception’ (a narrower one restricted to the purely sensory vs a broader 
notion that’s not so restricted), the difference need not be all that substantive, however” (Chuard 
2011: 8 fn.19). I concur that the dispute between atomists and extensionalists does extend beyond 
semantics, since whether or not we call experiences as of motion ‘perceptual,’ the two models 
propose competing explanatory hypotheses with significantly different ontological commitments. 
So, I recommend that we table worries that the atomist is merely playing at a verbal game.  
The second, and more glaring, problem for strategy (a) is that it does not obviously answer the 
challenge that LM represents a supervenience failure for the atomist’s mereological conception of 
experience with which we began. If LM sees a stationary object at adjacent locations in succession, 
then why does she fail to undergo a putative experience of motion? After all, the atomist asserts 
that a putative experience of motion or succession is nothing over and above a succession of 
discrete experiences. If the malfunction in MT causes the failure to represent motion (perceptually 
or not), then it appears that putative whole experiences do not merely supervene on series of 
successive atomic perceptions, rather putative experiences of motion are independent 
representations produced via collation/compilation/integration of perceptual information in a 
particular order. On this picture, atomic perceptions e1, e2, e3…en of an object in distinct contiguous 
locations at times t1, t2, t3…tn do not stand in a part-to-whole relation with an experience E of that 
object in motion over a duration Δt, rather they stand in a relation more akin to that which obtains 
between raw ingredients and a prepared culinary dish.  
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To achieve a desired culinary result, ingredients in a recipe must be combined in particular 
proportions with specific techniques, sensitive to time, temperature, and application of force. For 
example, a croissant pastry instantiates properties over and above the properties of its simple 
ingredients (viz. milk, sugar, flour, yeast, butter and salt), since the flaky layered finished product 
is a result of laminating the dough, i.e. creating many thin layers of dough and butter by repeatedly 
rolling, folding, and chilling; if done imprecisely, by rushing the steps, or overheating the dough 
in between rolling and folding each layer the baker will fail to yield a proper croissant. The 
properties of the baked croissant might supervene on its many-layered parts, but the finished 
pastry’s properties do not supervene on the properties of its raw ingredients. Likewise, on strategy 
(a), atomic perceptions at a time are analogous to the raw ingredients and the representation of 
motion over time is analogous to the prepared croissant where the processing in MT “laminates” 
the successive experiences together.62  
If the foregoing analogy is apt, then strategy (a) undermines atomism’s commitment to a 
mereological conception of experience. Invoking a function along the lines of post-perceptual 
collation to explain experiences as of motion, and the failure to have such experiences in cases of 
malfunction like LM’s, provides a modal objection to premise (M4) in Chuard’s Mereological 
Argument, viz. that there is no property F, the having of which doesn’t supervene on properties of 
these temporal parts arranged successively. Being collated supplies a de re modal property that the 
whole experience of motion E instantiates, since E could not exist as E without being collated. 
Being collated does not supervene on the properties of its temporal parts e1, e2, e3…en, which it is 
possible to experience successively without undergoing an experience of motion E, as evidenced 
                                                 
62 Processing in MT is a sufficient but unnecessary condition for the visual experience of motion, since multi-
realizability of functional kinds entails that some other suitable physical mechanism could instantiate the functional 
role of collating discrete successive perceptions played by the neural activity in MT. 
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by subjects suffering from akinetopsia like LM.  If it is possible to experience a series of atomic 
perceptions e1, e2, e3…en of an object in distinct contiguous locations in succession without thereby 
undergoing the whole experience of motion E, then, by Leibniz’s Law, E is not identical to the 
succession e1, e2, e3…en. In this manner, tracing the implications of strategy (a) threatens to defeat 
the reductive mereology at the foundation of atomism.  
To avoid the self-defeating implications of (a), atomists can turn to strategy (b) to explain the 
case of LM, hypothesizing that structural damage to MT causes information loss, such that some 
of the successive temporal parts (i.e. atomic perceptions) are inaccessible and without which no 
putative whole experience of motion supervenes. This route suggests that LM’s failure to undergo 
experiences as of motion is simply a matter of missing temporal parts. The atomist can concede 
that LM perceives the object in contiguous locations at successive times as a result of the well-
functioning regions of her visual cortex, and postulate that MT activation plays a functional role 
in the maintenance of content in visual short-term memory (VSTM).63 If so, then structural damage 
to MT causes a failure to retain atomic perceptions in VSTM. Lacking an accessible series of 
retained atomic perceptions, LM cannot undergo experiences as of motion. 
Strategy (b) is also consonant with the general appeal to memory, common in atomist error 
theories, explaining how we seem to experience motion despite the claim that we lack the capacity 
to perceive temporal relations between distinct events. Atomism holds that we can only perceive 
what happens at a given time, but given that we seem to undergo dynamic experiences like those 
of constant motion, memory functions to retain the just-past sensations which in combination with 
the present perceptual information yields a higher-order representation of motion.  
                                                 
63 There is considerable neuroscientific support for the functional relationship between V5/MT and VSTM; see Bisley 
& Pasternack (2000), Bisley et al. (2004), Silvanto & Cattaneo (2010), Ainja et al. (2015), D’Esposito & Postle (2015). 
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In this vein, Thomas Reid argues that the folk (whom he calls ‘the vulgar’) speak loosely when 
they claim to “see” motion, “since no kind of succession can be an object of either the senses of 
consciousness; because the operations of both are confined to the present point of time” (1855: 
235). Reid is clearly within the atomist tradition by denying the possibility of perceiving any kind 
of succession. He diagnoses that the reason folk report having experiences as of motion is that they 
do not properly distinguish sensation from memory. He proceeds to articulate the role that memory 
plays in discerning motion, “philosophically speaking, it is only by the aid of memory that we 
discern motion, or any succession whatsoever. We see the present place of the body; we remember 
the successive advance it made to that place: the first can, then, only give us a conception of 
motion, when joined to the last” (1855: 237). Given the critical role assigned to memory within 
atomist models, the missing parts strategy for explaining LM’s neuropathology seems plausible. 
If she lacks the ability to retain the just-past locations of a moving body, because of the damage to 
her MT, then she lacks the ability to generate an experience of as of motion via successive 
combination of temporal snapshots.  
The missing parts strategy appears to cohere with the atomist’s mereological conception of 
experience, since it attempts to preserve the idea that a temporally extended experience as of 
succession supervenes on a succession of experiences. If there are missing temporal parts due to a 
deficit in VSTM, in cases of akinetopsia, then there are no atomic experiences arranged 
successively upon which an experience as of succession supervenes. Or, is there? By all accounts, 
LM does perceive objects in contiguous locations at successive times as a result of the well-
functioning regions of her visual cortex, but ex hypothesi she is unable to retain any short term 
memory of the discrete visual experiences. So, LM does have successions of discrete experiences, 
yet no supervening experiences as of succession. The atomist’s suggestion is that she lacks the 
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capacity to retain memories of the just-past experiences, and thus the missing temporal parts in her 
memory prevent experiences as of motion. 
There is reason to be suspicious of the missing parts explanation. First, LM has the succession 
of experiences, but either does not retain a memory of each experience in succession or cannot 
access such memories. Nevertheless, atomism claims that experiences as of succession are nothing 
over and above successions of their temporal parts. The missing parts solution sneaks in the tacit 
assumption that short-term memories of an experience are identical to the experiential temporal 
part, since that is what LM is missing according to this strategy. Memories represent experiences, 
but representation falls short of identity, which makes the atomist’s assumption dubious at best 
and at odds with standard models of memory encoding. Without the assumption, supervenience 
fails and the missing parts strategy undermines atomism’s commitment to a mereological 
conception of experience. So, option (b) does not fare much better than strategy (a), and atomism 
lacks a satisfactory explanation of LM that preserves the central commitments of the model. 
To take stock of the arguments in the preceding sections: I first challenged atomism by 
defending the apparent phenomenology premise, viz. that the prevalence of constant motions, the 
overwhelming introspective evidence that one cannot help but observe objects in motion, and the 
common daily activities dependent on perceiving motion serve as strong prima facie reasons for 
contending that the experiences of constant motion are not merely putative, but most are veridical. 
Second, I surveyed a wide variety of recent neurocognitive research that posits the capacity to see 
constant motion in both humans and non-human animals, in order to further emphasize the degree 
to which the atomist error theory departs from both common phenomenology and scientific 
orthodoxy regarding motion perception. Lastly, I employed the case study of LM’s cerebral 
akinetopsia to develop an argument that atomism has insufficient resources to explain LM’s 
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neuropathology without undermining central commitments of the model. I argue that content 
extensionalism accounts for the apparent phenomenology, coheres with presuppositions of 
ongoing neurocognitive research, and provides a plausible explanation of LM’s inability to 
perceive constant motion. Presenting this extended challenge to atomism, I now turn to the atomist 
error theory that aims to explain away the apparent phenomenology and the presumption that 
humans perceive constant motion. 
 
2.3.3. Atomism’s Error Theory relies on the Zoetropic Effect  
Atomism denies that we perceive constant motion but offers an error theory for the phenomenal 
seeming of such putative experiences, whereas content extensionalism explains how we perceive 
constant motion by representing properties and relations instantiated by non-simultaneous events. 
According to atomism, putative temporal experiences as of a baseball in motion or as of a 
guitar arpeggio, are a result of some cognitive post-processing, often involving working memory, 
that utilizes the series of atomistic sensory “snapshots” captured at each moment. On this construal, 
the central claim of atomism is that perception is momentary, and mental representations of 
dynamic events are not perceptual—although atomistic percepts provide the experiential input for 
constructing representations of dynamic content. In this way, atomistic perceptions are the sensory 
building blocks extracted and summated to generate the temporally extended representations, 
which generate putative dynamic content in the phenomenology of our experiences. So, although 
atomists deny that humans perceive constant motion, they acknowledge the need to account for 
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the phenomenology of constant motion in visual experience and do so by a broad appeal to the 
zoetrope effect.64  
The zoetrope effect is whenever a sequence of static images are presented in a manner that 
creates an illusion of motion. A zoetrope is an early animation device consisting of a cylinder with 
a sequence of related static images affixed to the inner ring of the drum and thin slits in the cylinder, 
invented by William George Horner in 1834. The images on the inner ring might, for example, 
represent horse figures in different positions of a gallop, like those in Muybridge’s (1887) animal 
locomotion studies.65 Although each individual image in the sequence lacks any dynamic depictive 
content, the zoetrope produces an illusion of motion when the cylinder spins causing an observer 
peering through the slits to perceive a "moving" image (e.g. a single horse figure galloping).  The 
slits keep the successive images from blurring together. On most accounts, the experience is 
illusory, because instead of perceiving a series of similar horses, the viewer perceives a single 
horse galloping.  
Notice that, in addition to a series of images with a high degree of overlap in the 
representational content, a zoetrope requires actual motion of the drum to produce the illusion of 
motion. A simple flip-book animation works on the same principle, but it is the actual motion of 
flipping pages depicting a sequence of events which creates the illusion of motion in the animation. 
Likewise, the advent of motion pictures and cinematography derives from mechanisms designed 
to produce a zoetrope effect, like Emile Reynaud’s praxinoscope (1877) that utilizes mirrors, 
                                                 
64 Ian Phillips (2011) refers to the atomistic model of perception, as the ‘zoetrope conception of experience.’ 
65 See the complete catalogue of photographs and original prospectus from his locomotion studies: Muybridge, 
Eadweard (1979). Muybridge’s Complete Human and Animal Locomotion: All 781 Plates from the 1887 “Animal 
Locomotion.” Dover Publications. 
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instead of slits on the outside cylinder, and Thomas Edison & W.L.K. Dickson’s kinetograph 
camera and kinetoscope viewing box (1891).66 
The zoetrope effect provides a compelling metaphor for explaining the atomist model of 
temporal perception. Just as animation cells are used in stop-motion animation, or frames of stills 
compose a film, the atomist argues, so too our perceptual system uses a series of static inputs at 
successive times to represent a dynamic event occurring over time. It is tempting to think of visual 
perception as exploiting the zoetrope effect, since motion picture is a familiar medium, making the 
atomistic explanation intuitively plausible and effective as a heuristic. The appeal to cinematic 
motion is all too common and many atomists embrace this metaphor as a way to motivate the 
possibility that our perceptual systems work in a similar fashion (cf. Chuard 2011, Paul 2010). If 
we can record and reproduce action on film via a series of static images, then it is possible for a 
visual system to operate similarly by “recording” the static retinal image at each successive time, 
summating the series of static images, and thereby generating a visual experience as of constant 
motion. 
When I seem to visually experience a butterfly flying from one flower to another, I do not 
perceive the butterfly in motion, according to atomism, rather I perceive the butterfly in just 
noticeably different positions at successive contiguous locations at successive times and additional 
cognitive processes utilize these static images to make it seem as though I see the butterfly in 
motion. When I record a video of the butterfly pollinating zinnias with the digital camera built into 
my phone, the camera records at a rate of 30 frames per second (fps), i.e. it progressively scans 
                                                 
66 For a classic history of scientific film, see Tosi, Virgilio. (2005) Cinema Before Cinema: The Origins of Scientific 
Cinematography. Translated by Sergio Angelini. British Universities Film & Video Council. For more on Edison’s 
inventions, “Thomas Edison Papers,” archive at Rutgers catalogues all of Edison’s patent applications and dates 
related to the inventing and patenting process, including those related to motion picture: 
http://edison.rutgers.edu/filmpats.htm  
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and encodes a orthogonal bitmap digital image once every ~33ms (1/30 second) (Poynton 2012). 
The resulting digital video of the butterfly in motion is composed of a series of static images shown 
in rapid succession at a constant rate; each digital image in the series represents the butterfly and 
the zinnias over a very brief 33ms interval, and when the series is displayed in rapid succession 
the butterfly’s busy pollinating motion can be viewed on a digital screen.67 Like earlier 
technologies that exploit the zoetrope effect, basics of digital video are easy to understand and it 
enables one to conceive of a possible system of visual perception that functions in an analogous 
manner, scanning and encoding retinal images at a constant rapid frame rate, enabling both our 
experiences of constant motion and our memories thereof. Digital video reduces to a series of 
orthogonal bitmap digital images, likewise, the atomist contends that putative visual experiences 
of constant motion reduce to a series of static visual perceptions arranged successively. 
The zoetrope cinematic motion analogy reinforces ontological commitments of the atomist 
model. The analogy supports the reductive claim that putative temporal experiences of motion, 
succession, change, and duration reduce to mere successions of static perceptions at a time. 
Experiences are atomistic like frames of a motion picture, and putative experiences representing 
dynamic content over longer durations are nothing over and above the series of static experiences. 
As Chuard avows, “atomists insist that we cannot really perceive such relations, on the ground that 
no experience or experiential content is temporally extended enough to represent temporally 
distinct events” (2011: 3). Although atomistic experiences are brief enough that they cannot 
represent relations between non-simultaneous events, experience need not be durationless. In the 
video analogy, the digital camera at a rate 30 fps scans an image once every ~33ms, and higher 
frame frequencies further shorten the interval between scans (e.g. 48 fps = one scan every 
                                                 
67 Follow this link to view a 4 sec. digital video I shot of a butterfly pollinating a zinnia. 
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~20.8ms). Likewise, on the atomist model, visual perception operates at a high frame rate, because 
the content in a single experience is not “extended enough” to represent relations between non-
simultaneous events. In this respect, atomism appears committed to a fixed high frequency 
sampling rate, whereas extensionalism posits multi-scale sampling. 
The cinematic zoetrope analogy also provides a useful framework for explaining the atomistic 
error theory for why we seem to have temporally extended experiences even though, strictly 
speaking, we do not.  For atomism, the apparent phenomenology of putative temporal experiences 
are a function of i) phenomenal similarity—the “successive combination” of the phenomenal 
properties in each experience in the succession, ii) temporal proximity: the external temporal 
relations between the experiences, iii) the “degree of overlap” between the representational 
contents of the experiences, and iv) various contingent limitations: cognitive, mnemonic, 
introspective (Chuard 2011: 17).  
When I seem to see the butterfly’s motion as it pollinates, the illusion of experiencing constant 
motion results, in part, from the high frequency sampling rate, i.e. the close temporal proximity 
between each atomistic visual perception. If the visual system had a slow frame frequency with 
longer intervals between each perception, then one’s visual experience might seem staccato and 
discontinuous, like a strobe-light effect. Also, each visual perception in succession, like the bitmap 
digital images, has a high degree of representational overlap and phenomenal similarity. Besides 
the moving butterfly and flowers disturbed by the pollination, nearly everything else represented 
in the background visual field remains relatively unchanged from one atomistic perception to the 
next. Successive perceptions in the series represent the butterfly in just noticeably different 
positions at successive contiguous locations at successive times, but there is still a very high degree 
of representational overlap, especially if the interval between each perception is very brief and one 
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undergoes 30 or more distinct visual experiences per second. The apparent smooth and 
phenomenally continuous visual experience I seem to undergo as I observe the butterfly pollinating 
is due to the phenomenal similarity of each successive experience and high degree of 
representational overlap between the representational contents. If one were to splice together a 
series of digital images with different kinds of butterflies pollinating distinct kinds of flowers in 
varying environments, the playback would resemble a slideshow or an odd montage, but would 
not generate the illusion of a single butterfly in constant motion, because of the low degree of 
representational overlap and phenomenal similarity. 
There are also contingent limitations of the system that realizes visual perception. These 
include various noticeability thresholds, such that some small gradual changes will go unnoticed 
in introspection. Nevertheless, the cognitive, mnemonic, and introspective limitations of 
perceptual systems are acknowledged on both sides of the debate, and thereby should not play a 
central role in motivating or distinguishing atomism over and against extensionalism.68  
Appeals to the zoetrope effect and cinematic motion metaphor, central to the atomist’s error 
theory, pump folk intuitions and make the theory pre-critically attractive, but it is also misleading. 
First, the visual metaphor does not translate well for other modalities like audition, proprioception, 
and olfaction, nor does the atomistic conception of experience provide a satisfying account of the 
multi-modal perceptions and the discrepancies in various sampling rates for distinct sensory 
modalities. As I detail above, a plausible case can be made for vision to function like a high 
frequency frame rate digital video, but the metaphor is inadequate for other sensory modalities. 
For instance, the targets of auditory perception, including melodies and spoken sentences, are 
                                                 
68 See Chapter 4, in which I delimit the lower-bound thresholds on interval processing and integration for temporal 
perception in detail.  
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extended in time. Hearing a melodic phrase is not reducible to hearing individual notes in a 
particular order. Sounds are events, which produce signals that transmit information carried by 
sound waves (Bowen 2013) and hearing the dynamic signal cannot be reduced to hearing discrete 
parts of the sound envelope in succession. Perceiving a tonal modulation requires hearing the 
relationships between the non-simultaneous chords. In addition, our sound engineering and 
musical production does not mirror the frame rate model of digital video. 
Second, the guiding metaphor conceives of perception as a passive recording process, 
continuously scanning sensory images of the world at a constant rate. This passive conception is 
at odds with active prospective models of perception on which our experiences are driven by 
internal representations and actively constructed by probabilistic predictions and trajectory 
estimations (Gregory 1997, Grush 2005a, Eliassmith 2007, Howhy 2007, Friston 2002, Friston 
2005, Friston & Stephan 2007, Friston et al. 2012).  “The basic idea is very simple: the posterior 
probability of a given hypothesis about the causes of one’s sensory input will go up if predictions 
of future input based on that hypothesis are correct. This could be the method by which the brain 
gets to represent the world in spite of the noise in the sensory channels and the context-sensitivity 
of the causes in the sensorium (such as, e.g., occlusion). This means that the brain doesn’t try to 
infer the causes from the effects (the sensory input) but rather predicts the effects (the input) from 
a model of their causes” (Howhy 2007: 322). By contrast, on the atomistic model, experience is 
driven by brief sensory inputs continuously scanned and summated, like digital video, which is 
incompatible with predictive representation-driven models of perception. Content extensionalism 
entails an active predictive model of perception, consonant with the multi-scale sampling 
hypothesis, whereas atomism is rooted in a passive receptive model of perception. In my 
estimation, this contrast provides another reason for preferring extensionalism over atomism. 
84 
 
 
2.3.4. The Individuation Argument 
Phenomenological observations are important for describing the phenomena which require 
explanation, and, in this respect, serve to sharpen the focus of what theories of temporal perception 
intend to explain. The primary reason to shift away from the phenomenology is because atomists 
never deny that we have experiences as of motion, as of change, as of duration, etc., rather they 
offer an alternative explanation as to how such experiences are generated which is perfectly 
compatible with the atomist denial that we perceive temporal properties and relations between 
non-simultaneous events. Accordingly, an argument from the best explanation of the 
phenomenology is not very promising, since the opposing models both have explanations of the 
phenomenology and offer differing criteria for what counts as best—parochial conceptions of 
parsimony, simplicity, fecundity, phenomenal perspicuity, etc. While we cannot completely ignore 
the phenomenology of temporal experiences, we should recognize that there are multiple plausible 
explanations of the phenomena and additional arguments are required to make a case for the 
superiority of one over the other contenders. While I think the debate is better served by resisting 
the temptation to allow the apparent phenomenology to be the sole focus of the debate, it is 
instructive to first see how it results in a stalemate before shifting the focus to other arguments.  
Traditional defenses of extensionalism, especially those models I identify as process 
extensionalism (see §1.3.1) place a great deal of weight on phenomenological claims about 
purported experiential differences between an experience of succession and a succession of 
experiences, notably emphasized by William James (1890: 692) and reiterated by many others.69 
Most agree that such a difference exists, underwritten by simple introspection on one’s experience, 
                                                 
69 Cf. Husserl (1897-1917: 12), Broad (1923: 351), Sellars (1968: 232), Gallagher (1998: 22), Dainton (2003: 2) & 
(2008: 623), Lockwood (2005: 363); for a dissenting opinion on the purported phenomenology, see Kelly (2005b). 
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but there is disagreement over what, if anything, to make of the putative phenomenological 
difference. 
Broad (1923) and Russell (1927) both employ a simple analog clock example to illustrate that 
there is such a difference distinguishable between seeing the succession of the second hand on an 
analog clock, for instance, and having a succession of discrete minute hand experiences and 
thereby noticing that it has moved. In the first case, I seem to see the successive motion of the 
second hand, whereas, in the second case, I only infer or become aware of the motion of the minute 
hand by comparison of successive experiences. Along these lines, an argument is developed that 
purports to defend extensionalism and show that atomism fails to explain the difference between 
cases of perceptible and imperceptible motion. 
There is a well-advertised type of difficulty in such cases as the analysis of a perceived 
motion. If I move my hand before my eyes from left to right, and attend to the visual 
percept, it seems qualitatively different from the successive perceptions of my hand in a 
number of different positions. On a watch, we can “see” the motion of the second hand, 
but not of the minute hand. There is no doubt that there is an occurrence which we naturally 
describe as the perception of motion. We are aware of perceiving a process: if I move my 
hand from left to right, the impression is different from what it is if I move my hand from 
right to left, and it is obvious to everyone that the difference is in the “sense” of the motion. 
We can, in fact, distinguish earlier and later parts of the motion, so that the motion does 
not appear to be without structure. But the parts of it seem to be other motions, which, 
presumably, must each have its own structure. (Russell 1927: 278-9) 
 
Russell appeals to the qualitative difference between visually perceiving his hand moving and 
experiencing discrete successive perceptions of his hand in different locations, and affirms that the 
former type of experience without a doubt represents perception of motion. He also emphasizes 
that he is able to distinguish earlier and later parts of a motion, such that perceiving his hand move 
involves perceiving the structural relations of his hand’s successive location over time. The 
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following is a reconstruction of the so-called, ‘Individuation Argument,’ (cf. Broad 1923, 
Kiverstein 2010, Phillips 2011, Hoerl 2013): 
I1) I perceive the second hand moving. 
I2) I do not perceive the minute hand moving. 
I3) The salient difference between 1 & 2 is the length of the interval over which the 
changes occur. (I2 > I1) 
I4) If I perceive an object moving, then I perceive the structural relations of the object's 
successive locations over times. ('at-at' motion, see §2.4.2 below) 
I5) If I perceive the structural relations between an object’s successive locations over 
times, then extended contents of visual experience can represent relations between 
non-simultaneous events. 
I6) If so, content extensionalism is true and atomism is false  
 
Proponents of the Individuation Argument clearly lean heavily on the apparent phenomenology 
of motion perception to support the first two premises. I see the second hand on the analog clock 
moving, and I cannot see the minute hand moving. From the apparent phenomenological 
difference, it is inferred that there are perceptible motions and imperceptible motions, and there is 
a limit on the length of interval over which a motion occurs such that it is visually perceptible by 
humans.70 If an object moves too slowly, then we cannot perceive its motion. Broad emphasizes 
this minimum rate of change in the following passage: 
                                                 
70 One can extend this argument from qualitative difference by appealing to examples like Locke’s cannonball in order 
to illustrate that some motions and changes occur too fast to be perceived. Some motions are too slow to be perceived, 
other motions are too fast to be perceived, an only a limited range of motions occur at perceptible rates of change. If 
so, then our visual acuity for motion perception has both upper-bound and lower-bound limitations. In Ch. 4, I survey 
these sensory limitations, which place constraints on models of temporal perception.  
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Thus the qualitative differences between its earlier and later sections will be sensed 
together; i.e. the observer will actually sense the changing and will not merely notice that 
something has changed. We can now see why a change must surpass a certain minimum 
speed if it is to be sensed as such. If a change takes place slowly, this means that closely 
adjacent events are qualitatively very little different from each other. It may therefore 
happen that two events are not qualitatively distinguishable by us unless they are separated 
by more than the duration of a Specious Present. If this be so, these two qualitatively 
distinguishable sections of a single long event are too far separated to be sensed together. 
(Broad, 1923: 352) 
 
Broad is making two closely related points in this passage. First, there is a significant difference 
between the experience of perceiving change occur and merely recognizing that some change has 
occurred. Second, perceiving motion or change results from sensing together the qualitative 
differences between non-simultaneous events. Hence Broad opposes that atomist thesis that 
perception can only represent what happens at a given time, since he clearly asserts that we 
perceive relations between non-simultaneous events. 
By relying on introspection and the apparent phenomenology, the Individuation Argument 
begs the question against atomism. There is no reason for an atomist to grant (I1), since atomism 
explicitly denies that we see constant motion, like the second hand moving. Revising the premise 
so that it doesn’t presuppose the falsity of atomism we end up with: 
(I1*) I seem to perceive the second hand moving. 
The premise is no longer controversial, because all parties to the debate already agree that we seem 
to have experiences as of motion. With that adjustment, however, we must make corresponding 
revisions to (I4): 
(I4*) If I seem to perceive an object moving, then I perceive the structural relations of the 
object's successive locations over times.  
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Revising the premise in this fashion makes it false, since seeming to perceive motion is not a 
sufficient condition for perceiving structural relations of the moving object’s successive locations 
over time. Atomists can grant the truth of the antecedent, but deny the consequent, because they 
can offer a different explanation of why we seem to perceive an object moving. Thus, (I4*) is false 
and the Individuation Argument is unsound upon revision. One can certainly weaken the premise 
further to prevent its obvious falsehood: 
(I4@) If I seem to perceive an object moving, then I seem to perceive the structural relations 
of the object's successive locations over times.  
The atomist can grant that you seem to perceive such structural relations between an object at 
successive locations, and invoke the zeotropic effect in attempt to explain why we do not, strictly 
speaking, perceive those relations. This further revision does not help the extensionalist, because 
it requires a corresponding revision of premise (I5) rendering it vulnerable to objection, which 
ultimately blocks the inference to the conclusion: 
(I5@) If I seem to perceive the structural relations between an object’s successive locations 
over times, then extended contents of visual experience can represent relations between non-
simultaneous events. 
The atomist can obviously deny that seeming to perceive the structural relations between an 
object’s successive locations is a sufficient condition for representing the relations between non-
simultaneous events in visual perception. In brief, the deliverances of apparent phenomenology 
are not, by themselves, sufficient to establish the falsity of atomism and truth of extensionalism. 
As mentioned at the outset of this section, I do not find the Individuation Argument convincing, 
and I have now shown that it clearly fails to guarantee its overreaching conclusion.  
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2.4. Zeno-inspired Puzzle of Motion 
In this section, I reconstruct a familiar Zeno-inspired puzzle of motion, survey two false 
solutions to the puzzle, and explain the now standard 'at-at' theory of motion solution (cf. Russell 
1903; W.C. Salmon 1970, 1977, 1984). After doing so, I construct an analogous puzzle of motion 
perception and argue that the ‘at-at’ solution provides further support for extensionalist models of 
temporal perception, as opposed to atomist models. Revisiting proposed solutions to the familiar 
arrow puzzle serves to highlight how contemporary debates regarding motion perception bear 
striking analogues to the metaphysical disputes generated by Zeno’s puzzle.  
 
2.4.1. The Puzzle 
Perceived motion has long been a source of puzzlement; at least since Zeno of Elea in 5th 
century BCE framed it as paradoxical in his efforts to defend a Parmenidean monism, such that 
"all is one" entails change and motion are illusions.71 Zeno asked us to imagine an arrow in flight, 
but to stick with one of my earlier examples, let us think about tracking a baseball in constant 
motion. Imagine a baseball thrown by a pitcher, or better yet, observe an actual baseball from the 
moment the pitcher releases the ball propelling it towards home plate to the moment it comes to 
rest in the catcher’s mitt. What do we see? Surely, we see the baseball in motion; we see the 
baseball moving along a continuous path, typically with some angular rotation, until it hits the 
catcher’s mitt or is redirected by a hitter’s bat. Consulting the contents of our experience, it clearly 
seems as though we perceive the motion of a baseball in flight.  
                                                 
71 Our canonical record of Zeno's flying arrow paradox comes from Aristotle (Physics, VI 9.239b5-32). See W.C. 
Salmon (ed.) Zeno's Paradoxes (1970), for an excellent collection of philosophical and mathematical treatments, 
including contributions from Bergson (1911), Benacerraf, Black, Grünbaum, Russell (1929), and Thomson.  
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Now consider the skeptic's argument; someone like Zeno asks us to now imagine the baseball 
at any single instant along its path. Is the baseball moving at t1? How about at t2, or t3, or tn? No, 
Zeno claims, at any time-slice along the baseball's trajectory, it is static and motionless. Thus, we 
arrive at an apparent puzzling contradiction:  
Z1) From t1-tn, the baseball moves from point A to point B.  
Z2) At any given instant t1-tn, the baseball is motionless on the path AB.  
Z3) So, the baseball both moves and does not move. (Absurd!)  
Of course, the paradox only arises if you grant Zeno’s supposition that an interval of time is 
composed of indivisible instants.72 Zeno reasons that if the baseball moves from point A to point 
B throughout the period of his flight (from t1-tn), then it moves at each instant of its trajectory. 
Being located at each consecutive instant during the period of its trajectory, the baseball occupies 
a space equal to its own volume. But, if the baseball occupies a space equal to its own volume at 
an instant, then it is not in motion at that instant. So, the baseball is not in motion at any instant 
within the period of its flight. Thus denying the consequent of the initial conditional, Zeno 
concludes that the baseball does not move at all, which undermines (Z1).  
Note Zeno’s presupposition, as Russell points out, “the view that a finite part of time consists 
of a finite series of successive instants seems to be assumed; at any rate the plausibility of the 
argument seems to depend upon supposing that there are consecutive instants” (1929: 137).  At 
each instant, the baseball is located precisely in a space ‘equal to itself,’ and it cannot move during 
that instant; yet, at the next instant it occupies an adjacent location in space, and so on until the 
baseball comes to rest. The baseball changes position from one instant to the next, but at no instant 
                                                 
72 Aristotle denies this supposition, “Zeno argues fallaciously.  For if, he says, everything is always at rest when it 
occupies a space equal to itself, while that which moves is always in the now, the moving arrow lacks motion.  But 
this is false, since time is not composed of indivisible nows, just as no other magnitude is.” (Physics, VI 9.239b5-9) 
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is the baseball ever moving. Russell remarks that on Zeno’s analysis the baseball's change of 
position is nothing short of ‘miraculous,’ since the change must occur at no time at all. 
     
2.4.2. Proposed Solutions to the Puzzle: Zeno, Bergson, and Russell-Salmon 
Zeno’s proposed solution to the paradox is to simply reject the reality of motion: all perceived 
motion and change is an illusion; motion is not real. By denying (Z1), Zeno is committed to an 
error theory about all reports of "perceiving motion", and owes us an explanation of why we seem 
to experience things moving, if such experience is an illusion—analogous to the burden of 
explanation shouldered by atomism (see §2.3.3). I debate the possible merits of such an atomistic 
error theory above, finding it explanatorily inadequate. I likewise count the error theory as a cost 
of Zeno's strategy here. Besides the somewhat dubious assumption about time being composed of 
consecutive indivisible instants, commitment to a widespread error theory and the violence it does 
to our ordinary experiences of motion and change, should indicate that endorsing the unreality of 
motion and change is the wrong conclusion to draw from Zeno’s puzzle. 
Moreover, I contend that Zeno commits a fallacy of composition: first, he assumes that a 
motion is composed of consecutive indivisible instants; and, second, he infers that since the 
baseball is motionless at each instant along its path, the baseball must be motionless over the entire 
interval. Zeno’s failed solution thus relies on an invalid inference from an observation about 
instantaneously located objects to the strong metaphysical conclusion that motion is unreal. Zeno 
is not alone, however, in trying to draw metaphysical conclusions from his paradoxes. Before 
looking at a promising solution to the puzzle, let us briefly consider another false start that draws 
an opposing metaphysical conclusion. 
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In a contrast to Zeno, Henri Bergson (1911) denies (Z2) by claiming that the actual motion of 
the baseball is not composed of motionless instants. He suggests that Zeno’s mistake is to divide 
a motion into successive motionless locations, thereby being misled by what Bergson calls ‘the 
cinematographic method’ of representing reality. According to Bergson, the cinematographic 
method is the typical procedure for organizing our knowledge of physical processes, according to 
which we decompose a process by generating a series of successive state descriptions, analogous 
to the method in which motion pictures are created using a successive series of still frames. For 
instance, the atomist’s error theory that invokes the zoetrope effect to explain away apparent 
motion perception exemplifies the cinematographic method. Bergson recognizes that this analytic 
method has some epistemic and practical advantages, but he contends that it fails as a guide to the 
metaphysics of motion and change. 
He argues that a single motion is a simple and undivided process between two stops, i.e. a 
movement ‘created in a single stroke.’ For Bergson, the whole trajectory of a single motion is 
ontologically basic, revealed in intuition by 'entering into' the process and directly perceiving the 
phenomena of change and motion, and thus motionless states are mere artifacts of analysis 
decomposing motion into static points or spaces along its trajectory.73 By decomposing a process 
into a series of motionless states, Zeno divides the single motion into multiple motions, by adding 
counterfactual stops along its path, i.e. locations where the baseball could possibly stop, but did 
                                                 
73 Bergson championed intuition over analysis, in An Introduction to Metaphysics (1913: 7) he makes this 
methodological commitment explicit: “By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places 
oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible. Analysis, on the 
contrary, is the operation that reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements both common to it 
and other objects. To analyze, therefore, is to express a thing as a function of something other than itself.” He holds 
that analysis is complex, piecemeal, symbol-laden and an “always imperfect translation” of reality for practical 
epistemic goals, whereas "intuition, if intuition is possible, is a simple act” (1913: 8) and the true guide to metaphysics. 
I disagree with his reliance on metaphysical intuition and the concomitant criticism of analysis, but find merit in his 
insight that theoretical posits are often artifacts of one’s chosen analytic methods. See Russell (1929, 1927) for 
extended critique of Bergson and defense of the alternative position that analysis is necessary for understanding motion 
and change, both the physical stimuli and our perceptions thereof.  
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not. Bergson argues that such analysis misrepresents the metaphysics of an inherently dynamic 
process, by depicting a motion as a series of motionless states. Additionally, he concludes that any 
attempt to recompose the whole movement from successive motionless states, will lead to Zeno's 
absurd conclusion that “movement is made of immobilities.”74 
It is important to note that Bergson’s response to Zeno, makes a similar mistake, by implicitly 
ceding that Zeno’s inference follows if one accepts the cinematographic representation of reality. 
That is, Bergson does not identify the fallacious part-to-whole inference made by Zeno, and 
implicitly makes the same error in his critique of Zeno (cf. Salmon 1970: 24).  Bergson objects to 
the premise that the baseball is motionless at instantaneous locations along its path, by denying 
that a single motion has proper parts. Where Zeno concludes that motion must be unreal, Bergson 
concludes that the motionless instantaneous states must be unreal. Because Bergson holds that 
pure intuition is the proper guide to metaphysics and thinks reductive compositional analysis is 
misleading, he thereby places a stringent requirement on our understanding of change and motion: 
a dynamic process can only be understood through intuiting the nature of the structure given in 
direct perception.75 So, a motion’s structure is a single continuous process, which is revealed in 
the experience of perceptual continuity.  
Bergson diagnoses the flaw in Zeno’s argument to be the analytic decomposition of a 
continuous motion into a series of motionless states. By concluding that all such reductive analysis 
falsifies, Bergson throws out the baby with the bathwater, because he overlooks the possibility that 
analysis affords us the tools to understand a moving object’s trajectory in terms of spatially 
                                                 
74 Bergson (1911), reprinted in Salmon (1970: 63) 
75 “The view urged explicitly by Bergson, and implied in the doctrines of many philosophers, is, that a motion is 
something indivisible, not validly analysable into a series of states. This is part of a more general doctrine, which 
holds that analysis always falsifies, because the parts of a complex whole are different, as combined in that whole, 
from what they would otherwise be.” (Russell 1929: 119) 
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contiguous locations at consecutive times, preserving continuity and avoiding the conclusion that 
motion is consists of immobilities. Once we recognize how such analysis can aid our understanding 
of physical motion, we arrive at a promising solution. 
The widely accepted solution to the paradox invokes Bertrand Russell's ‘at-at’ theory of motion 
(1903, Ch. LIV), which claims that motion is simply occupying successive locations at successive 
times. Zeno fails to recognize that motion is a function of an object at distinct contiguous spatial 
locations at adjacent times. If the baseball is in exactly the same location at t1 and at t2, then it is 
at rest and not moving. If, however, the baseball is at <2,3,4, t1> and then at <2,4,5, t2>, then from 
t1 to t2 the baseball has moved one unit in the y,z direction of state space. Mathematical analysis 
enables us to describe the baseball’s motion by a mathematical function that maps spatial values 
(x,y,z) onto each admissible value for t. Zeno is simply looking at each state of the baseball (i.e., 
each ordered quadruple) by itself, and concluding that there is no motion. Obviously, an object at 
a static spatio-temporal location is not moving, but the mistake rests in failing to see that motion 
only occurs over an interval, not at a single point in time. According to the At-At solution, motion 
“consists in being at particular points in space at corresponding moments. There is no additional 
question as to how the [baseball] gets from point A to point B; the answer has already been given 
– by being at the intervening points at the intervening moments” (Salmon 2012: 415).  We can 
reconstruct the At-At response to Zeno’s puzzle, as follows: 
R1) Motion is simply occupying successive locations at successive times. 
R2) For the baseball to have a velocity at time, t, is to be appropriately located at times 
immediately prior to and immediately following t. 
R3) So, at t4, the baseball has an instantaneous state of motion in virtue of its locations at 
t3 and t5. 
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R4) So, it is not the case that at any given instant t1-tn, the baseball is motionless on the 
path AB. (Z2 is false) 
With this improved solution to the puzzle in hand, and its corresponding theory of motion, let us 
return to the debate between competing models of constant motion perception. I think there are 
some insights to be gathered from examining some analogues between the Zeno’s puzzle and the 
disagreement between atomism and content extensionalism. To begin, let us first revisit how both 
content extensionalism and atomism analyze a case of putative motion perception like seeing a 
baseball in motion. 
Content extensionalism claims that I perceive the baseball move, e.g. when a pitcher throws a 
fastball, in virtue of visually representing the structural relations between the ball’s successive 
locations at successive times. I visually target a moving object like a baseball by representing the 
intervening locations that it occupies over a brief interval.  If so, then extended contents of visual 
experience can represent relations between non-simultaneous events. Content extensionalism 
entails that my perception of a dynamic target, like a moving baseball, encompasses a temporal 
field of content, i.e. a perceptual experience can represent successive events occurring over a brief 
temporally structured interval. Accordingly, if the At-At analysis of motion is correct, then content 
extensionalism provides a clear model of how perception of motion is possible. 
By contrast, atomism claims that I do not perceive the baseball move, e.g. when a pitcher 
throws a fastball, rather I perceive the baseball at successive locations at successive times and 
judge that the ball is moving based on the present static perception and retained memories of the 
just past locations of the ball. At first blush, it appears that atomism also coheres with the At-At 
theory of motion, since I have discrete perceptions of the ball at successive locations at successive 
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times. Nevertheless, atomism denies that we perceive motion since we never represent successive 
locations of the ball in perception, but does not deny the apparent phenomenology. 
The atomist can grant that we seem to perceive motions, successions, changes, etc., yet argue 
that such putative temporally extended perceptions are the result of have a series of atomistic 
perceptions realized in a particular order. I seem to see the ball in motion in virtue of actually 
perceiving the ball occupy spatially contiguous locations at successive times. Since one only 
perceives what happens at a given time according to atomism, I never perceive the ball moving, 
because doing so would require perception of the temporal relations between non-simultaneous 
events, viz. the non-simultaneous events of the ball occupying spatial locations at successive times. 
It follows from atomism that representations as of succession reduce to successive perceptions of 
finely individuated atomic events. If so, then we only ever perceive the parts of a temporally 
extended dynamic target and representing the whole is a distinct cognitive achievement. Once 
again, the atomist gestures at some post-perceptual cognitive operation as the source of seeming 
perception of motion. Notice that this auxiliary hypothesis hands off the burden of explanation to 
some independent model of memory and cognition, and atomism itself contributes very little 
besides stipulating the constraint that perceptual experience never represents relations between 
non-simultaneous events.76  
Furthermore, there are striking similarities between Zeno’s proposed solution to the puzzle of 
motion and atomism. First, both deny that we perceive motion and change; Zeno because there is 
no motion to be the target of perception, and atomism because it holds that we cannot perceive 
temporal properties between non-simultaneous events. Second, both require an error theory to 
                                                 
76 In Chapter 3, I reconstruct Le Poidevin’s (2007) argument that temporal properties and relations are not proper 
objects of perception, which, if successful, would support the atomist thesis; I raise objections against the cogency of 
his arguments. 
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explain away the phenomenology of apparent motion perception. Third, atomism’s zoetrope effect 
explanation reducing putative perceptions of motion into series of static experiences mirrors 
Zeno’s decomposition of motion into successive motionless locations. Lastly, both cling to their 
anti-realist conclusions despite overwhelming phenomenological evidence to the contrary; Zeno 
denies the existence of motion and atomism denies the possibility of motion perception. So, despite 
the appearance of being able to accommodate the At-At theory of motion with auxiliary hypotheses 
about non-perceptual cognition, atomism’s denial of motion perception is much more like Zeno’s 
failed solution. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
After surveying a number of arguments on both sides of the debate, and although I think I have 
provided persuasive reasons to prefer content extensionalism, I have not ruled out atomism as 
candidate model of temporal experience. Part of the challenge consists in the constant reminder 
that there is no disagreement about the phenomenology; both the atomist and the extensionalist 
agree that it seems as though, phenomenologically speaking, one perceives constant motion. From 
this exchange and much of my repeated criticisms of atomism, one might conclude that the 
disagreement hinges on the distinction between perception and cognition, despite many efforts to 
bracket this possibility. The atomist draws the scope of perception proper, narrowly, reducing it to 
direct sensory stimulation at a given time. By contrast, the extensionalist conceives of perception 
as a representational capacity for synthesizing sensory information sampled at multiple temporal 
scales and an active predictive process by which representations are continuously updated in a 
prediction-correction feedback loop. This is a significant disagreement about the nature of 
perception, and one that I tackle directly in Chapter 4, where I argue that content extensionalism 
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and its proprietary multi-scale sampling hypothesis provide a better functional explanation of how 
temporal perception works. In Chapter 3, I proceed to reconstruct and dissolve Le Poidevin’s 
(2007) epistemological puzzle of time perception, and with it his argument denying that temporal 
properties and relations can be objects of perception.  
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3. DISSOLVING AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL PUZZLE OF TIME PERCEPTION77 
3.1. Preliminaries  
Imagine a horn player blasting a brief trumpet riff, then muting the horn and repeating the riff. 
Listening to the performance, we hear two events: a clear loud riff followed by a softer muted riff. 
Surely, there are lots of features of the two events that we perceive. For instance, we hear the 
timbre and volume of each riff, the muffled intonation of the muted riff, and that the sounds are 
coming from the horn. We also seem to perceive how long each riff lasts and that the louder event 
precedes the softer event. There is some dispute, however, over whether or not we actually perceive 
the temporal features of events. Do we perceive an event's duration? Do we perceive the temporal 
order that holds between events?78 If not, what are the bases of perceptual beliefs that we form 
about the duration and order of events? For those that respond negatively to these questions, their 
worry stems from the observation that temporal features of events are not causally efficacious and, 
thus, on a plausible causal theory of perception, cannot be perceived. Given this motivation for 
skepticism about temporal perception, it is instructive to examine the reasons for denying that the 
temporal properties of events play a causal role in the formation of perceptual beliefs, and to 
consider reasons for resisting such skepticism. 
Perceptual belief, as I will understand it in what follows, is a belief non-inferentially formed 
on the basis of perception. Non-inferential formation implies that the perceiving subject does not 
consciously induce or deduce the content of the belief from perceptual data.79 For example, I see 
and feel a dog in front of me, and I spontaneously form the belief that there is something warm 
                                                 
77 This chapter is previously published, and appears here with permission, and can be accessed via the hyperlink: 
Bowen, Adam J. 2013. “Dissolving an Epistemological Puzzle of Time Perception.” Synthese 190 (17): 3797–3817.  
78 Henceforth, whenever I use the term ‘order’ I will be referring to temporal order, i.e. the relation of temporal 
precedence and subsequence that events stand in to each other, not any other ordering relation (e.g., alphabetical 
order). 
79 BonJour (1985) calls this type of perceptual belief ‘cognitively spontaneous’.  
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and hairy in front of me. By contrast, if I see canid paw prints in the snow and form the belief that 
a dog was there, then this belief is consciously inferred and not, strictly speaking, a perceptual 
belief. We entertain many consciously inferred beliefs from perceptual data, but such inferential 
beliefs about the temporal structure of events fall outside the purview of the present inquiry. Also, 
it should be noted that this definition of perceptual belief does not rule out beliefs resulting from 
unconscious inferential processes, nor does it rule out that unconscious computations play a role 
in generating perceptual beliefs. For now, however, I will put the details of empirical psychology 
to one side, and proceed by granting that we perceive events and somehow form perceptual beliefs 
about the order and duration of events. The principal concern at present is whether or not the 
temporal properties of an event play a causal role in the formation of such perceptual beliefs. 
Le Poidevin (2007) claims that we do form perceptual beliefs regarding order and duration 
based on our perception of events, but neither order nor duration are by themselves objects of 
perception.80 Simply put, he denies that we perceive the duration and order of events.81 
Accordingly, there is no perception of an event's duration, only perception of the event which 
persists. Similarly, he claims that there is no perception of the order relation that obtains between 
events, only perception of the events in their respective order. Le Poidevin is making a subtle 
distinction between perceiving events in order, and perceiving the ordering relation itself. He 
admits that we perceive ordered events, but thinks that only after the fact can we represent the 
ordering relation that holds between them. Temporal properties are discernible only when one first 
perceives their bearers, and temporal relations are discernible only when one first perceives their 
                                                 
80 “To see one event as following on from another, I have to be aware of the events themselves. The relation by itself 
cannot be an object of perception as pure colour can. Similarly with duration: I cannot be aware just of the duration 
of an event, independently of my awareness of the event itself. Somehow, the awareness of order and duration emerges 
from a perception of the events that exhibit them.” (Le Poidevin 2007: 99) 
81 Le Poidevin is not alone in this claim, cf. J.J. Gibson (1973), "Events are perceivable but time is not" (quoted by 
Pöppel 1978: 713) 
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relata. On such a view, the question remains as to whether or not our perceptual beliefs about order 
and duration are formed on the causal basis of an event’s objective order and duration.82 Le 
Poidevin raises this issue in the form of an epistemological puzzle of time perception, from which 
he derives the claim that the order and duration of events do not causally contribute to our 
perceptual beliefs about them. Since his view is motivated by a causal truthmaker principle for 
grounding knowledge, it also holds that perceptual beliefs about temporal features must be caused 
by the features themselves in order to count as knowledge. Given these theoretical commitments, 
there is a puzzle concerning how such perceptual beliefs could constitute knowledge of temporal 
properties. I dissolve the puzzle by focusing on the case of audition and employing a distal event 
theory of sound to argue that temporal properties of sounds are among the targets of auditory 
perception, and that they are genuine, non-superfluous causes of auditory perceptual beliefs about 
the order and duration of sounds.  In response to Le Poidevin, I argue for an account according to 
which order and duration are objects of perception, causally contribute to our perceptual beliefs 
about them, and such beliefs are capable of counting as knowledge. I conclude by showing that, 
on my alternative account, the epistemological puzzle dissolves and his own solution to it fails. 
Before proceeding to the puzzle, we should first clarify what conditions something must satisfy to 
be an object of a perceptual state for Le Poidevin, and whether temporal properties are candidates 
for being such objects of perception.  
 
 
 
                                                 
82 The term ‘objective’, in this context, denotes independence from a particular perspective. As such, the objective 
duration of, say, a sound is the temporal boundary of that sound, whether or not someone hears the sound lasting that 
long. If one grants the reality of events, then it is natural to assume that events are occurents that have an objective 
temporal extent.  
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3.2. Objects of Perception 
If we cannot perceive order and duration per se, then they “are not in any straightforward sense 
objects of perceptual states” (Le Poidevin, 2007: 99). Le Poidevin emphasizes this point by 
drawing a disanalogy between the temporal features and spatial features of what is perceived; he 
claims that spatial features are objects of perceptual states in a straightforward sense, whereas 
temporal features are not. He argues that a straightforward story can be offered as to how a spatial 
property, like the shape of a baseball, is itself an object of perception when the baseball is 
perceived.83 The spatial properties of the baseball modify the distribution and properties of light 
rays which, in turn, modifies the visual perception of the baseball. Also, when I grip the baseball, 
its shape modifies the distribution of pressure affecting tactile and kinesthetic input. Le Poidevin 
can give a similar story about how the shape of the baseball modifies my perception of the transfer 
of energy and angular velocity when I spin the ball lightly in my hand or throw it forcefully, which 
is a variety of bodily perception. In each of these cases, Le Poidevin is observing that I am 
immediately aware of the shape throughout my experience of the baseball due to spatial properties 
modifying sensory input. So far, so good, there is a fairly straightforward story to tell about how 
spatial properties of an object are objects of perception when one perceives the object, given that 
they modify perceptual input. Le Poidevin has given us a criterion: x is an object of a perception 
just in case x modifies perceptual input in a way that makes the effects of x available to immediate 
awareness.84  
                                                 
83 Le Poidevin uses the example of an apple’s shape, but a baseball is a better example for raising the issue of bodily 
momentum perception. 
84 I am using 'immediate awareness' to denote the way in which Le Poidevin is purposely limiting the scope of direct 
perception, "perception has temporal limits, and if we draw these very tightly, certain things cannot be objects of (at 
least direct) perception." (2007: 98). This is also why I have stipulated that perceptual belief, for our purposes, only 
concerns spontaneous non-inferential beliefs, i.e. those that concern direct perception and immediate awareness.  
103 
 
Le Poidevin argues that, by contrast, the temporal features of order and duration do not modify 
sensory input when perceiving an event in the right sort of way, because we are only aware of 
temporal information after the event is no longer being perceived, not immediately nor throughout 
the experience. If so, temporal features are not proper objects of perception. The crucial premise 
of this argument is the claim that temporal properties of an event are not available to immediate 
awareness. But, if order and duration do modify our immediate perceptual awareness of events, 
thereby satisfying Le Poidevin's criterion for being an object of perceptual states, then the crucial 
premise is false. To demonstrate, let us take, for example, the auditory perception of sounds: the 
amplitude of an audio signal changes over time and parameters of the resulting sound are sensitive 
to duration, which modifies the sonic character of the auditory perception by altering the 
oscillations of sound waves. The fine temporal structure of audio signals is typically modeled by 
four distinct durational parameters which constitute the ADSHR sound envelope: attack, decay, 
sustain/ hold, and release times [Fig. 4].85  
                                                 
85 For detailed treatment of the ADSHR temporal envelope theory, see Gordon (1987), Bregman (1990), Jensen 
(1999), Jensen & Marentakis (2001) 
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Our understanding of the durational structure of audio signals has many significant 
applications which uniformly indicate that modifying the durational parameters of an audio signal 
causes perceptible changes in human audition, immediately and throughout one's awareness of the 
sound. In the production of music, compression amplification is a process used to control the 
dynamic range of a sound source like a musical instrument, and to even out volume fluctuations 
of recorded audio signals by reducing sound waves exceeding a volume threshold by a specified 
compression ratio. For example, a 1:6 compression ratio would decrease a sound's volume above 
a given decibel level by 1/6th its original output level. A compressor does not uniformly apply the 
same compression effect over the entirety of the sound wave, because doing so would compress 
the sound envelope without preserving the fine temporal structure of the sound. This would 
completely deaden the sound by flattening the envelope. Instead, the compression ratio increases 
incrementally from 1:1 to the specified maximum, 1:6, over a duration, i.e. the attack time of the 
sound, and the ratio gradually decreases until it returns to 1:1, i.e. the release time of the sound. 
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When programming the compression of an audio signal, sound engineers can adjust durational 
parameters of the ADSHR envelope to manipulate and transform sounds with precision. Such 
sound engineering interventions indicate that manipulating durational parameters modifies the 
perceptible quality of the sound. More importantly, for present purposes, adjusting temporal 
parameters of the sound envelope affects one's awareness immediately and throughout listening to 
the audio signal, not just after the sound event is no longer being perceived, which is Le Poidevin's 
claim about temporal properties. 
To further illustrate, another important application of compression amplification is designing 
effective hearing aids (Hickson 1994: 52-65), which improve sound quality for listeners with 
sensorineural hearing loss. Compression processing in hearing aids is especially effective in 
controlling the dynamic range of speech sounds to make them more intelligible against background 
noise (Neuman et al. 1998: 2273-2281). In order for compression processing to be effective in 
hearing aids, the sound modifying adjustments to temporal parameters must continuously affect 
the perception of sound, otherwise the hearing impaired could not discern the signal from noise. If 
interventions like attack and release time adjustments change the audio signal and, in turn, cause 
listeners to hear the sound differently (or hear it at all), then temporal properties of sounds modify 
our perceptual input immediately and throughout the perception of the signal. If so, then temporal 
properties are objects of perceptual states on Le Poidevin's criterion. So, like the spatial properties 
of the baseball, the temporal parameters of the sound envelope are objects of perceptual states. 
Furthermore, temporal properties play an ineliminable role in our perception of sounds and, I’ll 
quickly make the case that sounds are causally potent events. 
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Sounds are surely candidates for events that are perceived; in fact, the most comprehensive 
philosophical account of sounds (O’Callaghan, 2007, 2009) defends the view that sounds are 
events which stand in causal relations to auditory experiences.86  
Sounds have durations and are capable of surviving changes to their properties and 
qualities across time. Sounds stand in causal relations to the activities of objects and 
events that are sound sources, and they fulfill the causal requirement on any account of 
their veridical perception. Sounds thus occupy distinctive causal roles. (O’Callaghan, 
2009: 16, my emphasis) 
 
On this theory of sounds as distal events, sounds are caused by ordinary activities like strumming 
strings, crashing symbols, and buzzing lips while forcing air through horns; the sounds, in turn, 
cause reverberations and oscillations of waves through space which communicate the temporal 
parameters of the audio signal to the perceptual system or suitable recording device. It follows that 
sound events are causally potent. Additionally, sounds have durations, and an ordering relation 
which obtains between parts of sound events. So, if sounds are events, and the order of soundings 
and the durational parameters of a sound modify the sonic quality of an auditory perception, then 
the order and duration of a sound are objects of perception when the sound is perceived, in the 
same ‘straightforward sense’ in which the shape of a baseball is an object of perception when the 
baseball is perceived. If so, Le Poidevin’s purported disanalogy fails, because order and duration 
are objects of perceptual states. This preliminary result will have consequences for my arguments 
against Le Poidevin’s solution to the puzzle he raises for time perception. Let us now turn to the 
puzzle.       
                                                 
86 This view directly opposes accounts that treat sounds as properties or secondary qualities, e.g. Locke (1690/1975, 
1823) and Pasnau (1999). It should also be noted that my endorsement of O’Callaghan’s account is neutral with 
respect to the ontological status of events; it is, in principle, compatible with any of the candidate views about 
events, e.g., Davidson (1970), Kim (1973), Galton (1984), Lewis (1986), and Bennett (1988).  
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3.3. The Epistemological Puzzle 
Despite our disagreement about the status of order and duration as objects of perception, Le 
Poidevin agrees that humans are aware of temporal properties of perceived events without having 
to consciously infer or derive them from other perceptual information. Nonetheless, he holds that 
this awareness of temporal features is not perceptual, but ex post facto. With respect to duration 
he claims: 
We are only aware of how long an event lasted when it has receded into our phenomenal 
past—when, in other words, the event has ceased to be an object of perception. (2007: 98) 
 
The claim is that we are aware of duration non-inferentially, but awareness of an event’s duration 
is only enjoyed after the event is no longer being perceived. The same goes for order; we can be 
aware that parts of an event occurred in a certain order, or aware that a series of events occurred 
in a certain order, but awareness of the ordering relation is only had “when it has receded into our 
phenomenal past.” For Le Poidevin, this type of awareness is short-term memory or retentional 
awareness related to one’s recent perception of an event, but not consciously inferred from one’s 
perceiving the event. It is not immediate perceptual awareness, however, because order and 
duration are not proper objects of perception on his account. I grant that we do have this retentional 
awareness of order and duration, especially in cases of events and series of events which extend 
beyond one’s present perceptual episode or exceed one's real-time representational capacity. 
Nevertheless, the above result, that order and duration are objects of perception in some non-trivial 
cases (viz. auditory perception), implies that we also have non-inferential perceptual awareness of 
order and duration in some cases.  
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Regardless of whether awareness of order and duration is perceptual or only retentional, the 
claim that we are non-inferentially aware of order and duration does not directly imply that such 
awareness is truth-apt or knowledge conducive. Rather, it is merely a phenomenological datum 
that we do in fact have non-inferential awareness of the temporal properties of events we perceive. 
Arguably, it might be the case that we only form beliefs about order and duration that count as 
knowledge on the basis of inference from standard reliable clock systems, but these would not 
count as perceptual beliefs. If, however, we do non-inferentially form perceptual beliefs about 
order and duration that count as knowledge, then there is some reliable process by which we 
acquire such beliefs. For now, we can bracket the issue of determining the details of what cognitive 
process is responsible for perceptual beliefs about temporal properties and relations.87 We will 
instead focus on the epistemic problem of how our perceptual beliefs about the temporal order and 
duration of events can count as knowledge; a problem that arises once we grant both that we form 
perceptual beliefs about the order and duration, and that these beliefs are capable of counting as 
knowledge. The problem takes the form of an epistemological puzzle of time perception, which is 
an inconsistency resulting from the conjunction of the following four plausible claims:88 
 (E0) There are perceptual beliefs about order and duration that count as knowledge.89 
(E1) In order for the perceptual belief p to count as knowledge, the truthmaker of p must 
cause the formation of the belief that p. 
(E2) Objective order and duration are not the causes of our perceptual beliefs about order 
and duration. 
(E3) Objective order and duration, or facts concerning them, are the truthmakers of 
perceptual beliefs about order and duration. 
                                                 
87 Le Poidevin calls this the ‘psychological puzzle of time perception’, which is a separate problem but related to the 
epistemological puzzle of time perception. 
88 Le Poidevin, "The Wider View: Precedence and Duration" in his The Images of Time (Oxford: 2007), pp. 97-122 
89 I label the first claim 'E0' because Le Poidevin does not include it in his presentation of the puzzle, but it is 
required in order to explicitly generate the inconsistency.  
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Le Poidevin thinks the conjunction of (E1-E3) has the consequence that, “even if there is such a 
thing as temporal awareness, it cannot count as knowledge, since the truth-makers of our beliefs 
in these cases play no role in the causal history of those beliefs” (2007: 100, my emphasis). He 
then offers a solution to the puzzle which retains (E2) and (E3), but weakens the causal knowledge 
principle characterized by (E1). In §3.4, I will briefly explain the Causal Truth-Maker Principle 
equivalent to (E1) and grant its defensibility and plausibility, especially for those that share broadly 
held intuitions about reliable belief forming processes.  I then focus my argument, in §3.5, on Le 
Poidevin’s defense of (E2) and offer several objections to the claim that objective order and 
duration cannot cause our perceptual beliefs about order and duration. I argue that objective order 
and duration do play some causal role in the formation of our perceptual beliefs about order and 
duration. After demonstrating that Le Poidevin’s lines of response are unconvincing and his 
defense of (E2) fails, the purported puzzle dissolves.  
 
3.4. Causal Truth-Maker Principle 
I will reformulate (E1) as the following equivalent principle: 
Causal Truth-Maker Principle (CTMP):  A knows that p, where the truthmaker of p is t, only 
if t plays a causal role in A coming to believe p.90 
Le Poidevin defends CTMP, which is an epistemological principle concerning the causal 
conditions for the acquisition of perceptual knowledge. Let us take a simple example to illustrate 
                                                 
90 Le Poidevin’s formulation of CTMP is, “Perceptual beliefs that qualify for the title 'knowledge' are caused by 
their truthmakers” (100). The phrase ‘qualify for the title knowledge’ is equivalent to my ‘count as knowledge’ in 
(E1).  My formulation of CTMP clarifies what Le Poidevin’s means by ‘Perceptual beliefs…are caused by their 
truthmakers’, viz. that a subject A knows the perceptual belief p, where t is the truthmaker of p, only if t causes A to 
believe p. I think making an instance of p the object rather than “perceptual beliefs” in the abstract makes the 
principle more concrete and more clearly shows the relation between t causing the perceptual belief that p, and 
knowing that p. I am grateful to Ben Goodney for pressing this clarification. 
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CTMP: Jed perceives a squirrel sitting under a tree and forms a belief that he is observing a squirrel 
sitting under the tree in front of him. Call his belief ‘s’. According to CTMP, in order for Jed to 
know s, the truthmaker of s must cause Jed to form the belief s. A clear candidate for the truthmaker 
of s is the state of affairs involving that particular squirrel sitting under that particular tree in front 
of Jed: call the truthmaker ‘t’. Jed's perception of t is not sufficient for s to count as knowledge, 
but something like truthmaker’s causal sufficiency for s seems like a plausible necessary condition 
for the perceptual belief to count as knowledge.  
CTMP is part of Le Poidevin’s broadly reliabilist analysis of perceptual knowledge, which he 
calls a ‘circumstantial dispositionalist account.’91 On his account, Jed knows that the squirrel is 
sitting under the tree just in case (a) it is true that the squirrel is sitting under the tree, (b) Jed’s 
belief s is caused by the obtaining state of affairs, t (c) Jed is disposed to form the belief s when 
perceiving t, and s is true, (d) Jed’s belief s was a manifestation of that disposition, and (e) the 
circumstances are such that, had s not been true, that disposition would not have been manifested. 
Le Poidevin offers this analysis of knowledge in response to typical Gettier-style counter-examples 
to the sufficiency of CTMP in conferring knowledge on perceptual beliefs.  He argues that the 
counterfactual dependence required by condition (e) does not hold for certain Gettier-style cases. 
For example, if Jed perceived a cleverly designed squirrel robot and formed the belief s, then it 
would not be a manifestation of the truth-apt disposition and would not count as knowledge. We 
will not pursue the details of these broader issues or rehearse the typical objections, because Le 
Poidevin is only claiming that CTMP is a defensible and plausible necessary condition for the 
acquisition of perceptual knowledge. The plausibility of CTMP stems from externalist intuitions 
that the justification for one’s beliefs is grounded in reliable causal connections between oneself 
                                                 
91 See Le Poidevin (2007: 29), cf. Nozick (1981) for the dispositional component of this form of process reliabilism. 
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and the world.92 Also, CTMP is an epistemological extension of truthmaker theories which are 
generally motivated by broadly held intuitions that truth should be grounded in, or supervene upon, 
what exists.93 Thus, CTMP is plausible for anyone who shares general truthmaker intuitions, or 
who wants an account of how the justification of our perceptual beliefs is causally grounded in the 
external environment. So, we can provisionally accept (E1), for the purpose of critiquing Le 
Poidevin’s solution to the epistemological puzzle of time perception, of which CTMP is the second 
of four jointly inconsistent propositions.    
 
3.5. The Acausality of Temporal Order and Duration 
Le Poidevin defends (E2), the acausality of order and duration, which is the claim that 
perceptual beliefs concerning order and duration are not caused by objective order and duration. 
He begins the defense by drawing on the location problem for relational properties.94 That is, 
relational properties do not seem to have spatio-temporal locations.  Consider the proposition that 
Chicago is north of Champaign. Where and when is the north-of relation located? On Russell’s 
(1912) analysis, the correct answer is “nowhere and nowhen”; these types of relations are 
universals, hence not the sorts of things which are located. Le Poidevin takes this to imply that if 
Russell is correct, then relational properties are not causes, because causes must have spatio-
temporal locations in order to produce effects at the times and places that they do. So, there is a 
strong conceptual motivation for claiming that order and duration are acausal. Assuming that 
temporal properties are universals which lack locations, and causal efficacy requires spatio-
temporal locations, it is a small step to the conclusion that order and duration are acausal. 
                                                 
92 See Goldman (1979, 1986) and Dretske (1981, 1995) for defenses of externalist accounts of justification.   
93 For defense of truthmaker see Armstrong (1997), Cameron (2005, 2008a, b), Schaffer (2008, 2010), for an 
extended argument against truthmaker see Merricks (2007). 
94 See Le Poidevin (2007: 101-102), cf. Russell (1912: 56) 
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What if you are willing to abandon the Russellian account of universals? Le Poidevin also 
considers treating relations and properties as tropes,95 i.e. particularized tokens of a type, and he 
thinks that this strategy fares no better with the location problem. He reasons that the trope theorist 
has the same problem of assigning relational properties to a location. Where is the north-of trope 
located in our example? He claims that it would be ad hoc to locate this token of the relation in 
either Chicago or Champaign. Locating it in both places would seem to belie the trope's status as 
a particular, because particulars cannot be located in two places at the same time. So, he concludes: 
Even if we are dealing with the trope rather than the universal, perhaps the best thing to 
say is that the relation is nowhere: it does not have a spatial location at all. (2007: 102)  
 
Le Poidevin’s dismissal of a trope-theoretic answer to the location problem is a bit perfunctory. 
The trope theorist might claim that the north-of relation is located all over the place— north-of-x 
tropes are located at all of the spacetime points between x and anything else north of x. By this, I 
do not mean to suggest that the same particularized property is all over the place, rather I am 
suggesting that on some interpretations tropes can be distributed particulars.96 The actual account 
would be much more complicated, but we should recognize that there are live options available to 
varieties of trope theory which could locate spatial relations by grounding them in concrete 
particularized instances (tropes) of relational properties. Le Poidevin is evaluating the prospects 
of a trope-theoretic answer on the basis of a limited sample. Of course, if you are committed to the 
idea that there are no distributed particulars, for independent reasons, then you should side with 
                                                 
95 For treatments of trope theory, see Armstrong (1989), Bacon (1995), Mormann (1995), and Simons (1994) 
96 For example, we might claim that the brownness trope of a piece of chocolate is distributed throughout the 
chocolate. We could alternatively claim that there are thousands of brownness tropes in the chocolate, one for each 
micro-particle of the chocolate. But, I am not endorsing one interpretation over the other, because I think both are 
adequate candidates for answering the location problem. I am grateful to David Ingram for pressing me to clarify 
this point. 
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Le Poidevin and agree that it is correct to dismiss the trope view because it cannot help to solve 
the location problem. 
My point, however, is that just because some obvious options for analyzing properties do not 
provide a worked-out theory of how a relation could be spatio-temporally located, does not imply 
that such a theory is untenable. It is certainly possible that the best account for locating such 
properties is yet to be postulated—for the sake of job security and future philosophers, we ought 
to hope that some problems are still unsolved. Perhaps, the best thing to say, pace Le Poidevin, is 
that it is possible to locate relations, but such a theory might commit us to a nominalist ontology 
of relations and properties. Nominalism is not such a bad position anyhow, especially if one 
entertains independent reasons for thinking that universals are ontological extravagances. On this 
score, a nominalist ontology only quantifies over particulars, whereas the alternative quantifies 
over both particulars and universals, so it certainly has the advantage of parsimony. Also, if one 
wants to defend some form of nominalism to avoid having to accept the existence of universals, 
then trope theory is the most promising option because it doesn't face the difficulties which beset 
other resemblance-class nominalisms.97  
Notwithstanding the possibility of locating relations and relational properties, Le Poidevin 
argues from the premise that relational properties lack locations to his conclusion that order and 
duration are acausal.  We can schematize his Argument from the Location Problem as follows: 
(L1) If x is a cause, then x must be spatio-temporally located. 
(L2) Relations and relational properties lack locations. 
(L3) So, relations and relational properties are not causes  
(L4) Order and duration are relational properties.  
(L5) If so, then order and duration are not causes.  
                                                 
97 Namely, the problems of companionship and imperfect community, cf. Goodman's Structure of Appearance (1951). 
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(L6) Thus, objective order and duration are acausal.  
 
So, the argument directly supports E2 from the epistemological puzzle, since L6 is a restatement 
of it. If we can demonstrate that relations and relational properties are causes, then either L1 is 
false or L2 is false, and Le Poidevin’s argument is unsound. Take for instance an object that floats 
in water. What causes the object to float in water? Flat-footed answer: the object’s being less dense 
than the water. The relational property of being less dense than seems to be a cause of the object’s 
floating. Le Poidevin might reply that it is the object’s density, an intrinsic property of the object, 
which is the cause of its floating, not some relational property it has with respect to the water. This 
reply misses the mark, because the object’s density would not cause it to float, if it were placed in 
a liquid which was less dense than the object. Rather, the object would sink as predicted by 
Archimedes' buoyancy principle. So, an object’s floating or sinking in a liquid is counterfactually 
dependent upon the relational property that the object bears with respect to the given liquid. At the 
very least, this example should cast doubt on Le Poidevin’s claim that being a relational property 
entails that the property is acausal; especially considering that Le Poidevin is primarily concerned 
with the indirect causation of perceptual beliefs. That is, CTMP only requires that the truthmaker 
of p play a causal role in the formation of the belief that p.   
As a result, we should not accept so easily the conclusion that order and duration are acausal. 
Recall that Le Poidevin began with the observation that the order and duration are not the sorts of 
things that can be perceived; we only become aware of them after we perceive the event or events 
that exhibit them. He rightly concedes that just because (on his view) order and duration fail to be 
objects of perceptual states, “it does not immediately follow that they are not causes of those states” 
(2007: 101), because being causal is not a sufficient condition for being an object of perception. 
Nevertheless, he finds it implausible and puzzling how features of the world that we never perceive 
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can causally contribute to our perceptual beliefs. For this reason, he uses the Argument from the 
Location Problem to provide reasons for thinking that order and duration, as relational properties, 
cannot by themselves be causes of our perceptual beliefs. I have outlined two preliminary ways to 
resist this move: (i) by working out a theory for locating relational properties or (ii) to develop 
examples of causally efficacious relational properties, thereby showing that either causes need not 
be located or that relational properties are located. In the remainder of this section, I want to sketch 
how the duration of an event could cause my representation of that duration. In §3.6, I return to 
the theory of sounds as distal events to provide a more detailed objection to the location problem, 
by locating duration in the physical structure of sound events, and showing how the durations of 
sounds play a causal role in forming perceptual beliefs about them.  
To illustrate the possibility of an event's duration causing a perceptual state, take the 
generalized case where I perceive an event e persisting over some interval Δt. While e is the object 
of my perception, a property of e is the amount of time it persists, Δt. In a veridical case, my 
perception of e which lasts for Γt is caused by e’s property of persisting Δt, if there is a reliable 
mechanism by which Γt represents Δt. Only in virtue of e having some objective duration Δt, which 
is represented in my perception of e as Γt, can I come to form the belief that e lasted Δt. This does 
not rule out my getting it wrong; my belief would be false if I over- or underestimated the length 
of e’s interval, and in such cases my belief thereby would not count as knowledge.98 In cases where 
I do get it right, however, my belief is made true by the fact that an event’s perceived duration 
matches its objective duration. If an event’s duration is a property of the event, and perception of 
                                                 
98 In fact, humans are notoriously bad at estimating extremely brief durations (on the order of 1-400 msec.) and longer 
durations (on the order of minutes and hours) without external reliable clock systems and memory, but medium-length 
estimations (on the order of seconds) can be accurately reported without aid. Varela (1999: 277) claims that, “subjects 
can estimate durations of 2-3 seconds quite precisely, but their performance decreases considerably for longer times; 
spontaneous speech in many languages is organized such that utterances last 2-3 seconds; short intentional movements 
(such as self-initiated arm movements) are embedded within windows of the same duration.” See also Varela (1995) 
for a more extensive treatment of the psychological and cognitive-neuroscience support.       
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that event causes the belief that the event has the duration that it does, then the duration of the 
event plays a causal role in my forming the belief. This is true even when we grant that my 
awareness of the duration is delayed and subsequent to the event, given the empirical evidence of 
stimulus reaction delays in cognitive systems.99 Just because my perception of the duration is not 
simultaneous with the stimulus event does not imply that duration is not a property of the event 
that causes my perceptual belief. Le Poidevin is denying that objective duration can be causal in 
any respect, on the grounds that duration is not located, but we will see that this is also mistaken.   
 
3.6. Locating duration 
Le Poidevin claims that duration is a property that lacks location, and if it is not located, then 
it is acausal. Consider my perceptual belief that a trumpet blast lasts 3s. My belief about the 
duration of the trumpet sound cannot be caused by a bare perception of duration, since we agree 
to the obvious claim that properties of an event are not perceived in the absence of the event.100 
Nevertheless, I argued in §3.2 that the duration of an event is an object of perception when the 
event is an object of perception, which does not require a bare perception of duration itself. This 
section challenges the soundness of Le Poidevin's inference by defending a theory of sounds as 
distal events (introduced in §3.2) which both provides a plausible solution to the location problem 
and has significant advantages over the rival theory that identifies a sound with its waves. 
Allow me to apply the theory of sounds as distal events to the example of the trumpet blast. 
The activity of the trumpet player buzzing her lips on the mouthpiece and forcing air through the 
trumpet causes the trumpet sound. The sound event causes sound waves to oscillate through 
                                                 
99 Libet et al. (1967, 1991), and Jensen (1979) offer studies that purport to show that reaction times to skin stimuli is 
around 500 msec. A delay does not entail that duration is not a causal part of the perception. 
100 Unless we are in Wonderland, where one can see properties without their bearers, e.g., "a grin without a cat." 
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spacetime reaching the cochlea in my inner ear which detects pressure impulses from the waves 
and, in turn, produces electrical impulses along the auditory nerve which encode the temporal 
parameters of the audio signal. The trumpet sound’s objective duration of 3s directly modifies the 
oscillations of the sound waves, which communicate the sound to my auditory senses. Part of what 
is communicated by the sound waves is the temporal extent of the sound event. Notice, however, 
that on this view a sound is not identified with the waves it causes.  The waves represent 
information about the sound event to the perceiver, but the waves are not identical to the sound. 
The trumpet sound is located near its source, the trumpet, which is precisely where we hear it to 
be located.  I don’t hear the trumpet sound to be in my ear, I hear it located where the trumpeting 
takes place.  O’Callaghan clearly states this feature of the theory: 
Sounds, I claim, are located roughly where we hear them to be: at or near their sources. 
The sound does not travel as do the waves. The waves, however, are causally intermediate 
between the sounds and the auditory experiences of perceivers. The waves bear or transmit 
information about sounds through the medium, and thus furnish the materials for auditory 
experience. Sounds are stationary relative to their sources. If sounds are stationary events, 
then the auditory experience of location does not involve a systematic and pervasive 
illusion, and audition-based beliefs about the durations of sounds are for the most part true. 
(2009: 14-15) 
 
Why does identifying sounds with their waves imply that the auditory experience of location 
involves a 'systematic and pervasive illusion'? One reason is that auditory experiences represent, 
to a greater or lesser degree, the location of a sound source within one's environment, which is 
known as 'extracranial localization' (Gelfand 1998: 374). If a sound were identified with its wave, 
which oscillates dynamically through space instead of being located near its source, then 
118 
 
perceptual beliefs regarding the locations of sounds would be systemically erroneous.101 
Alternatively, an auditory system with a reliable extracranial localization function has clear 
adaptive advantages because we can, say, identify where the rattlesnake's rattle is coming from 
and avoid a potentially fatal bite. Of course, an adaptive advantage does not imply that it is a truth-
tracking advantage. Fair enough, but the view on which sounds are located at or near their sources 
provides a plausible story for why our auditory system is able to reliably detect the direction from 
which an audio signal originates (viz., where the sound is located) and estimate the distance. The 
alternative is in a worse explanatory position; if sounds were anywhere and everywhere the signal 
carries them, then reliable extracranial localization of sounds would be a mystery in need of further 
explanation.  
A second problem, indicated in the O'Callaghan quote, is that the pervasive illusion implied 
by the wave theory also infects all our duration-based beliefs. According to the wave theory, 
sounds are moving objects, identified with sound signals, and source location is only part of the 
story about sounds, viz. the beginning of the story. The sound itself travels as a wave and thereby 
arrives in the inner ear, so the sound is both at the source and at the receiver of the signal, and 
many diffuse places elsewhere. It follows that if one identifies sounds with the sound waves 
themselves, then sounds are weird growing and diffusing oscillations through space. The problem 
is that the signal becomes weaker and noisier as it travels from the source and stretches in 
spacetime. If sounds are identical to the expanding sound waves, then a sound which we record 
near the source to last, say, 10s is actually of a much longer duration since the waves expands 
further throughout spacetime, spreading and diffusing. Thus, our belief that the sound persists for 
10s is false. Let us call this the 'Diffusion Problem': if you hold that sounds are identical to sound 
                                                 
101 See O'Callaghan (2010) for an extended defense of the sound localization against skeptical challenges.  
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waves then, (a) a sound duration is vague or indeterminate due to diffusion of signal, (b) sounds 
are indefinitely expanding objects or events that undergo continuous change, and (c) beliefs about 
precise durations of sounds are false. To put the problem in a practical way, the wave theory is in 
tension with the applied science of sound recording, which operates on the assumption that a 
diffuse signal is not identical to the sound from which it originates. For this reason, sounds ought 
to be, and usually are, recorded as close as possible to their sources; for example, microphones and 
pick-ups are positioned relatively close to the instruments, the sounds of which the recording 
devices are designed to receive and transmit. The metaphysical ramifications of the wave theory 
is at odds with this practice. Does the sound as stationary event theory also face a version of the 
Diffusion Problem? 
On the view I endorse, sounds produce signals which transmit information about the event’s 
duration to my auditory system, which integrates the information into a percept. On the basis of 
this integration, I come to form perceptual beliefs about the sound event, like how long it lasts. 
Stationary sound events still have a wavelike oscillatory shape, because the physical form of the 
sound is produced by the vibrations of the source and is represented in the signal it creates. 
Although there is a distinction between the sound event and the signal it creates, the signal is an 
isomorphism of the sound, especially near its source. This explains the placement of recording 
devices in close proximity to sound sources, in order to record the structure of the sound—
including its temporal parameters—before the signal propagates. 
If one distinguishes a sound from its signal, which is only a representation of the sound, then 
one can measure exact sound durations at the source and avoid the Diffusion Problem by 
acknowledging that the signal becomes a weaker representation of the initiating sound as it 
expands. Instead of an isomorphism, the signal becomes an increasingly weaker quasi-
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homomorphism of the sound as it diffuses through spacetime. So, in addition to preserving 
localizations of sounds, another virtue of the distinction between sound and signal is that it 
preserves the integrity of sound durations and expediently avoids the Diffusion Problem. 
Returning to the challenge of locating duration, if sound events have durations and are located 
at their sources, then the duration of a sound event is distributed throughout the sound event.102 
Sounds produce signals which transmit information about the event’s duration to my auditory 
system and I come to form perceptual beliefs about the sound event. The sound event’s 
instantiating the property of lasting for 3s is a candidate truthmaker for my perceptual belief that 
a trumpet blast lasts 3s.103 So, on the present theory of sounds as events, we can answer Le 
Poidevin’s location challenge and provide a story on which the duration of an event figures 
centrally in the causal history of perceptual beliefs about duration, at least in the case of audition.  
Le Poidevin anticipates this sort of answer to the location challenge, and offers the following 
rebuttal: 
It does not help to point out that duration and precedence are consequences of events’ 
temporal locations, for this relies on those locations themselves being temporally extended 
and standing in temporal relations to each other. (2007: 102) 
 
He is suggesting that an appeal to the interval of an event to locate a property of duration is 
unhelpful because the locations must themselves be temporally extended, i.e. doing so presupposes 
what is being analyzed. My proposal is slightly different, because in addition to temporally 
                                                 
102 Mapping the sound event in 4-space, the duration would be located along the temporal dimension. 
103 Our perceptual beliefs about duration, probably, only rarely give numerical values. We can, however, ostensibly 
specify the duration by comparing it to a duration of equal magnitude. In fact, humans are quite good at this within 
the range of 500ms - 3s, temporal reproduction tasks in experimental psychology test for precisely this ability to 
reproduce durations. For good examples of this experimental method and results, see Wittmann et al.  (2007) and 
Ulbrich et al. (2007).  
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locating sounds, the distal event theory of sounds provides a systematic ontology for locating 
sounds in space as well. When and where is trumpet blast located?  Over the 3s interval of the 
sound event, and at or near the source of the sound. Recall that a sound is shaped like a wave, 
because it is isomorphic to and carries the information caused by the reverberations of its source. 
So, if we were able to measure the initial three second interval stretching from the trumpet's bell, 
at the exact time of the blast, then we would be able to exactly locate the sound event in spacetime. 
In fact, modern recording equipment does an adequate job recording and representing the structure 
of the sound event, including the fine durational parameters of the sound envelope.104 If we also 
know the exact location of the sound source in space, then we have the resources to provide 
accurate specifications for locating a particular sound. When I claim that duration is distributed 
over the entire interval, this does not commit me to the view that the total duration exists at each 
moment of the sound event. Rather, the total duration only exists over the entire interval of the 
sound event.105 A particular duration is a distributed property in spacetime, which explains my 
sympathy for finding an account that locates relational properties in the world. 
Le Poidevin claims that this response puts us in a position of needing to answer why, if the 
duration is extended throughout the event, is it incapable of causing the same effect at all parts of 
the event?  The property of having 3s duration is exemplified over the 3s interval of an event, not 
at each second of that event. For instance, at 1s into the perception of a sound event, I form the 
belief that the sound has lasted one second so far; we can claim that the duration of the event up 
to that first second caused the corresponding perceptual belief. If the sound continues for another 
                                                 
104 Note, that on the view I am advocating, when you amplify and replay an audio recording you are creating a new 
sound event that bears some ancestral relation to the original sound that was recorded. This has the interesting 
implication that the most replayed recordings have the most ancestors. 
105  It is like asking the question ‘when and where does the Earth revolve around the sun?’ The correct answer is that 
one revolution of the Earth around the sun occurs over an interval of ~365 days and over the path of its elliptical orbit.  
Each time-slice along the Earth’s orbital path is a state that belongs to the revolution, but it is only the entire path 
traveled over a year which is identical to a revolution.   
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2s before ceasing, only then could the duration of the event cause the perceptual belief that the 
sound lasts 3s. On the analysis I am suggesting here, durations are the sorts of properties distributed 
throughout a particular event, so the duration is isochronous to the extent of that event. That is, 
duration is nothing over and above the temporal extent of an event. 
I do not claim that we are always, or even most of the time, consciously aware of timing the 
duration of events and forming perceptual beliefs about durations.106 Rather, sometimes we do 
form true beliefs about the duration of brief events on the basis of our perception of these events. 
In such cases, which should count as perceptual knowledge, it is correct to claim that the 
truthmaker of the belief, viz. the persisting event, causes the belief. Since the duration is 
inextricable from the extended event, the objective duration of the event plays a central role in the 
causal history of the belief.107   
 
3.7. Beyond the location problem 
Even if we solve the location problem, Le Poidevin argues that there are further difficulties 
with granting that temporal order and duration can be causes. He contends that all cases of the 
purported causal efficacy of temporal properties can be explained away, including those unrelated 
to perception or perceptual knowledge. Take his case of some pasta’s being cooked because it has 
been boiled for 10 min. The mere passage of ten minutes does not cause the cooking. Le Poidevin 
claims that it is the individual events that take place during the 10 min that cause the pasta to be 
                                                 
106 I would claim instead that we normally outsource most of our timing to external reliable clock systems for three 
related reasons: 1) doing so frees up a lot of cognitive resources for other tasks; 2) our external temporal metrics are 
much more accurate over extended durations and extremely brief durations, thus grounding more true judgments about 
durations; and 3) there is likely an evolutionary advantage to cognitively outsourcing in this way (given 2 and 3). I 
think this claim would follow naturally from the Extended Mind thesis argued for by Clark & Chalmers (1998) and 
Clark (1997, 2003, 2008). 
107 Locating the order relations that obtain between two or more events may pose a more difficult task. Nonetheless, 
I think we can tell a plausible story, ceteris paribus, in which the objective orders of events cause corresponding 
perceptual beliefs about order.  
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cooked. I agree; no one would defend the ridiculous view that mere temporal passage causes the 
cooking of pasta, but I find it puzzling that Le Poidevin denies that the duration of the event has 
any causal contribution whatsoever. The individual events occur over an interval of 10 minutes 
and those same events could not have occurred over a briefer interval. If so, and if the events cause 
the cooking, then the durations of the events are, in part, constitutive of the cause. 
Le Poidevin might reasonably object that the same events could take place over a briefer 
interval, if the rate of change were accelerated, which supports his view that the individual events 
taking place are causal, not the interval over which they take place. At the original rate of change, 
the pasta requires 10 min of boiling to be fully cooked, whereas if the rate of change were increased 
two-fold, then the pasta would only require 5 min of boiling. Pushing back, I submit that the rate 
of change is another temporal relation of the events, since it represents the number of changes per 
unit of time. Thus, by modifying the causal story to focus on rate of change, we cannot eliminate 
the role played by duration, since the individual events' rate of change over a particular interval is 
what causes the pasta's being cooked. If the events cause the cooking, then the rate of change of 
the events and their duration are, in part, constitutive of the cause.108 
A more sophisticated example from nuclear science, suitably simplified for ease of exposition, 
will lend support to my claim that the specific orders and durations of causally efficacious events 
are not eliminable from causal explanations of those events. Nuclear chain reactions occur when 
the neutrons emitted by a fission event cause additional self-propagating fission events instead of 
either (a) being absorbed by non-fission capture events or (b) escaping the system.109 These 
reactions are sensitive to durational properties of fission events, including both the average time 
between neutron emission and absorption or escape, known as 'prompt neutron lifetime', and the 
                                                 
108 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting the possible appeal to rate of change. 
109See Lamarsh, John & Baratta, Anthony (2001). Introduction to Nuclear Engineering for details and equations. 
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average time from neutron emission to absorption into a capture event that results in fission, known 
as 'mean generation time'. In order to maximize the explosive power of fissile material, nuclear 
weapon design requires engineering a prompt supercritical assembly in which the number of 
fission events increases exponentially over a brief duration causing the release of explosively large 
amounts of energy on the order of hundreds of millions of electronvolts. Accordingly, nuclear 
engineers use the durational parameters of fission events to calculate the amount and type of fuel 
required to generate a rapid and intense enough reaction to produce such an explosion. The causal 
explanation of a nuclear chain reaction directly relies on the prompt neutron lifetimes and the mean 
generation times of fission events, i.e. these physical durations play ineliminable causal roles in 
chain reaction events.  
In response, Le Poidevin must claim that it is the fission events that cause the nuclear chain 
reaction, but the durational parameters of those events are strictly acausal. Again, I agree that no 
one would claim that the mere passage of time causes chain reactions, but it is empirically suspect 
to claim that such reactions are not causally sensitive to durational parameters, because (as we 
have seen) the properties of order and duration can partly constitute causally efficacious events. 
Perhaps, a charitable way to read Le Poidevin's skepticism about temporal properties being causal, 
in light of the nuclear chain reaction example, is to interpret him as claiming that temporal 
properties in scientific explanations are merely operational and not ontological. His rebuttal might 
go as follows: nuclear scientists and others use temporal variables to calculate the states of physical 
systems. For example, the purported durational property, prompt neutron lifetime, is merely a way 
of determining how much fissile material is needed to maximize the amount of neutrons absorbed 
into capture events resulting in exponentially increasing fissions. But, the duration is not doing 
any causal work at the level of reality.  
125 
 
The first part of the possible objection makes a lot of sense, since scientific models 
operationalize variables into quantifiable factors for the purpose of computation and prediction. 
And, given that fissile material is highly unstable, you need some way of calculating the conditions 
required for generating a nuclear chain reactions. Nevertheless, this response misses the force of 
the example, because the precipitating conditions of chain reaction fission events are causally 
sensitive to temporal parameters. Also, the very process that is engineered, the prompt supercritical 
assembly, is extremely time sensitive in its own right. Only if you ensure enough fissions per unit 
of time, will the supercritical assembly be prompt enough to produce an explosive chain reaction. 
So, the engineers are making calculations concerning the number of fission events based on 
probabilistic physical durations like the prompt neutron lifetime and the mean generation time to 
ensure the exponential increase in fission events within the real interval of a few milliseconds. 
Every stage of this causal explanation requires functional representations of temporal parameters; 
so, unless you are an anti-realist about time, you should find the example to be a compelling case 
of temporal properties playing non-superfluous causal roles.110 
Le Poidevin’s own solution to the epistemological puzzle is to maintain that order and duration 
are acausal and revise CTMP, weakening it to the following principle: 
Explanatory Truth-Maker Principle (ETMP): Perceptual beliefs that qualify for the title 
‘knowledge’ have truthmakers that figure in a full explanation of the acquisition of those 
beliefs. (2007: 116) 
 
The ETMP is a weakened principle in comparison to the CTMP, because it no longer requires that 
truthmakers play a causal role in the acquisition of the beliefs which they make true. This form of 
weakening undermines some of the externalist intuitions that motivate causal theories of 
                                                 
110 Le Poidevin is certainly not an anti-realist, since his epistemological puzzle directly refers to 'objective order and 
duration'. 
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perceptual knowledge, since it replaces the requirement of a causal relation between belief and 
truthmaker with an ambiguous relation of 'figur[ing] in a full explanation'; in assessing the merits 
of this revised principle a lot will ride on how such figuring is specified. In an effort to do so, Le 
Poidevin proposes a new kind of explanation, of which objective order and duration can figure in 
the explanation of how we come to form beliefs about order and duration. He coins this type of 
explanation ‘chronometric explanation’, which includes reference to the temporal locations of 
events, the temporal extent of events, or to the rate of change. Le Poidevin stipulates that 
chronometric explanation is a distinctively non-causal form of explanation.111 Nevertheless, this 
move seems to be an ad hoc strategy to solve his puzzle while maintaining the acausality of order 
and duration. I understand ad hoc moves to be those revisions to a theory that modify it in such a 
way to make it immune to a single problem, but fails to generate any new predictions or cover a 
broader range of phenomena. I recognize that his move to posit chronometric explanation was not 
intended as a scientific hypothesis, but it is offered as a way to get temporal properties back into a 
more complete explanation of how we come to have perceptual beliefs about order and duration. 
Le Poidevin concedes that his chronometric explanation and the ETMP play the same role as 
CTMP, with the only difference being that he can maintain the acausality of temporal properties 
and relations. This might be an important virtue, and conceptual grounds for following Le 
Poidevin, if your elect theory of causation struggles to accommodate cases where temporal 
properties appear to play causal roles. Thus, he is helping himself to all the causal explanations 
available to accounts like mine, while strategically screening off chronometric elements from 
playing causal roles. He certainly hasn't increased the explanatory power of the theory nor has he 
                                                 
111 Cf. Nerlich’s (1994: 41) for a discussion of geometrical explanation, which Le Poidevin cites as having affinities 
to his proposal, and is likely the source of his idea since geometrical explanation is also stipulated to be a non-causal 
explanation. 
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given independent reasons, beyond his Argument from the Location Problem, for thinking that 
temporal properties are unequivocally acausal. Furthermore, my examples from sound engineering 
and acoustical science offer significant countervailing reasons to think that temporal properties 
and relations are causally salient to both auditory perception and our ability to process signals in 
broader contexts (e.g., hearing aid technology and music production). 
To be fair, let us examine whether the introduction of chronometric explanation provides any 
additional advantages. In the course of explicating chronometric explanation, he says: 
Often it will occur in the context of a causal explanation. Thus, a certain effect may be 
explained, not simply by the existence of an antecedent cause, but by the location of that 
cause in time, or by the interval between that cause and another item, or by the rate at which 
some antecedent change proceeded. (2007:117)  
 
Le Poidevin's stipulation that chronometric explanation is non-causal does not seem to get him 
very far, since it occurs in the context of causal explanations. All the heavy lifting of satisfying 
ETMP is done by integrating chronometric with causal explanations, and the distinction between 
the supposedly distinct forms of explanation is predicated solely on the claim that order and 
duration of events cannot play causal roles; a claim, and arguments given for it, which I have 
attacked on multiple fronts. Thus, chronometric explanation appears to be non-causal in name 
alone. Le Poidevin owes us an independent argument for why we should accept that this is a 
distinct form of explanation, other than an expedient solution to his puzzle. Chronometric 
explanation suspiciously serves the same purpose as my claim that temporal location of an event 
and durational parameters of an event are properties of the event itself, properties invoked to give 
causal explanations across a wide-range of phenomena from auditory perception to nuclear 
engineering. Le Poidevin's proposed solution seems to be motivated by his strong conceptual 
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commitments concerning the acausality of order and duration, resulting from both his puzzlement 
about how temporal properties could be proper objects of perceptual states and his causal worry 
about the location problem. Thus, he invokes chronometric explanation in conjunction with the 
ETMP in order to give an account of how we come to form perceptual beliefs about the order and 
duration of events, and to preserve his commitment to the acausality of temporal properties.  
I have argued that we can give a much simpler analysis of the epistemic relation between the 
order and duration of events and our perceptual beliefs concerning them, once we recognize that 
order and duration are objects of perception and are poised to play causal roles in perceptual belief 
formation. If we deny E2, the acausality claim, then the epistemological puzzle of time perception 
dissolves. I have offered significant reasons for denying E2 and affirming that order and duration 
of events are causal in some non-trivial respects that accord with current scientific practice. Finally, 
Le Poidevin's solution to the puzzle ought to be rejected on the grounds that it weakens the 
truthmaker principle, invokes an artificial distinction, and rests on the spurious insistence that order 
and duration are always acausal.   
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4. MULTI-SCALE SAMPLING AND INTEGRATION AS A BASIS FOR TEMPORAL 
PERCEPTION 
4.1. Introduction 
Complex human behaviors display a wide range of temporally sensitive coordination, 
interaction, and perceptual discrimination. There are numerous practical and adaptive advantages 
gained by sensitivity to temporal features of a changing dynamic environment. The capacity to 
distinguish ballistic from non-ballistic motion, for instance, enables one to detect and avoid 
predators as well as to identify and track prey. Also, the capacity to recognize and produce speech 
patterns enables communication, which is imperative for the interaction of social animals. 
Paradigm examples of human culture also thrive on temporally mediated behaviors and indeed on 
capacities for fine temporal discrimination: creating and appreciating music, catching or hitting a 
baseball, or coordinating the movements of a dance routine. In addition, of course, in the present 
era of computer-based activities, mastering timing and sensorimotor coordination is necessary to 
successfully utilize technological devices as effective work tools as well as to enjoy their various 
gaming capacities.112 Our success at engaging and interacting with dynamic environments whether 
in the world or the cyber-worlds of human-machine interfaces strongly suggests that humans 
possess cognitive capacities for perceiving temporal properties and relations, specifically order, 
duration, succession, and synchrony. 
Supposing that humans do perceive temporal properties of, and relations between, external 
stimuli, the inquiry shifts to the question: what cognitive processes and mechanisms make this 
possible? Among cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists skepticism about temporal 
perception is unwarranted, and thriving research programs are dedicated to investigating 
                                                 
112 In fact, many video games increase level of difficulty as a function of timing task performance; even the classic 
puzzle game Tetris increases difficulty simply by increasing the rate at which the puzzle pieces fall, thereby 
reducing the amount of time a player has to rotate and position each piece.  
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hypotheses regarding both the functional capacities and neural processes that realize those 
capacities for temporal perception.113 In this chapter, I likewise table the skeptical worries and 
proceed from the assumption that the temporal perception is a legitimate target of investigation, 
and consider competing models of how it works for creatures like us.114  
Although some philosophers doubt that we ever perceive temporal properties at all, because 
temporal properties and relations are not objects of perception (Le Poidevin 2007), they often agree 
that we seem to have temporal experiences and offer alternative accounts of non-perceptual 
temporal representation. 115 Along these lines, temporal atomism is the view that perceptual 
experiences can only represent what is happening at a given time, and thus we do not perceive 
temporally extended events instantiating temporal properties and relations (Chuard 2011: 8). 
According to atomism, putative temporal experiences, say, as of a baseball in motion or as of a 
melody unfolding, are a result of the successive combination of discrete perceptual experiences. I 
visually perceive the baseball at each spatially contiguous location along its trajectory at successive 
times, and each distinct perception represents only a single temporal part of the ball’s motion. Why 
do I seem to see the ball moving, if I do not perceive temporal relations between non-simultaneous 
events?  
                                                 
113 Of course, the sociological fact that these projects are thriving (i.e. well-funded) does not entail the accuracy or 
legitimacy of a particular research program. Nevertheless, examining the empirical evidence and making an informed 
judgment about the explanations on offer is methodologically more satisfying than armchair skepticism. Also, the 
current research improves the prospects of future research testing novel hypotheses generated by well-informed 
philosophers of cognitive science, promoting valuable interdisciplinary interactions to combat the inbreeding of 
cladistic ideas.  
114 Psychological explanation is primarily a matter of functional analysis, answering the question "how does x work?" 
not identifying proprietary laws, cf. (Cummins, 2000). Presently, our x is temporal perception.  
115 This skeptical position agrees that humans and other creatures have means for representing temporal properties of 
and relations between external stimuli, but it denies that such temporal representation entails temporal perception. See 
Le Poidevin (2007) for an extended defense of this brand of skepticism. I argue at length against Le Poidevin's position 
in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, there is a long lineage of philosophers taking time perception seriously, albeit for different 
reasons and in the service of reaching various different conclusions: Aristotle, Augustine, Locke, Kant, Husserl, Broad, 
Russell, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Mellor, Dainton, etc.  
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One explanation is that the purported experience of motion is a function of the temporal 
relations between adjacent perceptions, the degree of representational overlap between the 
contents of those perceptions, and some cognitive post-processing involving working memory 
which utilizes the series of atomistic “snapshots” that our sensory systems capture at each passing 
moment to generate non-perceptual representations of temporally extended events.116 According 
to the atomist, my discrete perceptions of the baseball happen in such rapid succession that the 
interval between them is undetectable, making it seem as though my experience is extended and 
continuous. 
I am inclined to agree that working memory plays an important role in temporal representation, 
as I discuss below, but deny that perception is temporally atomistic in the way just described. 
Instead I advocate for a version of Content Extensionalism, holding that we perceive the temporal 
relations between non-simultaneous events in virtue of targeting and representing temporally 
extended content. I perceive the baseball moving by representing extended segments along its 
trajectory and the relations that obtain between its successive locations and orientations in 
spacetime. I also hypothesize that such perception involves sampling the environment at multiple 
temporal scales (e.g. tens of milliseconds, hundreds of milliseconds, seconds), prediction-
correction feedback cycles to continuously update projective estimates of ongoing stimuli, and 
integrating information across various subsystems. On my view, perceptual experience does not 
consist solely in passive detection of the environment, but involves active sampling, predicting, 
and updating representations in real time. 
Whether or not such neurocognitive processes posited by my preferred model count as 
perception is merely a question of conceptual boundaries, and not a particularly deep disagreement, 
                                                 
116 I evaluate and argue against the atomist’s error theory for explaining purported experiences of motion at length in 
Chapter 2, “Modeling Constant Motion Perception.” 
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since both extensionalists and atomists agree that we do seem to have such experiences, perceptual 
or not.117 No parties to the debate deny the phenomenology, rather they dispute what explains our 
temporal experiences and representations. More substantive and unsettled questions concern how 
such temporal representations are generated, whether our sensory systems sample the world in 
atomistic time-slices or at multiple temporal scales, how temporal information is integrated, and 
what mechanisms realize these capacities. Empirical research has the potential to decide between 
the diverging answers given by the opposing philosophical positions like atomism and 
extensionalism or, more conservatively, provide evidence that favors the proprietary hypothesis of 
one model over another.118 
Furthermore, I suggest that philosophical analysis of the experimental findings may generate 
new hypotheses and predictions for a particular scientific theory, or offer critical arguments to help 
rule out the plausibility of particular competing models. This is an important role for the 
philosopher to play in the advancement of cognitive psychology and neuroscience, just as the 
cutting-edge work of scientists should inform contemporary philosophy of mind.119 To illustrate 
this interdisciplinary upshot, I make a case for philosophical contributions to the fertile domain of 
temporal processing where there remain many contenders and no consensus on the exact 
mechanisms that realize temporal perception.120 In the following, I pay particular attention to the 
research concerning duration perception, including the models on offer and the hypotheses that 
link those models to real physical systems. 
                                                 
117 Chuard agrees that the differences between narrow, purely sensory, accounts of perception and less restricted 
accounts like mine are not substantive and should not be the focus of the debate (cf. 2011: 8 fn10). 
118 Some evidence E favors H1 over H2 if E increases the ratio of the posterior probability of H1 to the posterior 
probability of H2.  
119 Given that my future funding is not contingent on the success of any particular model, I can maintain an impartiality 
in my evaluations of competing models not enjoyed by scientists with considerable time and resources invested in 
their models. 
120 See Ivry & Schlerf (2008: 273-80) and Wittmann (2009: 1955-67) for detailed discussion of the competing models, 
reviews of the relevant experimental paradigms, and outstanding problems for each candidate.  
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In §4.2, I specify a target range of temporal phenomena salient to understanding perceptual 
cognition, and motivate the multi-scale sampling (MSS) hypothesis that sensory subsystems 
sample information at multiple rates, i.e. shorter and longer sampling periods. To continue building 
a case for MSS and its connection to content extensionalism, in §4.3, I argue that both behavioral 
and neurophysiological data support the hypothesis that nervous systems process temporal 
information by sampling stimuli signals at shorter and longer durations. I first consider evidence 
for sampling in the tens of milliseconds-range based on the performance limitations of our 
perceptual systems which constrain the lower-bound threshold of target phenomena for temporal 
perception in humans, i.e. system limitations determine how finely we can discriminate the 
temporal order and duration of external stimuli. In §4.4, I advance the hypothesis that working 
memory capacity is one factor that constrains the upper-bound limit on the temporal range of 
phenomena that can be perceived. Experimental data, I maintain, favors the hypothesis that 
temporal perception is constituted by multi-scale sampling and integration, over a single-sampling 
rate hypothesis implied by the atomistic “snapshot” model.  
In order to articulate a methodology for evaluating competing models within the mind sciences, 
in §4.5, I borrow insights about scientific representation from the structuralist program in the 
philosophy of science121 and endorse a form of constructive realism—the view that scientific 
theories are best understood as (a) families of models and (b) hypotheses that specify the respects 
and degrees in which a model represents some real physical system.122 I explain and proceed to 
implement constructive realism by offering an initial exploratory evaluation of the ways empirical 
                                                 
121 Cf. Suppes (1956, 1967), Sneed (1971), Suppe (1974), Stegmüller (1976), Balzer, Moulines, and Sneed (1987), 
Giere (1988), Bickle (1998) 
122 See Giere (1988: 92-110, 1999: 174-199) for an extended defense of constructive realism as a doctrine about 
scientific models and hypotheses representing real systems. The natural foil is the constructive empiricism of van 
Fraassen (1980, 1982), in which scientists construct models but only the observable aspects of real systems incur 
ontological commitments, giving an anti-realist interpretation of unobservable posits (e.g., forces, spin, charge).  
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evidence are marshaled in favor of the main competing models of duration perception, especially 
the “dedicated internal clock” and “intrinsic neural signature” classes of models. I argue that 
philosophers of temporal perception have a vested interest in remaining apprised of the ongoing 
empirical work on temporal processing, and conclude by highlighting some possible avenues for 
future interdisciplinary collaborations.    
 
4.2. Multi-scale Sampling and Integration 
A wide range of timescales are physiologically relevant to the maintenance of living systems, 
but only some of these scales represent candidates for perceptible durations. Michael Mauk and 
Dean Buonomano (2004) suggest that the human organism processes temporal information over a 
scale spanning, at least, 12 orders of magnitude, from fast neural processes like “axonal delays” 
necessary for sound to travel from one ear to the other  (≈10-3 - 10-2ms) to slower biological 
rhythms on orders of hours and days (≈106 -109ms) such as the “ultradian”, “circadian”, and the  
“infradian”  rhythms that auto-regulate important physiological processes including appetite, 
sleep-wake, and menstrual cycles.123 While these slower rhythms on the order of hours and days 
presumably are important for a complete understanding of physiology, they do not bear directly 
on the present issue of temporal perception, barring further argument to the contrary.124 Although 
I certainly can experience the effects of fatigue and drive to sleep associated with dips in the 
circadian cycle or the energized alertness associated with its peaks, it is implausible that I can 
                                                 
123 For classic chronobiology research see Aschoff, (1965, 1998); Scheving et al., (1974); and Winfree (1980), for a 
molecular genetic basis of circadian rhythms see King &Takahashi (2000). 
124 I leave open the possibility that these slower biological rhythms do influence temporal perception in important 
ways, but that is beyond the scope of the present investigation. For example, a recent study by Meissner & Wittman 
(2011: 289-297) indicates that interoceptive awareness of one's cardiac rhythms is correlated with more accurate 
timing in the range of seconds. That is, subjects that are better at perceiving their heartbeat are better at reproducing 
durations on the scale of seconds. For present purposes, I bracket the role of autonomic function in the perception of 
time intervals in the range of seconds. 
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perceive the entire 24-cycle. Likewise, I can hear various motifs, melodic phrases, chord 
progressions, and modulations in key during different phases of a musical performance, but 
perceiving an entire 15 min movement is beyond the range of my perceptual acuity. 
The scope of the present analysis ought to be limited to the intervals that, at least in principle, 
correspond to perceptible durations. Such a limitation in scope is not without precedent. Scientific 
investigations of human temporal perception, including the processes which realize such 
perception, typically target a more limited range of interval phenomena (≈10-1 - 104ms)—not too 
brief, but not too long.125 Much neurophysiological modeling and experimentation focuses on two 
distinct “temporal integration windows”, one at a short sampling period (20-50ms) and one at a 
longer sampling period (150-300ms); especially work in auditory perception (Plack & Moore 
1990; Plack & Viemeister 1993; Theunissen & Miller 1995;  Hirsch & Watson 1996; Poeppel 
1997, 2003; Warren 1999; Boemio et al. 2005). Additionally, both philosophers and psychologists 
appeal to temporal gestalts in the range of 2-3s in phenomenological descriptions and explanations 
of perceptually mediated behaviors.126 Positing temporal integration windows and gestalts 
suggests that nervous systems process continuous information from the environment by quantizing 
it into discontinuous chunks or “chunking”. 
Despite capacities to sample stimuli on multiple sub-second scales, there are limits on how 
brief sensory information can be chunked. If we sample the world in the range tens of milliseconds, 
why not in the range of microseconds or nanoseconds? First, while it is metaphysically possible 
                                                 
125 For comprehensive reviews that indicate the wide agreement regarding the salience of intervals in the tens and 
hundreds of milliseconds range, see also Buonomano & Karmarkar (2002: 42-51), Wittman (2009: 1955-67), van 
Wassenhove (2009: 1815-30), Merchant et al. (2008: 939), Eagleman and Paryadith (2009: 1841-51). The 
agreement is particularly notable because the various researchers cited advance opposing models of temporal 
processing, yet agree on the range of phenomena under investigation and design their experiments accordingly.   
126Cf. Clay (1882), James (1890: 603), Broad (1923: 350), Boring (1949), Myers (1971), Pӧppel (1978, 1988) 
Ruhnau (1994, 1995), Varela (1999), Dainton (2000, 2008), Kelly (2005ab), Lockwood (1989, 2005), Soteriou 
(2007), Hoerl (2009) and Phillips (2010).   
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that some perceptual system could sample stimuli at incredibly fast rates, and computer technology 
has produced processors that cycle at such rates, but mammal brains are not equipped with the 
hardware to execute such tasks. A single neuron in the human brain takes 1ms to fire and return to 
a resting state (Coon 1989), so it is preposterous to expect that populations of neurons firing could 
somehow sample sensory information at rates faster than individual neurons can fire. Second, if 
our perceptual systems were to sample at such fast rates, then we would be able to discriminate 
much finer-grained phenomena like the individual beats of a mosquito’s wings. But, we cannot; 
there are well-confirmed performance limitations on our capacities to discriminate sensory 
information. In the next section (§4.3), I describe the evidence for these lower-bound thresholds, 
and argue that the performance limitations with respect to sub-second processing should directly 
constrain models of temporal perception. Prior to doing so, let us examine how the forgoing 
discussion bears on the debate between extensionalism and atomism. 
Since content extensionalism claims that perception targets and represents temporally extended 
contents, the model hypothesizes that nervous systems somehow function to sample incoming 
signals and chunk information within extended temporal windows. According to this extensionalist 
postulation, sensory subsystems, such as those processing auditory signals, sample environmental 
stimuli at multiple scales, continuously processing and integrating the information across distinct 
temporal grains in order to generate perceptual representations of ongoing extended events. Such 
a hypothesis predicts that there are subsystems sampling signals at different rates in order to 
identify temporal patterns in dynamic stimuli (e.g. syllabic processing, rhythms, chord 
progressions, motion trajectories) enabling real-time anticipation of future states. Call this the 
‘Multi-Scale Sampling’ hypothesis. 
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Multi-Scale Sampling (MSS): The hypothesis that (i) distinct perceptual subsystems 
sample sensory signals at multiple interval scales, (ii) such subsystems sample the same 
sensory signals, in parallel, at distinct rates, (iii) multi-scale sampling enables the system 
to reliably anticipate future states of a dynamic target (e.g., watching a bird in flight, 
listening to a melody, hitting a baseball). 
 
MSS is a possible link between the theoretical model of content extensionalism and the physical 
systems that realize the function of representing temporally extended content in perception. 
Extensionalism claims that we perceive dynamic targets like melodic phrases in virtue of 
representing temporally extended contents, and MSS offers a functional explanation of how that 
works. If MSS is the case, we should expect to find evidence for distinct sampling mechanisms. 
Empirical support for MSS would, in turn, provide reason to prefer extensionalism as a model of 
temporal perception, if atomism were not also compatible with MSS. 
Can atomism avail itself of MSS? Atomism posits a series of discrete perceptual snapshots, 
which is compatible with a short sampling period (20-50ms), but is at odds with the proposal of 
MSS that distinct subsystems also process signals at longer sampling period enabling perception 
of temporally extended stimuli. If atomism is incompatible with longer sampling periods, 
generating perceptual representations of non-simultaneous events, then MSS is unavailable to the 
atomist. Atomism does have the resources, however, to propose an alternative hypothesis 
explaining away the evidence for longer sampling periods. 
An atomist might claim that the contents of longer integration windows are reducible to and 
composed of brief atomistic perceptions. This seems like a natural move, because atomism is an 
overtly mereological model according to which non-perceptual representations of longer durations 
are composed of atomistic snapshots as parts (cf. Chapter 2, Chuard 2011). For the atomist, 
purported evidence of temporally extended chunking is explained in terms of some other cognitive 
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function combining series of successive perceptions with a significant degree of representational 
overlap, not extended perceptual sampling. Call this the ‘Atomistic Sampling and Combination’ 
hypothesis. 
Atomistic Sampling and Combination (ASC): The hypothesis that (i) perception samples 
sensory signals at a single rate to generate atomistic experiences, and (ii) other cognitive 
mechanisms combine and encode the temporal relations between those successive 
perceptual experiences. 
 
On this alternative explanation, we perceive and encode the brief chunks in succession and some 
other downstream process integrates those chunks and makes the integrated content available for 
representation in memory. We do not perceive longer durations, but we can represent them in 
virtue of successively perceiving each of the atomistic parts. If ASC were the case, then we would 
expect to find evidence that mechanisms integrating over longer temporal windows are 
downstream consumers of the information processed by faster sampling subsystems. I argue that 
ASC is undermined by research indicating that distinct neural populations oscillating at different 
frequencies sample the same signal at distinct rates. 
As evidence supporting MSS, temporal information on multiple time scales are relevant to 
processing speech signals (Rosen 1992). Short-duration sampling (20-50ms) enables encoding of 
formant transitions in stop-consonants (Liberman et al., 1967), whereas sampling at 150-300ms is 
associated with encoding syllables essential for speech recognition (Greenberg 1998) and speech 
acquisition (Mehler & Hayes 1981, Eimas 1999). For instance, when I hear someone utter the 
sentence, “Beware of black cats,” my auditory cortices are sensitive, among other things, to the 
formant transition resulting from the stop-consonant ‘b’ in ‘beware’ and ‘black’ as well as the 
syllables ‘be’, ‘ware’, ‘of’, etc. I am able to recognize and encode speech in virtue of sampling the 
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auditory signal at different rates. If ASC were true, then my auditory system would sample the 
speech signal one sound at a time ‘b’-‘e’-‘w’-‘a’-‘re’ and only combine them after the fact.  
Poeppel (2003) and Boemio et al. (2005) present compelling neuroimaging data indicating that 
neural populations of auditory areas in the left and right hemispheres preferentially extract 
temporal information at distinct timescales, where the left hemisphere samples at short 20-50ms 
intervals and the right hemisphere auditory areas sample signals at the rates corresponding to 
longer temporal integration windows in the range of 150-300ms. If the auditory subsystems 
asymmetrically sample the same incoming auditory signals at distinct rates, then the longer 
windows are not merely composites of the shorter windows, contra what the atomist’s ASC 
hypothesis would lead us to expect. Thus, we have some evidence in supporting (ii) of MSS, and 
reason to doubt the tenability of ASC particularly for auditory processing.  
Another strategy available to the atomist is to simply concede MSS, but deny that empirical 
evidence about sensory signal sampling has any bearing on the viability of atomism. The atomist 
might claim, “Atomism is a theory about perceptual representation and its proper target is 
conscious experience not neural processing. The brain might be doing all kinds of processing of 
which I am unaware, but that does not preclude the possibility that I experience each moment 
successively. After all, this complex sampling and integration might result in regular conscious 
snapshots of the world in rapid succession; conscious experience is a product of neural processing 
but not identical to it.” I am suspicious of any move that tacks on another auxiliary hypothesis to 
rescue a model from disconfirmatory evidence. In this case, the atomist postulates that conscious 
perceptions are successive outputs of integrated neural processing (however, that happens), in 
order to block the inference that longer sampling periods enable perception of non-simultaneous 
events. This move is similar to how Ptolemaic astronomers posited complicated epicycles to 
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preserve circular planetary orbits, in light of observing retrograde motion of planets that conflicted 
with their earlier predictions. Additionally, this dodgy strategy excuses atomism from answering 
the present empirical challenge to the theory and, in turn, makes the model explanatorily otiose. 
Maybe atomists are not in the business of explaining how their model could be physically realized 
or how physical process generate perceptual representations. If so, all the worse for their business. 
The forgoing discussion provides sufficient reason to focus on the processing of temporal 
information on the orders of magnitude that correlate with phenomena that we seem to perceive 
together: hearing a rapid arpeggio played by a guitarist, seeing a raptor in flight, catching a ball, 
understanding a sentence token as it is spoken, etc. These sorts of phenomena spanning brief 
intervals in the sub-second range up to no more than a few seconds in duration are the bread and 
butter of temporal perception, because such events are seemingly within the window of present 
experience (see Ch.1) and are associated with the temporal integration windows borne out by 
evidence from cognitive science. By contrast, hearing the entire song played by the guitarist, 
watching a raptor catch and kill its prey, playing a game of baseball, or engaging in a lengthy 
dialogue are significantly longer events that cannot be directly perceived as a whole—although we 
can effectively represent events of longer duration. 
For an example of representing longer complex events, a spreadsheet scorecard and 
conventional notation enables a baseball spectator to represent the diverse events that occur over 
the course of a game, since individual cells are marked to represent the history of an offensive 
player for every at-bat—coding the number of pitches taken, balls or strikes, whether the batter 
reached base or were put out, and by which defensive position player(s), whether the runner 
advanced on a hit or by stealing, etc. The batter/runner histories during each half-inning, and the 
individual events within those histories (e.g. a sequence of pitches), constitute the order of a 
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particular game. A scorecard is a tool for thinking (cf. Dennett 2000), a mind-tool enabling 
representation and analysis of the complex structure of events in a baseball game, what happened 
when and by whom, and in relation to what other happenings. By recording the history of a game 
onto a scorecard, a scorekeeper converts perceptual information from her ongoing observations of 
a game into an external portable representation; the scorekeeper “makes marks in the world in 
order to cut down [her] cognitive load” (Dennett 2002: 96). 
To put this example in terms of information processing, a scorekeeper offloads an intractable 
long-term memory task into the scorecard (i.e. remembering the details of every batter history that 
happens over the course of a game) by taking a rich manifold of visual and auditory information 
(in analog form) and digitizing it into a readily accessible digital format. Fred Dretske (1981) takes 
the analog-to-digital conversion to be the fundamental function of mobilizing perceptual 
information for cognitive mechanisms, putting it into a format that the consumers of the 
information can exploit for various tasks. The scorecard is an external analog-to-digital converter 
that reduces the cognitive load on the scorekeeper's memory in exchange for dedicating more 
resources to perception. This enables the scorekeeper to more attentively observe the presently 
occurring events—actively converting incoming analog sensory information into digital form for 
selective cognitive use. Likewise, given MSS, sensory subsystems that sample analog signals on 
distinct temporal scales are digitizing the information in order to make it accessible to be utilized 
by downstream mechanisms for representing ongoing and complex events. 
Necessarily, there is information lost in the digitization of analog information, since, in the 
process of modeling the data, a given representational scheme will make forced assumptions about 
the accidental and non-accidental features of the world, ignoring the former and fixing the latter. 
Dretske describes his information processing model of perception, as follows: 
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Seeing, hearing, and smelling are different ways we have of getting information about s 
into a digital-conversion unit whose function it is to extract pertinent information from the 
sensory representation for purposes of modifying output. It is the successful conversion of 
information into (appropriate) digital form that constitutes the essence of cognitive 
activity…Cognitive activity is the conceptual mobilization of incoming information, and 
this conceptual treatment is fundamentally a matter of ignoring differences (as irrelevant 
to underlying sameness), of going from concrete to abstract, of passing from particular to 
general. It is, in short a matter of making the analog-digital transformation. (Dretske 1981: 
142).  
 
In some ways, Dretske's analog-digital transformation realizes the same function as synthesis 
in Kant's model of cognition. Namely, the function of selecting and integrating sensory 
information, in order to generate a perceptual representation of events in the world. Consider the 
following passage, where Kant introduces the active capacity of synthesizing a sensible manifold: 
The synthesis of a manifold, however, (whether it be given empirically or a priori) first 
brings forth a cognition, which to be sure may initially still be raw and confused, and thus 
in need of analysis; yet the synthesis alone is that which properly collects the elements for 
cognitions and unifies them into a certain content; it is therefore the first thing to which we 
have to attend if we wish to judge about the first origin of our cognition.   (A77-8/ B103) 
 
Synthesis is the function of processing and integrating multiple sources of sensory information 
into a unified representation. For example, if I hold and observe a toad while it croaks “ribbit,” my 
auditory system enables me to hear the sound the toad emits, my visual system enables me to see 
the throat swell prior to the croak, and I feel the toad’s diaphragm expand and contract, in addition 
to feeling the temperature and texture of the toad’s skin. Even this somewhat simplified example 
of holding a toad shows that sensory information is being picked-up and processed across multiple 
channels (i.e. auditory, visual, tactile, olfactory) simultaneously, and yet my perceptual system and 
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subsystems continuously function to select and combine the information into a coherent 
representation of the toad croaking in my hand.  
For Kant, this initial synthesis of analog sensory information is a necessary condition for 
cognition, by which the further synthesis of understanding represents the perceptual information 
according to concepts. Without this synthesizing function, or analog-to-digital conversion, the 
sheer amount and complexity of incoming analog information about the environment would 
overwhelm perceptual processing and make the problem of representing the world intractable.  For 
Kant, synthesis is a necessary integrative function, without which ongoing perceptual 
representation of the world would be impossible; and, as such, a proper analysis of our capacity to 
cognize the world should begin with understanding this integration.  
While there are certainly differences in the aims and theoretical motivations between Kant’s 
synthesis and Dretske’s analog-digital transformation, they share an emphasis on the integrative 
function which makes available sensory information via perceptual representations by selecting 
some bits as salient, discarding other bits as irrelevant—taking an analog flood of information 
across multiple channels and converting them into a digital form more easily exploited by other 
cognitive systems. I argue that the MSS hypothesis helps to explain how we digitize the 
information, by selecting and sampling the environment at multiple temporal scales. 
First, I argued that content extensionalism and atomism differ with respect to hypotheses 
concerning how perceptual systems select and sample ongoing sensory information. Second, I 
motivated MSS and made a case for its connection to content extensionalism. Finally, I compared 
Dretske’s analog-to-digital conversion and Kant’s active synthesis in order to explain the 
necessary role of sampling and integration for processing sensory information and making 
perceptual representation possible. To further support MSS, in the following subsections, I both 
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delimit the lower-bound thresholds on interval processing and integration for temporal perception 
(§4.3) and hypothesize that the upper-bound threshold of temporal processing and integration in 
direct perceptual awareness is a function of working memory capacity (§4.4). 
 
4.3. Delimiting Lower-bound Thresholds for Temporal Perception 
The contingent limitations of our perceptual processing systems constrain the range of 
temporal intervals relevant to our cognitive capacity for temporal perception. For the sake of 
explication, I treat cognitive capacities as complex dispositional properties for processing 
particular kinds of information, although specifying the conditions under which a capacity is 
manifested is often difficult.127 Fortunately, time processing is tractable because we possess 
plentiful data indicating that certain precipitating conditions reliably cause certain responses. In 
this way, behavioral regularities help delimit the upper- and lower-bound thresholds of temporal 
perception. In addition, the neurophysiological research I cited in the previous section related to 
the short-duration temporal integration window of 20-40ms, as one of the sampling rates predicted 
by MSS, provides some explanation of the lower-bound thresholds. I begin with the lower-bound 
thresholds which stimuli must exceed in order for us to register and process the temporal relations 
of succession, order, and simultaneity.  
The lowest of these thresholds is the fusion threshold, which denotes the briefest time 
separation between two stimuli of a single sensory modality to be discerned as distinct stimuli. 
Stimuli presented too closely together, below the fusion threshold, will be represented as a single 
stimulus. Thus, the fusion threshold indicates the minimum interval between stimuli, called the 
'interstimulus interval', that is necessary for perceiving distinct stimuli as distinct. Experimental 
                                                 
127 Cf. Marr (1982) and Cummins (2000). 
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paradigms use transient stimuli (e.g. clicks, flashes, noise bursts, taps) to establish that the fusion 
threshold is 2-3ms for auditory stimuli,128 10ms for tactile stimuli, and 20ms for visual stimuli.129 
We can state these fusion thresholds as dispositions: If a subject were administered two taps on 
the arm <10ms apart, then, ceteris paribus, the subject would only perceive one tap. A 
corresponding disposition can be iterated for the fusion threshold for each sensory modality, since 
perceptual subsystems specialized for processing different types of perceptual information also 
differ with respect to temporal acuity. Simply reflecting on the experience of listening to complex 
music reveals that we are capable of finely discriminating auditory stimuli, whereas the greater 
fusion threshold for vision—the coarser temporal resolution of visual stimuli—is illustrated when 
one observes a hummingbird feeding at a flower and sees only blurry motion instead of its 
individual wing beats. 
A second threshold is the order threshold which represents the minimum duration at which 
two events can be perceived in their correct order; when using transient stimuli the order threshold 
across all modalities is around 20-40ms.130 If a subject were presented two tones >2ms and <20ms 
apart, then, ceteris paribus, the subject would hear the two tones as non-simultaneous, but could 
not discern which tone occurred first. The subject represents one tone happening before the other, 
however, the auditory system is unable to exploit the perceptual information carried by the 
representation about the order of the non-simultaneous tones. This is an instance of what Blackmon 
et al. (2008:195-207) call ‘unexploited content’, which is information available in or carried by a 
representation that the system is unable to exploit. The reason the perceptual system is unable to 
exploit the information has to do with the tradeoff between faster sampling and high frequency 
                                                 
128 Exner (1875), von Békésy (1936), Elliott & du Bois (2017) 
129 Landis (1954) 
130 Hirsh & Sherrick (1961), Hirsh & Fraisse (1964), and Fraisse (1984)  
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resolution. The ability of listeners to resolve and integrate rapid frequency changes on the order of 
20-40ms only allows for a resolution of 40 Hz or less, whereas a longer temporal integration 
window of 200ms enables the auditory system to distinguish very small frequency changes on the 
order of 5-10 Hz (Poeppel 2003: 250). So, the ability to discern such rapid auditory stimuli, yet 
not exploit temporal order information contained in the representation, is a function of the tradeoff 
in resolving power for the ability to represent rapid frequency changes in perception. 
Related to this tradeoff between integration and resolution, the order threshold becomes much 
larger as the stimuli become more complex. For example, in baseball, on a force play, if the 
baseball and the base-runner were to arrive at the base at different times, but the interstimulus 
interval between the visual stimuli is below the umpire's order threshold, then the umpire would 
perceive the events of the ball-arriving and runner-arriving as non-simultaneous, but be unable to 
discern which event happened first. Due to the complexity of tracking two distinct trajectories 
toward the base, the order threshold in these cases is much greater than the 20-40ms estimate for 
simple stimuli. 
A third relevant threshold is the simultaneity threshold which represents the minimum 
interstimulus interval for two stimuli to be perceived as successive, below that threshold two 
stimuli are perceived as simultaneous. When using transient stimuli the simultaneity threshold is 
approximately 20-30ms across modalities.131 If a subject were administered two taps on the arm 
>10ms and <20ms apart, then, ceteris paribus, the subject would feel the two taps as distinct yet 
simultaneous. Since the fusion threshold for tactile stimuli is lower than the simultaneity threshold, 
I can perceive the arm taps as distinct, without perceiving that the taps as successive. For vision, 
however, the fusion, order, and simultaneity thresholds are roughly the same, which implies that 
                                                 
131 Kanabus et al. (2002), Fink et al. (2006), Wittman (2009). 
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if a normal subject can register two distinct visual stimuli then the subject should also be able to 
discern their order. By contrast, for audition the simultaneity threshold is around 10ms, but the 
order threshold is 20ms, so one can discern that two stimuli are successive without being able to 
judge which stimulus was presented first.  
I take these lower-bound thresholds to further support the idea that processing on the 
magnitudes of tens and hundreds of milliseconds are integrated in perception, one feature of multi-
scale sampling. MSS predicts that some sampling rates can rapidly resolve frequency changes but 
at a lower resolution, which is evidenced by the limitations defined by the fusion, order, and 
simultaneity thresholds. If our perceptual system passively took in big ‘gulps’ of temporal 
information with a much higher resolution, without multi-scale processing and integration, then it 
would be unlikely for us to represent rapid frequency changes and represent sub-second 
phenomena as required for speech comprehension and musical appreciation. 
 
4.4. Delimiting Upper-bound Thresholds: Temporal Integration Windows, Reproduction 
Tasks, and Working Memory 
Temporal processing on the scale of one to tens of seconds is also hypothesized to play a 
critical role in the integration of sensory information in the elaboration of a perceptual 
representation.132 As previously noted, the range of a few seconds has phenomenological 
relevance, because we seem to directly perceive events unfolding within intervals of a few seconds. 
Ernst Pöppel (1978) estimates that the temporal integration window for conscious perception is 
≈2-3s, which roughly approximates the philosophical notion of the 'specious present'.133 Beyond 
                                                 
132 Cf. Wackerman & Ehm (2006: 482) and van Wassenhove (2009: 1818) 
133 Philosopher Michael Lockwood (2005: 379-80) uses ‘time window’ to denote the scales of duration relevant to 
conscious experience. For various accounts of the specious present, cf. Clay (1882), James (1890), Broad (1923), 
Boring (1949), Myers (1971), Pӧppel (1978, 1988) Ruhnau (1995), Varela (1999), Dainton (2000, 2008), Kelly 
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the apparent phenomenology, a principal source of evidence for the temporal integration window 
comes from behavioral studies that employ temporal reproduction tasks to assess duration 
perception in human subjects. Before examining the highly constrained experimental task, a 
familiar example will be useful for illustrating the phenomenon. 
Imagine a drum lesson in which the instructor demonstrates a simple rhythm in 3/4 time on a 
snare drum and instructs the student to reproduce the same rhythm. The student's task is one of 
temporal reproduction, i.e. a task in which a temporal structure is first perceived and then 
replicated. Drumming is a skillful behavior that illustrates the abilities of humans to perceive the 
temporal structure of environmental stimuli, regulate motor action in accord with temporal 
patterns, and reproduce those patterns. The timing processes necessary for execution of complex 
coordinated behaviors like drumming are very complex, but are presumably constituted by more 
basic mechanisms for perceiving duration and order. A detailed look at the temporal reproduction 
paradigm will assist in evaluating its measurement of duration perception. 
In a temporal reproduction task, participants are instructed to reproduce a stimuli (e.g., tones) 
of various target durations (e.g., 8s, 14s, 20s) by pressing a key when they judge that a second 
comparison stimulus has reached the same duration as the probe stimulus.134 In an auditory 
experiment, trials typically begin by presenting participants with a probe tone at one of the target 
durations (encoding interval), followed by a silent pause (interstimulus interval).135 After the pause 
                                                 
(2005b), Lockwood (1989, 2005), Soteriou (2007), Hoerl (2009) and Phillips (2010). See also Gallagher (1998: 26-
31) for a discussion of the terminological and philosophical perplexities of the specious present.  
134 Some versions of this task instruct participants to press a key to start the comparison stimulus and press it a second 
time to halt the stimulus, this additional motor task has significant effect on the timing task so it is avoided in recent 
temporal reproduction task experimental designs.  See, for example, Eisler & Eisler (1992), Meissner & Wittmann 
(2011), and Wittmann et al. (2010) 
135 The length of the interstimulus interval can vary in experiments to adjust for variance in participant response times, 
so that investigators are able to ensure that the total duration for each run of trials is identical for each participant (cf. 
Meissner & Wittmann, 2011). For example, each run consists in six trials on each of the three target durations for a 
total of eighteen trials presented in random order, varying the interstimulus interval to adjust for response variance 
allows for each run to have same duration (e.g., 14 min.) for each participant.   
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participants are presented a comparison tone, and they are instructed to halt the tone by pressing a 
key when they judge the comparison duration (reproduction interval) to match the target duration. 
Since temporal reproduction tasks are taken to be a standard measure of perceptual timing 
accuracy, and perceptual timing is supposed to be an implicit automatic process, counting 
strategies by participants would confound the data. Thus, participants are instructed not to count, 
and secondary cognitive tasks are typically used to further preclude counting strategies.136 
Numerous studies indicate human performance on temporal reproduction tasks for stimuli 
falling within the range of the temporal integration window of 2-3s is highly accurate, whereas 
longer intervals are substantially and systematically underestimated.137 Temporal reproduction 
accuracy is robust across subjects for interval stimuli within the temporal integration window. For 
example, in a psychopharmacological study, Marc Wittmann and colleagues (2007) used the 
temporal reproduction task to measure the effects of the hallucinogen psilocybin on duration 
perception and found that subjects receiving both low and high doses of psilocybin performed, on 
average, just as good on temporal reproduction tasks for intervals <3000ms as control subjects 
receiving a placebo.  
This evidence of reliable timing within the temporal integration window is significant, since 
subjects under the influence of psilocybin exhibit a wide range of dissociative and hallucinatory 
symptoms. For intervals exceeding the temporal integration window (>3000ms), however, control 
subjects far outperformed hallucinating subjects. The researchers took this to indicate that the 
                                                 
136 For example, a secondary memory task can consist in presenting an image of 4 simple shapes or numbers before 
the onset of the probe tone, and instructing participants to remember those shapes or numbers. After the comparison 
tone is halted, a shape or number is presented and the participant is asked whether or not that shape or number is one 
of the 4 that were presented initially. The additional load on memory by the distracter task prevents participants 
from trying to cheat the prohibition on counting strategies. Some studies restrict the target durations of reproduction 
task to less than 2s (e.g., 500ms, 1500ms, 2000ms) to preclude counting strategies altogether, since such strategies 
are ineffective in the sub-second range. 
137 Cf.  Block & Zakay (1997), Ulrich et al. (2006), Ulbrich et al. (2007), Wittmann et al. (2007), van Wassenhove et 
al. (2011)  
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serotonin agonist, psilocybin, does not directly interfere with dedicated temporal processing 
mechanisms, but interferes with attention or working memory required for representing and 
encoding durations of longer intervals (2007: 61). This study helps us begin to see the relevance 
of working memory and its function in temporal processing for durations exceeding the upper-
bound threshold of the temporal integration window. 
A plausible hypothesis for why the temporal integration window is the upper-bound threshold 
of direct temporal perception, is that working memory capacity sets the upper-bound of immediate 
perceptual experience at ≈2-3s, because the updating of working memory is necessary to track a 
dynamic environment. Differences in working memory capacity offer a basis of the variability of 
the temporal integration window between subjects. In some studies (Ulbrich et al. 2007; Wittmann 
et al., 2007), all subjects prior to the temporal discrimination task, are given the Corsi-block test; 
a test consisting of nine white blocks that light up in a sequential random order, where subjects are 
asked to identify the order in which the blocks light up, and the number of blocks increases with 
each accurate performance.138 Performance on the Corsi-block test is a good predictor for 
performance error on temporal reproduction tasks. That is, subjects that score lower on the Corsi-
block test have a systematically greater margin of error in temporal reproduction tasks where the 
target stimulus has a duration of greater than 2500ms, as compared to high-scoring subjects. So, it 
is reasonable to conclude that the duration of a subject's temporal integration window is strongly 
correlated with their working memory capacity. Does this entail that temporal perception is a direct 
function of memory? No, it only indicates that the upper-bound of the temporal integration window 
is somehow constrained by working memory capacity. The evidence favors the hypothesis that 
this constraint is a regulatory feature of the memory system, such that buffering and encoding of 
                                                 
138 This task is modeled in many so-called ‘memory’ games marketed to the general public. 
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perceptual content occurs on regular cycles, the periodicity of which is determined by how much 
information the perceptual system can process at a given time and how that information is 
represented in working memory.  
Recall that atomist models often emphasize the role of memory in accounting for putative 
experiences of temporally extended events. One might think that the foregoing discussion of the 
temporal reproduction paradigm and the experimental results favor the atomist’s mereological 
conception that purported temporal experiences are a result of combining series of static 
perceptions successively, and with the aid of working memory. Note, however, that content 
extensionalism does not deny that working memory plays important roles in cognition, especially 
when tracking events over longer intervals, e.g. watching a play or engaging in conversation. That 
working memory constrains the upper-bound of the temporal integration window is no great boon 
for atomism, because it does not favor one theory over the other.  
As opposed to vindicating the atomist’s explanation, the experimental evidence from the 
temporal reproduction paradigm weighs slightly against their model. The highly accurate 
performance of subjects on temporal reproduction tasks within 2-3s intervals, even across subjects 
with impaired working memory, suggests that perceiving brief, yet temporally extended events, 
within such integration windows does not rely on mediation from working memory. Content 
extensionalism and MSS predict that sensory systems sample the environment at multiple scales 
up to and including the 2-3s integration window, enabling perception of temporal relations 
between non-simultaneous events occurring within that interval. So, once again, atomism is in a 
worse position to explain the empirical evidence than content extensionalism. I now move to 
defend a position within the philosophy of science that has informed my approach to explanation 
throughout the project. 
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4.5. Constructive Realism: A Model-based Approach to Temporal Perception  
  At the outset, I argued the empirical work should inform philosophical theories of temporal 
perception and possibly help decide between competing hypotheses linking theoretical models to 
the world. Likewise, I hold that philosophers might play valuable roles in the advancement of 
science, in terms of evaluating competing models of how temporal perception is physically 
realized in nervous systems like ours. To enter into this interdisciplinary project, I here outline a 
framework for understanding scientific theories and specify the desiderata by which assessment of 
competing models should proceed. 
 How does temporal perception work? What cognitive mechanisms make temporal processing 
possible? The preferred way to go about answering these questions in cognitive science is to 
develop a model, or a family of models, intended to represent the structures and mechanisms of 
the target system. The various competing models aim to show how neural mechanisms process 
and encode temporal information in the service of generating representations that preserve 
different aspects of the temporal structure of a specific event, such as the event's duration, interval, 
and order. This brief summary is an oversimplification, however, and a more careful understanding 
of model-building practice in cognitive science is required.  
 My focus on models and modeling is a methodological choice, made in order to emphasize the 
important roles that such representational media play in attempting to understand, explain, and 
make predictions about systems of temporal perception—highlighting the continuity in method 
between philosophy and scientific practice.139 Models are particular kinds of 'mind-tools', which 
                                                 
139 See Godfrey-Smith (2003) for an argument that large-scale systematic philosophical theorizing is best understood 
as model-building. Likewise, Laurie Paul (2012) argues that metaphysical theories are classes of models, which 
employ experience, intuition, thought experiments, and logical analysis in the construction and evaluation of such 
models. Paul thinks that metaphysics has a distinctive subject matter from science, but not a distinct methodology. I 
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help to make epistemic problems tractable (Dennett 2000). Humans are adept model builders, and 
when investigating a complex domain, as we often do in both philosophy and the sciences, an 
effective method is to proceed is by fixing some structural components and functional relations 
within a modeled system in order to make inferences about how the system will behave under 
various transformations and thereby seeing how well that fits with our observations and 
interventions, among other data.  
 I endorse a form of constructive realism and hold that comprehensive theories of temporal 
experience are constituted by both (a) families/classes of models, and (b) hypotheses linking the 
models to the phenomena and the cognitive systems of which they are intended models.140 Broadly 
understood, models are humanly constructed entities developed and deployed to represent and 
explain features of the world, hence the 'constructive' dimension of this meta-theory. As for the 
'realistic' dimension, the hypotheses of a theory function to specify the respects and degrees to 
which a given model represents some real physical system, “asserting a genuine similarity of 
structure between models and real systems without imposing any distinction between 'theoretical' 
and 'observational' aspects of reality,” (Giere 1999: 168). Hypotheses provide propositional 
interpretations of a model by saying what the model shows, and how it relates to the world, since 
most models take a non-linguistic form (e.g. maps, diagrams, scale-models). As the propositional 
component of a theory, hypotheses are truth-evaluable. Models themselves do not have a truth-
                                                 
largely agree with her methodological position, with one reservation: metaphysicians of mind have a much greater 
overlap in subject matter with their scientific counterparts in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, than 
metaphysicians of material objects do with their physicist counterparts. Accordingly, I directly engage with models 
in the sciences, taking philosophical theories of time perception to be sharing a set of problems with those models. 
140 This metatheory of theories, constructive realism, is developed and defended by Giere (1988, 1999), but as far as 
I know, I am the first to apply it to the theories of temporal experience. For opposition to constructive realism see 
van Fraassen (1980), and see Giere (1999: 174-199) for a thorough contrast between constructive realism and van 
Fraassen's constructive empiricism. Additionally, my construal of theories as models borrows insights from the so-
called "structuralist program" in philosophy of science, cf. Suppes (1967), Sneed (1971), Stegmüller (1976), Balzer, 
Moulines, and Sneed (1987), Bickle (1998), Moulines (2001, 2006).  
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value, but hypotheses can make true or false claims about the functional organization of a target 
system. A hypothesis linking a model to its target system entails predictions about the function 
and behavior of that system under various conditions. 
 Constructive realism is a model-based approach to explaining theories of temporal perception, 
which exploits some insights from the structuralist program in the philosophy of science, a class 
of related views that share two principal assumptions: (1) scientific theories are properly conceived 
of in terms of their models rather than in terms of sets of sentences; and, (2) the tools for formally 
explicating the structure of a scientific theory are provided by mathematics, not first-order logic 
or metamathematics (Bickle1998: 58-61).141 The first of these assumptions is the most important 
for my purposes, because it marks the departure from logical positivism which identifies scientific 
theories with sets of propositions formalized in first-order logic.142  
 On the positivist conception of science, scientific representation is understood as a two-place 
relationship between statements and the world, whereby a theory's hypotheses are either true or 
false given the total available evidence. On the model-based approach, however, scientific 
representation is a relation between agents with particular purposes and some target phenomenon. 
This can be captured in the form: S uses X to represent T for P; where S is some agent(s), X is a 
theory that consists in certain principles that inform structural devices (i.e. models), T is some 
target phenomenon, and P is some purpose. Since models represent in terms of similarity of 
structure relative to some purpose, they are better evaluated in terms of degree of fit with the 
available data. We have better and worse representations given our purposes, not true or false ones.  
                                                 
141 The various proponents of the structuralist program prefer different mathematical formalisms to explicate the 
structure of theories. van Fraassen (1972, 1980, 1987) and Suppe (1974) endorse a geometrical state space approach; 
Suppes (1956, 1967), Sneed (1971), Stegmüller (1976) prefer set theory; Balzer, Moulines, and Sneed (1987) and 
Bickle (1998) prefer set theory augmented with category theory; Giere (1988) prefers the computational formalisms 
in cognitive science.  
142 Cf. Carnap (1928, 1938); Popper (1935); Reichenbach (1938); Hempel (1950) 
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 One normative criterion for evaluation is how well the structural features represent the system 
in question or goodness of fit, which comes in degrees. Ronald Giere claims, “to say a model is 
“true of” a particular real system in the world is to say no more that it “fits” that system or “applies 
to” that system” (2006: 65). No model represents every aspect of a target system, and explanatory 
purposes determine which aspects and to what degrees a given model should represent. 
Accordingly, a model might trade good fit to one respect of the system for a deformation or 
elimination of another negligible respect, relative to its purposes.  For example, I expect a 
topographic map of a National Forest to represent the grade and relative elevation of the target 
terrain using contour lines—suited to the purposes of navigating the environment— but not the 
height of particular trees or groundcover texture.  
 A related point about norms of model evaluation is that, “the fit of a model to some real system 
is a matter of comparing aspects of the model not with data directly, but with a model of the data. 
It is a model-model comparison not a model-world comparison. And, of course, there may be 
several different legitimate ways of analyzing the data to obtain a model of the data” (Giere 2006: 
68). Topographic maps can be drafted from field surveys and annotated aerial photography, which 
provide detailed models of the data against which the accuracy of the map can be judged. In the 
21st century, however, models of the data are now constructed using GIS (geographic information 
systems) digitized data capture techniques, e.g. producing vector data from stereo pairs of digital 
aerial photographs often taken by unmanned drones.143 The cardinal mistake is to think that GIS 
methods directly create a model of the world from raw data; rather, data capture techniques create 
models of the data from which models of the world can be generated and checked against by 
experiment (see Peschard 2010, 2012 and van Fraassen 2012 for the role of models in 
                                                 
143 See Chang (2010) for a comprehensive introductory text on GIS, Goodchild (2010) for a survey of the progress 
made over the first twenty years of GIS research. 
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experimentation). The various ways of modeling the data provide different constraints on the 
resulting models and different norms for their accuracy. Theories of temporal perception also differ 
along these lines, since how one characterizes the phenomena and what constraints one builds into 
the target system largely determines the structure of the model.  
 Model evaluation always involves a model-to-model comparison and models of data are 
constitutively dependent on choices made concerning how to collect and analyze the data, relative 
to our explanatory purposes. If no unified model exhausts every possible combination of data 
capture and analysis techniques, or every possible combination of explanatory purposes, then no 
single model captures every feature of the target domain in all explanatorily relevant respects. 
Models constructed for different purposes can tell us different things about the very same system. 
It follows that there is no single uniquely true model of the data or model of the world. Models are 
better or worse approximations that make problems manageable and improve our understanding, 
hence the need for multiple interconnected or overlapping models. The proprietary hypotheses and 
principles invoked by a given model, however, are true or false in various respects and degrees—
providing grounds for rejecting false hypotheses and locating common ground between contending 
hypotheses and principles.  
 From Giere's account, I adopt the view that a scientific theory is comprised of its models, i.e. 
families of structures specifiable by formal principles, as well as theoretical hypotheses that 
generalize from observational data which, in turn, connect the models to real physical systems in 
the world. To specify the relationship between the model and the target system, Giere employs a 
similarity relation to determine the respects in which a given model resembles the real system. He 
explains: 
A theoretical hypothesis asserts the existence of a similarity between a specified theoretical 
model and a designated real system. But since anything is similar to anything else in some 
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way or other, the claim of similarity must be limited (at least implicitly) to a specified set 
of respects and degrees. (1988: 93)  
 
Giere's sentiment echoes a common refrain found in Quine's metaphysics of science. Namely, that 
notions of similarity and simplicity are parochial (cf. Quine 1966: 234). What is simple and salient 
to one domain of discourse is a complex convolution for another. So, we must specify the scope 
and purposes for which a model is constructed and evaluate the attendant theoretical benefits 
accordingly. Since we represent things in science for particular purposes, which come in degrees, 
the similarity of a model to its target is judged in relation to the purpose for which the model is 
constructed and the respects of the target being modeled, where the target is some real system. As 
such, there are pragmatic advantages to adopting the model-based approach, since it more 
accurately tracks model-building practice in the sciences.144 
According to constructive realism, there are both top-down and bottom-up constraints that 
determine the empirical adequacy of a given theory and its models. Presently, bear in mind that 
we are only concerned with models in cognitive neuroscience, although these general points about 
model-building can be extended into other scientific domains. Bottom-up constraints are 
determined by the contingent limitations of physical implementation, such that the model can be 
plausibly realized by neural mechanisms. In this respect, bottom-up constraints are evidentiary, 
and not typically explanatory. Top-down explanatory constraints include the observable 
phenomena and specific effects exhibited by the cognitive system under investigation; these 
phenomena frame the scope of what the theory is intended to explain, i.e. its explananda. In 
practice, a model-based approach is an effective analytic method for generating explanations of 
how cognitive systems solve particular problems. Nevertheless, a single model is usually 
                                                 
144 Cf. van Fraassen (1980: 65-67, 1987: 114-18) and Giere (1988: 62, 81-89) 
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insufficient to adequately represent and explain all features of a complex system, which is, in part, 
why I argue that a theory should be conceived of a family of models. In fact, we should find it 
extremely surprising if a single model could provide a detailed representation of all sets of 
phenomena. In the next subsection, I present the target phenomena that serve as constraints on a 
viable theory of temporal processing and perception. 
 
4.6. The Target Phenomena to be Captured by Models of Time Perception 
Theories of temporal processing are developed to provide mechanistic explanations for a wide 
range of target phenomena and reliably manifested perceptual effects. A theory's models ought to 
represent structures that can account for these phenomena, which include both reliable 
representation and systematic misrepresentation of temporal structure by human subjects under 
specifiable conditions. Although the list is not exhaustive, each of the following target phenomena 
signifies a theoretical desideratum for candidate models of time perception, particularly 
concerning our experience of duration: 
a) Sub-second Discrimination: Humans, and other animals, are able to discriminate intervals 
and durations on the millisecond timescale.   
b) Reliable Temporal Reproduction: Human performance on temporal reproduction tasks for 
stimuli falling within the range of the temporal integration window (500ms-3s) is reliably 
accurate.  
c) Suprasecond Performance Deficit: Human performance on temporal reproduction tasks for 
stimuli >3 seconds exhibits a systematic shortening, i.e. there is a systematic degradation 
of accuracy on reproduction tasks for durations greater than three seconds.  
d) Subjective Time Dilation: Human subjects sometimes experience a stimulus or event 
lasting longer than its objective duration. This effect is reliably manifested when the stimuli 
are more complex, infrequent, unexpected, increased in some spectral magnitude (e.g. 
brightness or amplitude), or affectively salient. For example, if a subject is shown an 
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oddball stimulus after a series of similar stimuli, she will perceive the oddball stimulus as 
being longer in duration than the repeated stimuli.145  
e) Subjective Time Compression: Human subjects sometimes experience a stimulus or event 
as briefer than its objective duration. This effect is reliably manifested when stimuli are 
simpler, frequent, expected, or decreased in spectral magnitude. For example, if a subject 
is presented a series of identical stimuli like several tones of exactly the same frequency 
and duration, she will perceive the latter stimuli as being shorter in duration than the initial 
stimulus.146  
 
One might wonder why phenomena (a-e) should constrain philosophical theories of time 
perception. The first reason is simply that most of these phenomena are recognized as salient in 
phenomenological accounts of temporal experience. Recall that philosophical theories of time 
perception are motivated by our capacities to perform complex motor actions and engage in 
projects that require fine temporal discrimination, such capacities corresponding to (a) subsecond 
discrimination and (b) reliable temporal reproduction. Introspective evidence also reveals 
subjective time dilation and compression effects, that is, (d) and (e) respectively. For example, 
experiences of time dilation abound, such as persons in vehicular accidents typically report a 
feeling of time "slowing down" as the collision occurs, and athletes in clutch performances report 
a feeling of time "slowing down" as aiding them when performing excellently.147 A perspicuous 
phenomenology of temporal experience will therefore be able to recognize and describe these 
various phenomena as informing their account, and such introspective evidence continues to guide 
psychological and neuroscientific investigations into time perception. 
                                                 
145 For studies of the oddball time dilation effect, see Tse et al. (2004), Paryadith & Eagleman (2007), Eagleman & 
Paryadith (2009), van Wassenhove et al. (2011) 
146 You can see this for yourself by looking at an analog clock with a second-hand. When you first direct your 
attention to the clock the first tick of the second-hand will appear to last longer than the successive ticks. 
147 Michael Jordan claims that during some of his greatest feats, e.g. in the NBA finals, he seemed to be going in 
slow-motion which enabled him to out maneuver opponents when driving to the basket. 
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A second reason for paying attention to the types of time experiences described in (a-e) is that 
phenomenological theories on their own do not, in my view, have the resources necessary to 
explain these psychological effects. For example, Heidegger (1927) argues that phenomenology is 
the guide to fundamental ontology, meaning that he purports to derive the necessary conditions for 
the possibility of experience.148 Yet although such transcendental arguments may yield a 
metaphysical model, they cannot yield a functional one. Providing useful models of specific 
physical mechanisms is simply not at the same level of description as “big-tent” metaphysics. 
Thus, if we want to know how we process temporal information in perception, then we require a 
scientifically informed account. If we want to understand the structure of the competing scientific 
theories, then a model-based approach provides the best method for such understanding.  
In order to provide explanations of the target phenomena (a-e), a theory's models posit 
cognitive mechanisms or integrated networks by which the cognitive system can process and 
represent temporal input; transforming and integrating those representations in the elaboration of 
perceptual content.149 Models are analytic tools, and they earn their keep by the sorts of problems 
they can negotiate in practice – implying that they are selected against when their deficiencies 
outstrip their advantages. If so, we should let the models play out in the intended domain so as to 
investigate whether or not they make the problems of temporal perception tractable. In the next 
section, I distinguish between two families of neurocognitive models concerning the perception of 
duration and begin a preliminary investigation into their relative merits and shortcomings, in order 
to pave the way for future interdisciplinary work in the domain of temporal perception.  
                                                 
148 “Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible.  In the phenomenological conception of ‘phenomenon’ what one 
has in mind as that which shows itself is the Being of entities, its meaning, its modifications and derivatives.”  
(1927/1962: 60, H. 35, original emphasis) 
149 Explaining how such transformation and integration works is a special case of the perceptual binding problem. For 
discussion of the binding problem and evidence for feature integration theory see Treisman (1988, 1993), Treisman 
& Gelade (1980), Treisman & Gormican (1988). 
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4.7. A Brief Comparison of Dedicated Models and Intrinsic Models of Temporal Processing 
Prior to examining specific cognitive models of timing processes, it is important to organize 
the logical space of possible models by marking a deep division between two broad families of 
models: dedicated vs. intrinsic models.   
A dedicated model posits a class of structures to explain the singular function of timing 
perceptual input, i.e. a mechanism or system of mechanisms devoted to processing the duration of 
stimuli. A dedicated model therefore simply proposes a timing device in the brain (and nothing 
more) that somehow measures and processes temporal information from sensory input and makes 
that information available to other dedicated subsystems, such as those responsible for executing 
perceptual judgment or motor control.  
An intrinsic model, in contrast, represents timing as an ongoing process that is one subroutine 
of a more general mechanism for processing perceptual information. According to this family of 
models, the brain is always encoding temporal information, but this function does not involve a 
dedicated timing mechanism. Rather timing is an inherent feature of neural subpopulations. For 
example, on one set of intrinsic models, temporal information is encoded in the spatial firing 
patterns of neural networks dedicated to processing other sensory information, like visual or 
auditory input (Karmarkar & Buonomano 2007). On other intrinsic models temporal information 
is extracted from other magnitudes, such as the amount of energy expended by a given subsystem 
to process a particular set of stimuli (Eagleman & Pariyadath 2009). Consequently, on this type of 
model, duration is viewed as a function of how much energy it took to process and integrate 
information about the target event. For intrinsic models, timing is context dependent and modality 
specific. For instance, it is an intrinsic property of auditory processing that realizes functions for 
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representing timing in audition, and likewise for other modalities. There is no general purpose 
timing mechanism for intrinsic models, as there is for dedicated models. This makes intrinsic 
models notoriously ill-suited for explaining evidence of humans to make accurate cross-modal 
comparisons of duration.  
It remains to be seen whether dedicated and intrinsic models are completely incompatible with 
one another, or whether cognitive systems deploy different timing strategies in response to 
different types of phenomena. For example, audition and vision differ with respect to fineness of 
temporal grain, such that auditory information can be processed with greater resolution.150 This 
gives us prima facie reason to seriously consider the possibility that the auditory system could 
employ a more efficient timing strategy than, say, the visual system, in response to the fine 
temporal parameters of audio signals. For example, millisecond information could be extracted 
from intrinsic features of perceptual subsystems, whereas longer durations and multi-modal 
representations are computed by a dedicated timing mechanism. At the same time, multi-modal 
perception poses a significant challenge to theories that attempt to combine approaches, because 
subjects perform well on cross-modal timing tasks within the temporal integration window, i.e. 
subjects are reliably able to compare the duration of a tone to the duration of a presented image. 
Future research is required to determine whether the multi-modal challenge can be overcome with 
a hybrid combination of dedicated and intrinsic models of temporal processing. The framework of 
constructive realism is compatible with such a solution, since it recognizes how multiple 
overlapping models and their proprietary hypotheses constitute theories.  
                                                 
150 Dedicated “internal clock” model theorists hypothesize that the difference in auditory and visual temporal 
discrimination is due to the internal clock or pacemaker running at a faster rate when the stimulus is auditory than 
when it is visual (Penney et al., 2000; Wearden et al. 1998). An alternative hypothesis is that there are distinct timing 
mechanisms for auditory and visual modalities. Parallel distributed processes operate on distinct timescales 
simultaneously which require a further process or processes for integration and buffering. 
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If temporal information were processed in fundamentally different ways by the visual and 
auditory systems, we would not predict subjects to reliably compare the relative durations of 
different types of sensory input. Other things being equal, we should also prefer a theory that 
employs a small number of fundamental principles to explain a broad range of phenomena, what 
Quine (1966) calls the theoretical virtue of familiarity of principle. This epistemically conservative 
principle is seemingly violated by theories that help themselves to both intrinsic and dedicated 
models, since different kinds of timing strategies employ distinct principles introducing needless 
complexity into the theory. If one model can accurately predict performance on both modality-
specific and cross-modal timing tasks, then, all things considered, we should prefer a single type 
of timing mechanism over a motley combination of timing strategies. For the present purposes, I 
will treat the two families of candidate models separately, while leaving open the possibility of 
hybrid models. 
A second division in logical space between types of timing models concerns whether the 
durations of events are computed over localized or distributed networks.151 Localization and 
distribution is a matter of how a model is physically implemented in an actual system. A localized 
model, on the one hand, identifies a particular region of the brain or a particular neural network as 
realizing the salient structures. Typically a localized model is also a dedicated model which 
identifies components of the timing mechanism as being implemented in a certain region of the 
brain, like the basal ganglia. A distributed model, on the other hand, identifies temporal processing 
as taking place in separated and, in principle, dissociable regions of the brain. A distributed 
dedicated model, for example, posits several dedicated timing mechanisms distributed in different 
neural networks across the brain. Intrinsic models are typically also distributed, since temporal 
                                                 
151 Cf. Ivry & Schlerf (2008). 
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information is continuously encoded in neural processes taking place in various subsystems. 
Mounting empirical evidence strongly favors distributed processes, regardless of whether one's 
elect models are dedicated or intrinsic. Nonetheless, since the localized hypothesis is not dead, I 
will present the difficulties that arise for such models and offer alternative ways of interpreting 
some of the research that is marshaled in favor of localized theorizing as we look at particular 
models. 
At this stage, I only offer a brief exploratory analysis assessing the merits and potential 
problems of the dominant dedicated models, and make a few relevant comparisons to the 
alternative intrinsic models. Dedicated models of time representation, as mentioned above, pursue 
a fundamentally modular strategy for explaining the ability of cognitive systems to process 
temporal features of the environment. A modular strategy postulates that cognitive tasks are 
accomplished via specialized networks or neural pathways that are dedicated solely to those 
particular tasks. A dedicated model may therefore be described as employing a “divide and 
conquer" strategy. Just as visual modules are for visual processing and auditory modules are for 
auditory processing, dedicated models assume that certain brain structures are devoted to the 
function of processing temporal information. These theories suggest that there is a specific 
representational scheme for internal timing, but that this scheme is perfectly general such that the 
same mechanism is operative regardless of the modality of sensory input. That is, it does not 
distinguish between, say, auditory temporal data (e.g., the duration of a tone) and visual temporal 
data (e.g., the duration of a flash); it processes all temporal information in the same manner for 
both modalities.  
For the last three decades, cognitive psychologists have widely endorsed an internal clock 
model (ICM) of temporal processing (Church 1984, R. Block 1990, Wittman 2009), which 
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continues to occupy a majority position within the field (cf. Rammsayer & Ulrich, 2001, Grondin 
2001, Wearden, 2004). This relatively simple model posits that temporal processing has the 
structure of a gated internal timer (a pacemaker) operating on an oscillatory basis. The intuitive 
appeal of this model derives from our use of pendulum clocks to keep time, since such clocks 
measure temporal magnitudes via the regular oscillations of the pendulum. In ICMs, attention and 
external stimuli influence the gating of the pacemaker which, in turn, generates trains of discrete 
pulses at a constant rate encoded in an accumulator and updated to working memory for 
comparison. The mechanism is a simple circuit that closes at the onset of an attended stimulus and 
accumulates a regular number of pulses like ticks on a stopwatch. At the offset of the stimulus, the 
gate opens and the pulses no longer accumulate. The mechanism of the internal clock model can 
be illustrated in the following ways:  
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Figure 5: Simple Internal Clock Model with (i) a pacemaker mechanism that generates regular 
oscillatory pulses to time a target stimulus, (ii) a gated switch that controls pulse train throughput,  
(iii) an accumulator that encodes pulse train frequency when the gate is closed and updates timing 
information to (iv) working memory that stores accessible representations of stimuli duration for 
(v) a comparator component that judges relative duration of a target stimulus or compares the 
duration of distinct stimuli. 
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Figure 6: Attentional Gating Mechanism (A) models a simple internal clock with an open gate, so 
that the pulse trains from the pacemaker are not being encoded in the accumulator. (B) shows the 
internal clock with the gate closed by attention, i.e. the perceptual system attends to a target and 
times the stimulus by encoding the pulse train frequency until the gate is reopened when attention 
lapses or shifts to a new target.   
 
One prominent ICM - the pacemaker-gate-accumulator model - posits a dedicated timing 
mechanism that encodes temporal durations as cumulative pulse counts A, which are the product 
of the intervals of presented temporal stimuli t and the effective pulse train frequencies f, such that 
A= t · f  (Zakay & R. Block, 1997). According to the model, as depicted in Figure 5, the accumulator 
pulse train counts are then updated to working memory and made available to the comparator 
component of the timing mechanism in order to inform perceptual judgments and motor actions 
with respect to the duration of a stimulus. The function of the comparator component is analogous 
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to how a human subject reads off conventional metrical units on an external timing device such as 
a clock. Comparative differences in the pulse train frequencies f recorded in the accumulator 
represent variations in timing behavior or variations in time perception task responses.  
One of principal motivations of such dedicated ICMs is that temporal perception is not seen as 
restricted to a single sensory modality. There is no sense organ for time, but implicit timing takes 
place across all modalities. By contrast, as I noted above, intrinsic models are typically limited by 
context dependency and modality specificity. The temporal reproduction paradigm is used to 
measure our capacity to reproduce an auditory or visual stimulus using the press of a key, which 
is itself a cross-modal sensorimotor behavior. Our general proficiency at such tasks indicates that 
temporal perception is not a modality specific mechanism. As Richard Ivry and John Schlerf note, 
“our sense of passage of time appears to transcend the sensory modality of a stimulus... The facile 
manner with which we compare time across different modalities suggests some sort of internal 
clock” (2008: 273). Some studies explicitly test cross-modal temporal discrimination, for example, 
comparing the duration of a sound to the duration of a presented image.152 Such studies bolster 
support for a common dedicated timing mechanism for processing temporal information across 
modalities. So, with respect to temporal discrimination in cross-modal tasks and perception, 
dedicated models maintain a significant advantage over intrinsic models.  
The simplicity of the ICM is, however, also one of its major drawback, because the gate and 
pacemaker are arranged serially and thus the model cannot distinguish between the effects of the 
two different components. This makes it difficult to dissociate endogenous effects on the 
                                                 
152 Rolf Ulrich and colleagues (2006) specifically set out to test the predictions of the pacemaker-accumulator ICM. 
Using a standard temporal reproduction task, subjects were required to discriminate between the duration of a 
constant probe stimulus and a variable comparison stimulus. In congruent trials the probe and the comparison were 
either both auditory stimuli or both visual of stimuli, whereas in the incongruent trials the probe and comparison 
were presented in different modalities (i.e., either audio-visual or visual-audio). Subjects perform better than the 
model predicts for congruent trials, but the model uses a complex psychometric function to accurately predict that 
subjects perform better on v-a incongruent trials than on a-v incongruent trials. 
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pacemaker pulse rate (e.g. neural dynamics or electrochemical properties) from cognitive effects 
on the gating (e.g., response task, stimulus modality, distribution of attention, working memory 
capacity).   
 “The effective frequency f may vary due to a change of the pacemaker fundamental 
frequency f P (e.g., in  response to organismic, physiological factors), or due to a change of 
the gate through-put g (e.g., attentional, cognitive effects):  f= f P · g   (where g is a real 
number in the range from 0 to 1).”  (Sysoeva et al., 2011: 1) 
 
For example, an ICM must postulate that the pacemaker accelerates pulse train frequency in cases 
of subjective time dilation and decelerates pulse train frequency in cases of subjective time 
compression. Some ICM theorists assume that the brain, and thus the pacemaker, has access to its 
own internal rate of information processing, which usually fires at a constant rate. They suggest 
that under duress, or increased attentional load, the overall information processing accelerates, 
thereby increasing the pulse train frequency of the pacemaker and causing subjective time dilation 
effects.153 These theorists employ this strategy to account for oddball effects, where an oddball 
stimulus is judged to be longer when presented to subjects in a sequence of identical stimuli. 
Accordingly, the appearance of an oddball stimulus after a sequence of identical stimuli increases 
arousal and attention, accelerating the rate of the internal pacemaker, thereby causing the subject 
to judge the duration of the oddball to be longer than the preceding stimuli. Notice, however, that 
this hypothesis postulates a complex interaction of physiological (i.e. arousal, processing rates) 
and cognitive (i.e. attentional load) factors, and thus confounds the effects of the pacemaker and 
gating through-put. This multiplication of auxiliary hypotheses also appears to violate the 
familiarity of principle desideratum for scientific theories. 
                                                 
153
 Cf. Rose & Summers (1995), Ranganath & Rainer (2003), Tse et al. (2004), Ulrich et al. (2006). 
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The second major drawback of dedicated ICMs is that there is no plausible neural 
implementation of the model. This is not for a lack of trying to locate the ICM. Recall that 
dedicated models are typically localized models; ICM researchers often marshal evidence from 
neuroimaging studies (PET and fMRI) to point to some region of the brain to correlate with the 
activities of the dedicated timing mechanism. For example, the cerebellar timing hypothesis posits 
that the cerebellum has the unique representational capacity required for implementing temporal 
processing, and cerebellar networks are accessed whenever precise timing is required.154 
Nevertheless, structurally similar arguments have been made in favor of other neural regions 
uniquely realizing a dedicated timing mechanism, such as the supplementary motor area155 and the 
basal ganglia.156 These conflicting hypotheses and the evidence in favor of all of them, provide 
reason to think the localized models are empirically inadequate, and distributed models are 
preferable.  
A final problem is that whether or not the localization question can be settled, dedicated ICMs 
do not have an accompanying story of how a neural population realizes a pacemaker, gate, 
accumulator, or comparator. That is, ICMs violate the bottom-up constraints imposed by the 
contingent properties of neurophysiology, failing the physical realization level of cognitive 
analysis. Theorists have developed complex algorithmic formalizations in order to fit the ICM to 
the diverse behavioral data, including subjective time dilation and compression. Nevertheless, 
without a plausible way for neural subpopulations to physiologically realize these functions, the 
ICM remains a mathematical model, not an actual model of the target cognitive process, namely 
duration perception in humans. In response to this failure of dedicated models to find an adequate 
                                                 
154 Cf. Ivry et al, (2002), Ivry & Keele (1989), Mangels et al. (1998), Ackermann et al. (1997) 
155 Cf. Coull et al. (2004), Macar et al. (2006) 
156 Cf. Harrington et al. (1998), R.P.N. Rao et al. (2001) 
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neural implementation, many cognitive neuroscientists are developing alternative intrinsic models 
of temporal processing that are largely constrained by neurophysiology at the outset. We should 
note that these bottom-up constraints are evidential, not explanatory. So, failure of realization rules 
a model out on evidential grounds. Successful implementation, however, adds nothing to the 
explanatory contributions of the model, whose target is the various observable effects in temporal 
perception like subjective time dilation and compression. The model itself explains these effects, 
whereas the physical implementation does not. 
Obviously, in this brief section, I have not exhaustively assessed the competing models of 
duration processing, but I have begun the process of scouting the alternatives and flagging potential 
problems. In this manner, the ongoing development and future iterations of content extensionalism 
will be informed by the ongoing research that might provide insight into exactly how multi-scale 
sampling and integration is physically realized by sensory subsystems.   
 
4.8. Concluding Remarks on Future Interdisciplinary Collaborations 
Why should philosophy of mind pay attention to these alternatives? Philosophical analysis of 
time perception is concerned with the temporal structure of experience and our cognitive capacities 
to process and represent temporal properties and relations of events. If we grant physicalism, then 
conscious experiences supervene on physical states of the cognitive system at any given time. So, 
philosophers have a stake in determining what the cognitive system looks like, how it processes 
temporal information, and how to best model that system. Given that there is a live dispute in 
cognitive science as to whether duration processing is best modeled as dedicated neural timing 
mechanisms or whether temporal information is encoded ubiquitously in intrinsic features of state-
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dependent processing, philosophers should examine the available evidence and evaluate the 
candidate models themselves rather than uncritically defer this question to the scientists.157  
This dispute is also of interest to the philosopher because the reliability of our cognitive timing 
processes bears on the question of how we represent order and duration in ways that make possible 
fine temporal discrimination and complex coordinated behaviors; the target phenomena that I 
identify above in §4.6. In addition, philosophical analysis and novel interpretations of the 
experimental findings may also generate new solutions or help rule out the plausibility of a 
particular competing model. Empirically informed philosophers ought to take part in science, 
rather than being mere handmaidens performing the thankless task of conceptual analysis. On the 
view I am pushing, philosophers of science are not merely reading off the ontology from some 
dominant model and offering a semantics for it, rather we ought to be working alongside the 
primary investigators by evaluating the relative merits of incommensurable models and offering 
up testable hypotheses that might rule out contenders. Furthermore, I claim that model choice in 
the domain of temporal cognition imposes constraints on the plausibility of philosophical theories 
of time perception. I suggest that our best strategy for adjudicating the model choice dispute with 
respect to temporal cognition involves seeing how the particular models fit the introspective and 
experimental data, what predictions they entail, and then, on this basis, determine the merits and 
deficiencies of each contender. 
 I am concluding the dissertation with this interdisciplinary upshot for the philosophy of 
cognitive neuroscience, because I believe it highlights fruitful possible avenues for collaborations 
                                                 
157 See Ivery & Schlerf (2008: 273-280) and Wittman (2009: 1955-67) for detailed discussion of the competing 
models, reviews of the relevant experimental paradigms, and outstanding problems for each candidate. In an earlier 
chapter, I directly engage this debate, since Le Poidevin (2007: 109-122) argues that any of the candidate models 
support his epistemological conclusion about the formation of perceptual beliefs about duration, which I challenge 
on other grounds as well. 
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between philosophers and neuroscientists working within the domain of temporal perception. In 
the first half of the chapter, I argued that behavioral neuroimaging research on speech processing 
lends some confirmation to the MSS hypothesis postulated on my version of content 
extensionalism. I welcome the possibility to directly test MSS, and further refine my model. I also 
argue that atomism and its ASC hypothesis are inadequate to explain some of the relevant 
experimental data, but more needs to be done to test the viability of atomistic sampling. If we are 
invested in the broader enterprise of understanding temporal perception and how it is functionally 
realized in the human neural architecture, then we have an intellectual obligation to continually 
seek ways to improve our models and hypotheses.  
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